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Abstract 
Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, 
including “the passions and other emotions resembling them.” These two terms for affective 
mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often 
treated by the scholarship as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and 
‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his 
work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former 
are the transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute 
their felt nature and their impulse. The latter are the particular passions fully realized, with 
characteristic valence, and analyzed by Hume in terms of their particular belief structures and 
various relations between ideas and impressions understood to be constituent of the particular 
passions being characterized. The term ‘emotion’ for Hume generally denotes either the 
attending feeling and impulse, sometimes distinct from the passion (particularly as ‘passion’ 
is being used to include the associated beliefs, causes and objects), or as a synonym for a 
particular passion, typically when Hume is primarily referring to the felt nature of the 
passion. Generally speaking, ‘passion’ is a more cognitive category of affective mental state, 
while ‘emotion’ is more sensationalist. Part One takes an in-depth look at the textual 
evidence in the Treatise to develop this characterization of ‘emotion.’ Part Two offers an 
examination of ‘passion’ in Hume, through a look at the debate between sensationalist and 
cognitivist readings of Hume’s theory of the passions, and associated tensions often 
attributed to Hume. I will argue that when we grant Hume the conceptual emotion/passion 
distinction, he has the tools to accommodate both highly sensationalist and highly cognitivist 
understandings of affective mental states. I finish Part Two with the application of my 
distinction to two more key topics in Hume studies: his sympathy mechanism, and his theory 
of belief and motivation. I argue that interpretive puzzles in both benefit from the application 
of my emotion/passion distinction.   
Keywords 
David Hume, passion, emotion, history of theories of emotion, sensationalist theories of 
emotion, cognitivist theories of emotion, feeling
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Introduction 
 
Hume opens Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature1 by reminding the reader of his 
division of the contents of the mind into ideas and impressions. Impressions are then 
further divided into original impressions (impressions of sensation) and secondary 
impressions or impressions of reflection. Secondary impressions include, “the passions 
and other emotions resembling them.”2 These two terms for affective mental states, 
‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used with frequency in Hume’s work, though passion is 
clearly the dominant term. The scholarship on Hume frequently treats them as denoting 
the same type of mental state. To be more specific, passions are understood to be Hume’s 
technical term for affective, motivating mental events, while the term ‘emotion’ is used 
either synonymously, or as a way of describing particular passions or characteristics of 
passions—an ‘emotional’ passion is one associated with a particular mental disturbance 
or movement. But neither reading seems to reflect Hume’s characterization of the 
secondary impressions (as quoted above) with enough subtlety. The category of 
secondary impressions does indeed encompass all of the passions, but it also includes the 
“other emotions resembling them.” Taken at face value, this appears to suggest that the 
passions alone do not exhaust the category of secondary impressions.  Rather, the 
suggestion appears to be that passions are emotions, but not all emotions are passions, 
and there are certain passion-like emotions that are also to be understood as secondary 
impressions.  
                                                 
1Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), (Oxford: Claredon Press) 1978. 
2 THN, 2.1.1.1; italics added. 
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The appearance of the term ‘emotion’ in Hume’s characterization of secondary 
impressions is one of many in Hume’s Treatise that seem to mean it to reference 
something beyond, or at least not identical to, what is referenced by the term ‘passions.’ 
Hume’s discussion of secondary impressions throughout Book II focuses largely on the 
examination of particular passions and types of passions. Yet the term ‘emotion’ is used 
with frequency there, as well as in the other two books of the Treatise. The question is, 
what did Hume intend by introducing this additional term? What are the passion-
resembling other emotions?  
In this dissertation I will argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his 
discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between 
what I will label “attending emotions” and “fully established passions.” The former are 
the transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute 
their felt nature and their impulse. The latter are the particular passions fully realized, 
with characteristic valence, and analyzed by Hume in terms of their particular belief 
structures and various relations between ideas and impressions understood to be 
constituent of the particular passions being characterized. The distinction between these 
two kinds of mental events in Hume’s conceptual framework provides a way for us to 
attribute to Hume two different senses or uses of the term ‘passion’: in one case ‘passion’ 
refers broadly to the felt experience of our particular passions, i.e., as identical to the 
emotion that Hume argues is the essence of the passion, and , in the other case, ‘passion’ 
refers to the entire experience of particular passions, including not only the characteristic 
valenced feeling, but also associations of impressions and ideas, and, importantly, a 
particular belief structure. The term ‘emotion’ for Hume generally either denotes the 
attending feeling and impulse, sometimes distinct from the passion (particularly as 
‘passion’ is being used in the second sense), or is used as a synonym for the particular 
passion in question (typically when Hume is using passion in the first sense). 
  
The various discussions of my dissertation will all be occasioned by the intent to answer 
the question, “What is the role of ‘emotion’ in the Humean picture of the mind?” But the 
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interest I believe to be found in these discussions is by no means limited to the interest 
found in the answer to that question. Seeking to determine how we can best understand 
the role Hume intends emotions to play in human mental life will inform a clearer 
understanding of Hume’s work on the impressions of reflection generally, what we might 
in contemporary discussions refer to as Hume’s theory of emotion. An understanding of 
his work in this regard, which is found primarily, though not exclusively, in Book II of 
the Treatise, has bearing on his account of motivation, and the notorious relationship 
between passions and reason that he suggests obtains. This in turn is an essential part of 
the foundation of his moral philosophy, something beyond the scope of this project, but 
clearly essential to understanding Hume. Indeed, the potential scope of application of a 
new interpretation of Hume’s thought surrounding his ‘impressions of reflection’ could 
be seen to have an impact on most of Hume’s broader thought. Feeling plays a pivotal 
role in all aspects of Hume’s philosophy. Therefore, a better understanding of his use of 
affective language, and the details of his theory of mind as it pertains to feeling has the 
potential to influence all areas in Hume studies. 
Beyond the implications of this project for Hume scholarship, I take it that the project has 
potential application in contemporary discussions in philosophy of emotion as well. This 
is a topic I will take up again in the last section of this work, where I will consider 
potential directions for further work arising from this topic. But here is a brief idea of the 
motivation as it pertains to contemporary scholarship. One way to understand my 
intentions in characterizing the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise is as an attempt to 
answer the question of whether ‘emotion’ in Hume can be understood to refer to a 
particular kind of distinctive mental event or, put another way, if Hume had something 
like a category of emotion in mind when he introduced the term to his discussion.  
One of the reasons for asking such a question is to determine whether Hume is suggesting 
that among the kinds of things we need to posit in a theory of the mind, we not only need 
to be able to talk about the particular passions and their role, but also about emotions 
generally and their role. To find a category of emotion in Hume would suggest that on his 
analysis we need to be able to talk about both passions and emotions in order to have a 
sufficiently rich conceptual framework within which to discuss the workings of the mind. 
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This is a point of some significance when we look forward to some of the current work 
being done within philosophy of emotions. Both Louis Charland3 and Thomas Dixon4 
have suggested that current discourse has lost some important richness in trying to make 
the single term ‘emotion’ do all the work in characterizing our affective mental 
experience.  Dixon has argued that discussions of affective mental states prior to the 
emergence of the category ‘emotion’ involved numerous, variously defined terms (such 
as sentiments, affections, passions). By contrast, inclusion of all such mental states under 
the umbrella term ‘emotion’ encourages sweeping generalizations and a lack of subtlety 
and diversity in the claims made about the nature of emotion. This is to be lamented, 
according to Dixon. Charland has argued that ‘passion’ in particular is a useful additional 
category that perhaps needs to be reintroduced to the discourse. I am ultimately 
suggesting that Hume, by his introduction of the new term5 ‘emotion’ into the discourse 
on the passions of his time, is implicitly pushing a similar line; that is, he is seeing a need 
for an additional category of affective mental state in order to explain our mental life. 
Insofar as we can indeed posit something like a category of emotion in Hume, we obtain 
tools for further consideration of possible ways to break down the broad grouping of 
affective mental states, and put some subtly and richness back into the discourse on the 
passions.  
Another reason to question whether Hume had a distinct category of emotion in mind as 
he introduced the term in the Treatise, is that contemporary discussions of the category of 
‘emotion’ question whether it is a category that makes sense at all. Current debates 
question whether upon examination we find anything that can unite in a single category 
                                                 
3 Charland, L. (forthcoming). Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from History of Psychopathology. The 
Oxford Companion to the Philosophy of Emotion. P. Goldie. 
4 Dixon, T. (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. 
Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
5 Dixon (2003) in particular has argued that the term ‘emotion’ used in a sustained way in the more modern 
sense is found first in Hume.  
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all that we are inclined to denote with this term.6 I would like to suggest that Hume’s 
introduction of the term ‘emotion,’ along with the characterization of ‘emotion’ that can 
be pieced together from his use of the term, paved the way for our contemporary category 
of emotion. Understanding how Hume used the term could usefully inform debates about 
the natural kind status of emotion and emotions, and in particular their intellectual history 
and inheritance. This then, provides another contemporary motivation for the current 
study. 
But why, one might ask, focus on ‘emotion’ in particular? To someone entering from the 
contemporary debate this may seem an obvious choice, given the prominence and 
importance of the term in current discourse on mind, whether in the context of 
philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, neurology, moral philosophy, etc. But to 
those familiar with the discourse of Hume’s time the focus may seem a bit 
anachronistically derived. That is to say, the project appears to favor ‘emotion’ over other 
terms often used apparently synonymously with ‘passion.’ Hume, as well as his 
contemporaries, supplemented the use of ‘passion’ with several other terms in discourse 
that touched on affectivity, including ‘affections,’ ‘sentiments,’ ‘appetites,’ ‘feelings,’ 
and ‘desires.’ In Hume’s case in particular, these terms are in addition to the various 
named particular passions (love, hate, pride, humility, desire, aversion, grief, joy, anger, 
benevolence, etc), as well as his multiple references to ‘vivacity,’ ‘force,’ ‘impulse,’ and 
‘liveliness,’ all terms denoting various kinds of felt states of mind. The question of 
                                                 
6 Scholars like Paul Griffiths have suggested that there really is no single category or natural kind of 
‘emotion’ (Griffiths, P. E. (1997), What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press), arguing instead that we think of select individual emotions as 
representing natural kinds of basic emotions. By contrast, Louis Charland argues for the possibility of 
‘emotion’ as a whole as a natural kind [Charland, Louis (2002). “The Natural Kind Status of Emotion”. 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53:511-537]. Following Griffiths, Charland suggests that a 
natural kind be understood as a category in which properties are correlated, not necessarily by resemblance 
with each other, but rather by homology, which is focused more on history and origin of the objects. Mental 
states that would fall under the term ‘emotion’ would be identified by things such as their evolutionary 
story, as we come to understand how beings that are ‘emoters’ successfully navigate in the world. 
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whether, or in what way, these terms should be understood as related to or distinct from 
the dominant term ‘passion’ may appear to be just as important as the question as it 
pertains to ‘emotion’. Why should this study focus on this particular apparent synonym?  
The reason for this focus I believe can be found in the exploration of the way this 
particular term was used to introduce new dimensions into the discourse on affective 
mental states.7 While Descartes had presented a picture of the passions that moved them 
beyond being merely passive, Hume constructed a philosophy of mind where the 
passionate mind was not only moved primarily by the passions, he wanted to show that 
reason alone, as he took it to have been conceived in the rationalist tradition, was 
impotent to provide impulse. The somewhat mechanical account of our movements of 
mind through association was paired with an account of the force and impulse of 
affectivity, to create an account of belief and motivation. The passions, conceived as 
particular affective states, with characteristic causes, objects and valence, could not alone 
do the work Hume required to explain the shifting, changing nature of the feeling-driven 
mind. Therefore his category of reflections of impressions had to include not only these 
particular passions, but also the “other emotions resembling them.” Hence the focus of 
this project on this particular term, and the additional kind of affective mental state it 
seems to denote, as playing a key role in Hume’s philosophy of mind.    
                                                 
7 This is not to say that the other terms mentioned aren’t used in a way that adds dimensions to Hume’s 
theory of mind that would not be present with only a concept of passion. Sentiment in particular appears to 
play a particular role in his moral psychology, as well as that of some of his contemporaries. My intention 
here, however, is to provide the justification for the focus on ‘emotion’ out of all potential candidates; and 
this justification, it turns out, has less to do with his moral philosophy, and more to do with his overall 
picture of the workings of the mind. This difference between ‘emotion’ and ‘sentiment’ can be seen in the 
relative frequency with which each show up in each Book of the Treatise. While sentiment appears not 
infrequently in Books I and II, it is used regularly in Book III. On the other hand, emotion appears often 
enough in Book I, quite frequently in Book II, and then is hardly used at all in Book III. ‘Emotion’ is 
clearly a term important to Hume in explaining the workings of the mind, while ‘sentiment’ figures 
strongly into his explanations of moral psychology in particular.  
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With this general picture of the motivation for the project in mind (and some suggestion 
of how the findings of this study might be developed and more broadly applied), I will 
give a brief outline of what I will discuss in each of the two parts that make up this 
dissertation. Part One, “The appearance of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise,” will provide a 
detailed textual analysis of Hume’s use of the term ‘emotion’ in that work. I will begin by 
considering Hume’s stated taxonomy of the contents of the mind, and in particular the 
taxonomy he offers of his ‘impressions of reflection’ (1.2). I will then look at some 
textual evidence for the claim that Hume applies the term ‘emotion’ more broadly than he 
does the term ‘passion,’ at times making it appear synonymous to impression of 
reflection generally (1.3). This discussion will lead into a consideration of emotions in 
Hume as essentially felt in character, and touch on the relationship between these feelings 
and their (possible) physiological underpinnings, a topic Hume has little to say about, but 
is necessary to address if only to distinguish the identity of the emotions Hume is 
referring to as more concerned with feeling than physical events (1.4). I will then look at 
the nature of these feelings, which I will argue always have a particular hedonic tone, or 
valence—put another way, I will look at text that shows emotions to be either pleasant or 
painful (uneasy) in nature (1.5). The role of valenced emotion will then be explored as a 
part of the production of particular passions (1.6) and then as the key principle in 
motivation (1.7). One of the sections of the Treatise where ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ 
appear most clearly distinct is in Hume’s account of the calm and violent passions at 
2.3.4. I will therefore take some time to work out what is meant by ‘calm’ and ‘violent’ in 
Hume, and how these relate to emotions and their strength/weakness (1.8). Another 
treatment of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise that appears to distinguish it from ‘passion’ occurs 
in Hume’s maxim introduced in the discussions of 2.2.8 that all perceptions are attended 
with some emotion. The ‘attending’ nature of emotions will therefore be explored as a 
key aspect of their character and role in Hume’s philosophy of mind (1.9). The 
discussions of Part One will culminate in a treatment of the transient, fluid and mixable 
nature of emotion (1.10), where I will argue for a strong conceptual distinction between 
emotions and passions in Hume based on the role emotions play in the changeableness of 
the feeling mind.       
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The analysis of Part One will guide the reader not only through the particular passages 
where ‘emotion’ is used, but also through the details of the types of discussions in which 
this term plays a reoccurring role. Based on the characterization of ‘emotion’ that arises 
in Part One, I ultimately wish to argue for a distinction between Hume’s use of the terms 
‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ along the following lines. When Hume speaks of the emotions he 
is consistently referring to movements of the mind that have both affective content and 
are capable of motivating (at times indirectly) by virtue of the ‘impulse’ they provide. 
They are distinguished from the passions by their fluid, transient nature. While particular 
passions have characteristic hedonic tone or valence, and occur as part of particularly 
determined causal chains that Hume takes great pains to elaborate on through much of 
Book II, emotions are valenced feelings that can flow between impressions and ideas, 
their feeling changing to match the dominant impression of reflection they come to 
contribute to.  
This distinction between types of mental events I argue can be attributed to Hume’s 
conceptual framework in his theory of the impressions of reflection. I do not want to 
argue that this distinction is clearly to be found in his explicit taxonomy of mental events 
(which is itself not always clear anyway—something I comment on in the discussion of 
1.2 in this work). I even hesitate to make the case that this distinction is reflected in his 
use of the terms in a clearly consistent way. Though I take there to be strong textual 
evidence supporting the reality of a distinction between these as general concepts in 
Hume, which is naturally strongly reflected in particular usage taken as a whole, Hume’s 
looseness in his use of these (one would assume) technical terms means that a stronger 
reading of the distinction in Hume cannot be supported.8 Therefore, along with the claim 
about the basic conceptual distinction implicit in his theory, I will also suggest that 
                                                 
8 This loose use of language is of course not without precedence in Hume—see, for example, his own 
comments on his use of the technical term ‘imagination’ at 1.3.9.19n1. The difference between these two 
cases is that in the case of imagination Hume explicitly recognizes that he is inclined to use the term in 
multiple ways, and gives the reader some guidelines in determining his meaning from context. In the case 
of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ he offers no such clarification.  
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Hume’s use of terms in relation to each other can be understood in the following two 
ways. Passions as understood as ‘original existences’ are a kind of emotion (i.e., passions 
considered as whole and without representative content are emotions, but do not exhaust 
the category of emotions). Passions as understood as involving what Hume calls their 
‘attending circumstances,’ i.e., their causes and objects (which appear to have beliefs and 
particular associations of ideas and impressions as partly constitutive of them) are not 
identical to the emotions, but are necessarily ‘attended’ by them.  
Part Two of the dissertation will begin with a small step away from the text in order to 
consider some of the secondary literature that has considered the potential distinction 
between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in Hume (2.1). While that particular distinction has 
received little treatment (and that which has been done has been brief), the 
characterization of the passions and what we would currently identify as Hume’s general 
theory of emotion, have received ample treatment, especially in recent decades. Therefore 
I will turn to give a brief survey of some of the scholarship on Hume’s theory of the 
passions (2.2). I will focus this discussion primarily around the question of whether 
Hume’s theory of the passions reveals him to be a cognitivist or a sensationalist with 
regard to his theory of emotion9. There are aspects of his theory that appear to fall into 
both camps, and the suggestion has been made by some that Hume clearly intended his 
theory to be read in one way or the other, while still other commentators have suggested 
                                                 
9 The language I am using here may be slightly confusing. In contemporary discourse the discussions centre 
around theories of emotion, not of passion. Therefore, though Hume focused on passions as the dominant 
term for affective mental states, when we shift gears into a contemporary analysis of him as a theorist of 
affectivity, the scholarship tends to refer to his ‘theory of emotion.’ This is not a particular source of 
confusion in most discussions, as the two terms are generally used interchangeably, with one merely 
seeming more antiquated than the other. However, in a discussion such as mine where a distinction 
between the terms in their older use is being sought this may cause some confusion. I have nevertheless 
chosen to refer to Hume’s ‘theory of emotion’ at times when I am considering his thought in the context of 
contemporary analysis, as is in keeping with the discussions I am engaging in and referring to. I am 
obviously not intending to bring the distinction I have argued is found within Hume to the use of these 
terms in debates outside of discussion specifically on that interpretive problem in Hume studies.    
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that Hume was confused in trying to have it both ways. I will acknowledge that there 
appears to be a tension in Hume’s thought in this regard. In an effort to explore it more 
thoroughly, I will look at the case for Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion (2.2), as 
well as the case for Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion (2.3).  I will then offer a 
brief analysis of how this apparent tension in Hume’s thought might be answered by the 
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for in Part One. I intend to show that though 
there is indeed some attempt by Hume to ‘have his cake and eat it too’ in the way he 
draws on both the cognitive and sensitive aspects of the passions, he is not guilty of as 
problematic a tension as may first appear, once the cognitive and sensitive aspects of his 
theory are pried apart with the positing of a conceptual distinction between passions and 
emotions, respectively.  
I will finish this work by offering two brief considerations of how this distinction may be 
usefully applied to interpretive issues in other central themes in Hume studies. I will first 
present a case for how my proposed understanding of the distinction between emotion 
and passion might inform interpretations of Hume’s characterization of belief and its role 
in motivation (2.6). I will then consider an interpretive problem in the application of his 
principle of sympathy, which I believe can be answered with the distinction between 
emotion and passion (2.7). In the conclusion, I will present some suggestions of further 
directions this work may take, both in the realm of history of philosophy and Hume 
scholarship, as well as potential impact on contemporary debates surrounding the 
philosophy of emotion.  
With this outline in mind, it is time to move into the detailed analysis of the uses of 
‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise in Part One.  
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Part One: The appearance of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s 
Treatise 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
I will begin my investigation with a thorough look at the occurrences of the term 
‘emotion’ in Hume’s Treatise. My intention is to offer, first, ample examples of his usage 
of the term for the reader’s own consideration, and second, a preliminary analysis of his 
usage, which will be reconsidered and ultimately added to as my analysis progresses 
through Part One of the project. At the end of Part One, I will provide a summary of what 
I take to be the findings of this examination. This will include both highlighting the types 
of discussions Hume predominantly uses the term in, and suggesting claims we might 
make about Hume’s characterization of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise. Some of these claims I 
will take to be clearly established, some, at this point, merely probable conclusions, and 
some important questions that I take to require considerable additional analysis before 
they can be answered.  
But before moving on to this initial textual analysis, it may be useful to make a general 
comment on Hume’s use of the rhetorical device of synonymy in his writing style, as 
pointed out by Norton and Norton in their edition of A Treatise. In his writing Hume 
frequently used a literary device “in which synonyms or synonymous phrases were 
conjoined.”10 That is to say, he often uses a variety of terms or phrases all intended to 
designate one idea or concept, particularly in the context of a single discussion. This may 
                                                 
10 Norton and Norton (2007), 570. 
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be counter-intuitive as a way of doing philosophy if one’s concern is careful use of 
technical terms. The purpose of listing synonyms, for writers of Hume’s day, would be 
either to “amplify meaning,” or to avoid repetition of the same word when a particular 
concept is under discussion. Norton and Norton suggest as an example of the first 
purpose Hume’s treatment of ‘force’ in his theory of ideas, which is frequently 
supplemented with terms like ‘vivacity’, ‘liveliness’, ‘firmness’, etc. And as an example 
in Hume of the second purpose, they suggest his frequent replacement of ‘imagination’ 
with ‘fancy’.11  
Given my aim of offering a characterization of ‘emotion’ in Hume, this point about his 
writing style has obvious potential implications. Particularly insofar as I am seeking to 
give ‘emotion’ a characterization distinct from other terms for affective mental states that 
Hume uses, such as ‘affection,’ ‘sentiment,’ and, (most commonly), ‘passion.’ Hume not 
infrequently lists more than one of these terms together, and even at times appears to 
replace one with another mid-discussion. One might argue, therefore, that instances in 
which Hume offers  different terms for affective mental states (such as passions, 
emotions, affections, etc) in conjunction with each other is weak evidence, or perhaps 
non-evidence, of any real conceptual distinction. Similarly, one might point to his fluidity 
between the terms in certain discussions as evidence that they really are synonymous for 
Hume. But I would argue that ‘emotion’ is not simply introduced in the Treatise as part 
of a device to amplify meaning, or avoid repetition.  Rather, I would suggest that the 
observation of his writing style from Norton and Norton puts more emphasis on the need 
to pay close attention to the contexts in which the term ‘emotion’ is used, and in 
particular, to those contexts in which it appears the dominant, or even sole designation for 
the concept at issue. There may indeed be places where it is hard to say whether using 
                                                 
11 Ibid. Norton and Norton provide a lovely quote from Hugh Blair on the method of using a variety of 
synonyms in writing: synonyms “are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer can 
employ them to great advantage, by using them so as to heighten and to finish the picture which he gives 
us. He supplies by one, what was wanting in the other, to the force, or to the luster of the image he means to 
exhibit.”  
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‘affection’ instead of ‘emotion,’ or ‘emotion’ instead of ‘passion’ would have made a 
huge difference to Hume’s meaning. But there are multiple ways to explain such 
instances. It may be that in the context in question the overlapping reference of the terms 
under consideration makes any of them appropriate. In other cases, we may find that one 
term indicates a broader category to which the second term belongs. It may also, indeed, 
be an instance of a writing style in which synonyms are used to amplify meaning or avoid 
repetition.  
It is worth noting what Hume himself has to say about his tendency to use the same 
technical terms in different ways dependent on the context in his footnote to 1.3.9.19, 
which is on his use of ‘imagination.’ He begins explaining it in part by referencing the 
more common ways of talking about his subjects, and claims that at times he finds 
himself “oblig’d to fall into” this way of speaking. Though he comments that “nothing be 
more contrary to true philosophy than this inaccuracy,” he nevertheless offers his readers 
his varied use of the term ‘imagination,’ with the following explanation to guide them in 
understanding each particular usage:  
When I oppose [imagination] to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we 
form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, 
excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. When I oppose it to 
neither, ‘tis indifferent whether it be taken in the larger or more limited sense, or 
at least the context will explain the meaning.12  
A few things are worth nothing. First, the concept attached to ‘imagination’ is narrower 
in some contexts, more general in others. The way to tell the difference between different 
uses will be to note whether it is being ‘opposed’ or contrasted with some category (in 
this case, reason) which will otherwise be considered included in the more general 
category (in this case, imagination). Second, Hume acknowledges that there will be 
instances in which it doesn’t really matter whether we take him to mean the more general 
                                                 
12 THN 1.3.9.19n1  
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or more narrow sense of the term. Third, and most importantly for the careful reader, 
Hume tells us that context will point us to the meaning of the term.  
This last is perhaps the most important point for the purposes of this investigation. Hume 
himself appears to say here that the best way to understand his particular uses of terms 
with varied signification will be in the particular context of the usages of such terms. In 
what follows I will mostly steer away from explanations that rely on assumptions about 
Hume’s literary use of synonyms. To lend support to my readings, I have carefully 
grouped instances of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise  according to conceptual context and 
function, with an eye to drawing conclusions that do not rely in any case on one quote 
taken in isolation, but always on a collection of supporting uses and discussions. 
Ultimately one of the things I do wish to suggest in Part One of this work is that when we 
look at all the uses of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise together, a picture emerges of a general 
characterization of emotion in Hume, a characterization that I wish to develop in further 
discussion to the end of showing it to be a useful designation for affective mental states 
that has an importantly distinct meaning for Hume from the more dominant term, 
‘passion.’ 
 
1.2 The taxonomy of the Humean mind 
 
A useful starting place for this investigation is Hume’s explicit identification of emotions 
as having a place in his taxonomy of the contents of the mind. Unlike certain other terms 
for affective mental states that Hume uses, such as affection and sentiment, emotion is 
consistently listed along with passion (and sometimes desire and aversion) as part of what 
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constitutes the category of impressions of reflection.13 A reminder of Hume’s general 
taxonomy of mind may be helpful at this point.  
The perceptions of the mind are divided into ideas and impressions, which Hume tells us 
map on to our mental experiences of thinking and feeling respectively. All ideas are 
copies of impressions, and are described as “the faint images of things in thinking and 
reasoning,” while our impressions are those perceptions which “enter with most force and 
violence” into our consciousness (1.1.1.1). Both ideas and impressions may be simple 
(“admit of no distinction or separation”) or complex (“may be distinguish’d into parts”), 
with the complex being themselves composed of the simple (1.1.1.2). The category of 
impressions is subdivided into impressions of sensation (or original impressions) and 
impressions of reflection (or secondary impressions). Impressions of sensation “are such 
as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, 
from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs” 
(2.1.1.1). These are impressions that come by way of our senses. The investigation of 
such bodily sensations Hume takes to be the work of anatomists and naturalists. As such 
he excuses himself from saying anything about them or their causes.14 Secondary 
impressions, or impressions of reflection, come to the mind as ‘reflections’ of our 
original impressions, or of our ideas derived from them.  Given their status as 
impressions, it is worth remembering that this is a feeling kind of reflection, not thinking. 
                                                 
13 See 1.1.1.1, 1.1.2.1, 1.1.6.1, 1.2.3.3, and 2.1.1.1. These are all the instances in the Treatise in which 
Hume explicitly lists what he intends by ‘impressions of reflection.’ 
14 It might be noted that despite Hume’s statement that discussions of the anatomical beginnings of our 
impressions would “lead [him] to far from [his] present subject” (2.1.1.1) and he will therefore leave such 
discussions out of his analysis of human nature, there are certainly moments where his psychological 
explanations dip into language and explanatory principles more properly considered part of a physiological 
approach (see for example 2.3.5.2, where Hume explains the effect of custom on the passions in terms of 
the ease of spirits moving, presumably through the body and brain). In doing this he tends to be following 
the general approach to the physiology of sensation as he likely was familiar with it in writers such as 
Descartes and Malebranche. 
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As impressions are not ideas, we should not understand these ‘reflections’ to be copies of 
anything.15 
So what part of our experience does Hume think makes up this category of impressions 
of reflection?  Impressions, he tells us at the very beginning of Book I, are “all our 
sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul” 
(1.1.1.1). Sensations are then identified as our original impressions, providing felt 
experiences of our organs and senses, including their pains and pleasures. Reflection on 
these sensations and on the ideas we form as copies of these sensations, in turn gives rise 
to new kinds of impressions, “impressions of reflection, viz. passions, desires, and 
emotions” (1.1.2.1). Desire, and its opposite, aversion, are added to the list of impressions 
of reflection at 1.1.2.1, and 1.2.3.3. In all cases, Hume lists both passions and emotions as 
constitutive of his category of impressions of reflection (see 1.1.1.1, 1.1.6.1, and 2.1.1.1).  
Though Hume puts faith in his readers’ ability to “perceive the difference between 
feeling and thinking” (1.1.1.1) in understanding his ideas/impressions division, and 
likewise appears to take the distinction between bodily feeling and those feelings that 
arise from our ideas and impressions of bodily feeling to be clear, he offers more detailed 
explanation of his suggested taxonomy internal to impressions of reflection. This 
treatment, however, and the distinctions it presents are not always clear. At 2.1.1.3 Hume 
makes what appears to be an initial division of impressions of reflection into the 
categories of calm and violent. He says the calm are “the sense of beauty and deformity 
in action, composition and external objects,” while the violent are, “the passions of love 
and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.” But this division is “far from being exact.” 
Reflective impressions arising from observations of beauty in poetry, for example, can be 
experienced as violent ‘raptures,’ while certain mental states we would generally 
recognize as passions (love, hate, grief, joy, etc) may be experienced calmly, “decay[ing] 
into so soft an emotion as to be, in a manner, imperceptible.” The calm/violent 
distinction, Hume goes on to say, is one commonly made, but in fact is a “vulgar and 
                                                 
15 See 2.3.3.5. 
  
17 
 
specious division” that he makes here merely to “proceed with greater order” in his 
analysis. The help this division offers the readers, the ‘greater order’ it is meant to 
provide, is apparently in pointing them to the main focus of Book II, the passions, which 
Hume identifies as the (generally) more violent impressions of reflection. Hume then 
offers his division of the passions themselves into the direct and indirect, a distinction I 
will explore in later discussions of the passions in this project.  
For now, I think it is worth considering some of the attempts that have been made to 
reconstruct the basic taxonomy of impressions of reflection that Hume has offered here. 
The exact flow of the taxonomy is not clear from an isolated reading of 2.1.1, as I think 
becomes evident when we consider some of the attempts that have been made by 
commentators to represent the organization. James Fieser, in his article, “Hume’s 
Classification of the Passions and its Precursors,”16 offers analysis of several authors’ 
attempts at constructing a Humean taxonomy of the reflective impressions, as well as 
offering a construction of his own. Fieser’s article highlights what I take to be the 
primary difficulty in organizing an outline of Hume’s impressions of reflection: figuring 
out how best to incorporate both Hume’s calm/violent distinction and his direct/indirect 
distinction into a single taxonomy that flows from the general category of impressions of 
reflection, down to the appropriately categorized individual passions. To recap, Hume’s 
own discussion gives us the following information: 
1) Impressions of reflection are “the passions, and other emotions resembling 
them.” (2.1.1.1) 
2) Impressions of reflection may be divided into two kinds: calm and violent. 
3)  The calm are “the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and 
external objects;” the violent are “the passions of love and hatred, grief and 
joy, pride and humility.” (2.1.1.3) 
                                                 
16 Fieser, J. (1992). "Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors." Hume Studies 18(1): 1-17. 
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4) The calm/violent distinction is not exact—generally calm impressions of 
reflection may be experienced violently and vice-versa.  
5) Hume’s aim is to use this distinction to identify the topic of his current book: 
“those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.” 
(2.1.1.3) 
6) The passions can be divided into the direct (“desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, 
fear, despair and security”) and the indirect (“pride, humility, ambition, 
vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity and their dependents”). 
(2.1.1.4) 
The main difficulty should be evident. The calm/violent distinction is acknowledged as 
inexact, particular passions (never mind other kinds of impressions of reflection, if there 
are any) may fall into either category.  
Fieser also sees the need to accommodate a distinction, found outside of Treatise 2.1.1, 
between instinctive and acquired passions. While the latter type of passion arises from 
ideas and impressions of pain and pleasure in varied contexts, the former are part of 
original human nature, hence their identification with a kind of instinct.17 Examples 
Hume gives of our ‘original instincts’ include benevolence and resentment, love of life, 
kindness to children, punishment to our enemies, happiness to our friends, and a general 
appetite to good or general aversion to evil.18 Some commentators have identified those 
                                                 
17 This is a distinction that will receive more attention in later discussions of this project. 
18 THN 2.3.3.8 and 2.3.9.8. Hume also mentions, at 2.3.9.8, certain bodily appetites as falling into this 
category, such as hunger and lust. This is a bit confusing, as at 1.1.2.1 Hume identifies hunger as an 
impression of sensation, and at 2.1.5.6 both hunger and lust are identified as sensations. He does, however, 
identify lust as a passion again at 3.2.2.5, though he consistently calls it an appetite in this section as well. It 
is not clear if this is an oversight on Hume’s part, or if there is a distinction being made between mere 
sensations of bodily appetites, and more realized experiences of these sensations of appetites, that involve 
reflection in a way that makes them more akin to passions. Perhaps, for instance, when I am working on a 
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passions original to us as ‘primary impressions,’ and those acquired upon perceptions of 
pain and pleasure as ‘secondary impressions,’19 and therefore have placed this distinction 
somewhere in their reconstructions of Hume’s taxonomy of the impressions of reflection, 
a move Fieser takes to be appropriate. With this in mind, I will turn to a quick look at 
some of the suggested taxonomies. 
Kemp Smith, like Fieser, uses the primary/secondary impression of reflection distinction 
in his outline.20 He suggests that impressions of reflection can first be divided into 
primary and secondary, with the primary not divided further, but the secondary 
subdivided into indirect and direct. The direct, then are subdivided into calm and violent. 
Kemp Smith’s outline, Fieser points out, comes up short, since Hume makes it clear that 
indirect passions can be experienced as violent (as well as calm, one might assume; 
2.1.1.3). Pal Ardal offers some improvement in his suggested organization21: impressions 
of reflection divide into primary and secondary, with the primary subdivided into calm 
and violent, the secondary into indirect and direct, and finally each of these in turn 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
philosophy paper and my stomach growls this feeling is merely an impression of sensation, not at all being 
a reflection of any current ideas or impressions. If, on the other hand, I see my colleague eating a piece of 
chocolate cake and begin to desire one myself, my hunger may be considered something more like a 
passion, as it is a reflection of current impressions and ideas. Similar scenarios could certainly be 
constructed for the example of lust. Appetites may in this way straddle the impressions of 
sensation/impressions of reflection divide for Hume. But this is only a suggestion—more work would 
certainly be needed to prove such a claim.   
19 Fieser notes Norman Kemp Smith (1941), Pall S. Ardal (1966) and Philip Mercer (1972) as all having 
made this distinction in these terms. Note that the language is slightly confusing. Hume uses ‘original’ and 
‘secondary’ impressions at 2.1.1.1 to refer to impression of sensation and impressions of reflection 
respectively. This is of course not the use intended when commentators sub-divide the category of 
impressions of reflection into primary and secondary. 
20 Kemp Smith (1941), 168. 
21 Ardal (1966), 10.  
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divided into calm and violent as well. This purposed taxonomy has the advantage of 
nicely reflecting Hume’s implied claim that any impression of reflection may be 
experienced calmly or violently. Philip Mercer, among others, has accepted this outline in 
his work.22 Fieser argues, however, that this outline fails to properly accommodate the 
division of particular passions into the categories of generally calm and generally 
violent, a division that, he points out, is supported by historical precedents. 
Fieser’s own outline involves adopting a token/type distinction when approaching the 
classes of calm and violent passions. Types of passions are generally calm or violent, 
though individual tokens may be expressed either way. Thus, Fieser argues, “membership 
[in the classes] will remain constant despite any variantly experienced tokens.”23 His 
taxonomy, therefore, flows as follows: impressions of reflection are divided first into the 
(generally) calm and (generally) violent. The generally calm include only certain kinds of 
pleasure and pains that may qualify as impressions of reflection (such as the “sense of 
beauty and deformity”—Fiesser identifies these generally with “aesthetic emotions and 
value judgments”24). The violent are subdivided into the direct and indirect passions. The 
primary/secondary distinction is then made only within the class of direct passions, as 
none of the primary impressions of reflection that are mentioned are indirect passions, 
nor, in fact, does it seem possible for that to be the case, given the more complex and 
often socially informed structure of the indirect passions.25      
                                                 
22 Mercer (1972), 22-23. 
23 Fieser (1992), 7.  
24 Fieser (1992), 11. 
25 Again, a fuller treatment of the direct/indirect passion distinction in Hume will be considered later in this 
work. For an interesting discussion of the layered contexts of association tied to the indirect passions, and 
their relation to the direct, see Jane McIntyre’s “Hume’s Passions: Direct and Indirect” [Hume Studies, 26 
(2000), 77-86]. 
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Fieser’s article offers an interesting historical background to some of the categories 
Hume uses, suggesting the need to read Hume’s work on the passions as informed by the 
Stoic tradition and Hutcheson’s calm/violent class distinction in particular.26 The 
taxonomy he develops has the strength of being historically informed and shaped. But I 
am not convinced of it. Despite the common and historic class division of passions into 
calm and violent (which Hume would no doubt have been very aware of), I think Fieser 
is wrong to insist on incorporating this class distinction into Hume’s taxonomy of the 
impressions of reflection. Hume emphasizes that he takes this to be a ‘vulgar’ distinction, 
and this is something he never says about his division of perceptions into ideas and 
impressions, nor of impressions into sensations and impressions of reflection, nor of 
passions into direct and indirect. What he does say when he introduces the distinction 
between calm and violent impressions of reflection at 2.1.1 is that this common usage 
makes it a useful distinction in pointing his readers to the kind of impression of reflection 
he is interested in addressing in Book II of the Treatise, namely, the passions (which he 
takes to be most commonly understood as generally violent passions). He desires to draw 
on the common distinction between calm and violent to “proceed with the greater order” 
in his continuing discussion—having talked about ideas, he now wants to talk about our 
more ‘violent’ impressions of reflection, the passions. This reading of Hume’s intention 
in drawing the reader’s attention to the calm/violent distinction is supported, I think, by 
his later discussions of this distinction, the primary purposes of which are to explain how 
the common distinction can be used to explain peoples’ mistaken perceptions that they 
are at times motivated by reason. Violently experienced passions we tend to recognize as 
such, the calm we tend to confuse with reason.27 In both his discussions of motivation 
                                                 
26 Much more could be said about the scope of these influences on Hume. In the conclusion of this work I 
say a little more about directions that such research could take, in light of the interpretive arguments I 
present. 
27 I only mention Hume’s views on motivation here to support my point. Fuller discussions of Hume on 
motivation will naturally follow as this work progresses. See THN 2.3.3.8-10, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6.10 for more 
on the workings of calm and violent passions.  
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and his introduction of his topic of the passions in 2.1.1, Hume treats the calm/violent 
distinction not as a technical and precise distinction, but rather as a common way of 
thinking and speaking that is useful in the discussions in question. 
Of course there is something dissatisfying about this explanation, since it leaves us 
without a clear taxonomy of the impressions of reflection of the kind Fieser and others 
have tried to construct. But I think this dissatisfaction, and the general difficulties in 
producing a taxonomy internal to Hume’s impressions of reflection, is a product of what 
Hume actually presents the readers with, not of shortcomings in the scholarship. Consider 
again what Hume tells us. Impressions of reflection are clearly distinguished from 
impressions of sensation. They include “the passions, and other emotions resembling 
them” (2.1.1.1). Then he offers a way to understand a narrowing of this category by 
separating the commonly considered calm impressions of reflection from the commonly 
considered violent. The latter the reader would recognize as the passions, which Hume 
intends to make the focus of his investigation in Book II, in particular “their nature, 
origin, causes, and effects” (2.1.1.3). In presenting his distinction between direct and 
indirect passions, Hume is already moving his investigation into the passions in 
particular. Nothing, it turns out, is said about how the generally calm impressions of 
reflection fit into a taxonomy of impressions of reflection. And of more immediate 
concern to our investigation, nothing is said about the impressions that might fall into the 
evasive category of “other emotions” resembling the passions.  
So what role has emotion played in Hume’s discussions of the taxonomy of the contents 
of the mind? First, they are impressions, not ideas—that is, feelings, not copies of felt 
experience. As impressions they are identified consistently with secondary impressions, 
or impressions of reflection. This means that they arise as felt ‘reflections’ of our ideas 
and impressions, at first  of sensations, particularly of pain and pleasure, and then with 
the natural production of more, often complex, ideas and impressions, they arise from 
these as well. As for how emotions may or may not be separated from other kinds of 
impressions of reflection, in particular from the passions and desires/aversions that are 
included in the lists Hume gives of impressions of reflection, this isn’t clear. The 
calm/violent distinction is presented primarily to point the reader to “[w]hat we 
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commonly understand by passion… a violent and sensible emotion of mind” (2.3.8.13). 
This seems to suggest that passions are a particular kind of emotion, a conclusion 
supported by the reference at 2.1.1.1 to impressions of reflection being, “the passions and 
other emotions resembling them.”  In fact, there are places where ‘emotion’ and 
‘impression’ appear to be used interchangeably (see for example 2.1.5.6 and 2.1.9.5). But 
there is not, at this point, sufficient evidence to draw such a conclusion about the 
relationship between emotions and impressions generally, nor a conclusion about how 
passions and emotions as constituents of the category of impressions of reflection are 
related. We do know that passions themselves can be divided into direct and indirect, and 
that impressions of reflection generally may be experienced as either calm or violent. 
Hume also tells us at 1.3.16.3 that animals are “susceptible of the same emotions and 
affections as persons,” and we learn in Book II that animals experience many of the same 
particular passions that humans do. These are all together basic contents of the mind,  
facilitating the thinking, feeling and reasoning that forms in us beliefs and moves us to 
action. But if emotion is to be understood to play a role more distinct, in particular from 
the passions, we need to look beyond the basic taxonomy of mind that Hume offers, 
which, I take to have shown here, is very basic and lacks detail in its presentation of the 
classes of the impressions of reflection in particular. 
 
 
1.3 Emotion as a broader category of impressions of          
 reflection 
 
One conclusion that might be drawn from the discussion above is that while passions may 
be best considered as a particular kind of impression of reflection (i.e., the generally more 
violently experienced impressions of reflection), ‘emotion’ is used in a way that often 
seems to suggest it has a broader application than that. One might suggest that all calmly 
or violently experienced impressions of reflection can be considered emotions, and 
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passions are a particular kind of emotion. This is a conclusion that would appear to have 
support from other discussions in the Treatise. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to 
present some of the textual evidence that I take to support the conclusion that Hume 
presents emotion as a broader category of impressions of reflection than passion.  
The term ‘emotion’ is clearly used by Hume in some contexts as a sort of ‘catch-all’ 
phrase, meant to be inclusive of a wide array of felt mental states or events. For example, 
in his discussion of time, Hume argues that when we hear five consecutive notes on a 
flute we have an impression of these five sounds, and corresponding ideas, but no sixth 
impression of time passing (our idea of the passage of time, he explains, comes from the 
manner in which the impressions appear, not from some distinct impression).  “These 
five sounds,” he explains, “making their appearance in this particular manner, excite no 
emotion in the mind, nor produce an affection of any kind, which being observ’d by it 
can give rise to a new idea” (1.2.3.10). The point Hume is seeking to make is that not 
only are we limited to the initial five impressions of sensation, but that there is no further 
impression of reflection generated by the experience of these five notes. ‘Emotion’ is 
being used here as a sort of general term for impressions of reflection (in this case 
supplemented with the term ‘affection’28). It is used with similarly broad scope in 
Hume’s critique of our tendency to “bestow on external objects the same emotions” we 
observe in ourselves, “and to find everywhere those ideas which are most present to [us]” 
(1.4.3.11). Here again ‘emotions’, contrasted with ‘ideas’, appears to be a sort of catch-all 
phrase for impressions. Finally, in his discussion of sympathy in animals in Book II, 
                                                 
28 The addition of ‘affection’ to supplement ‘emotion’ in this passage may arguably be an example of the 
literary use of synonymy in Hume that Norton and Norton point out (as was discussed in 1.1). There is 
reason to think that ‘emotion’ and ‘affection’ in Hume might be close to synonymous. At the very least, it 
appears much harder in the case of ‘affection’ to present a case for any kind of real distinction from 
‘passion,’ or ‘emotion’—it appears for Hume to be a rather general term for impressions of reflection.  
Without arguing for any further interpretation, I will note for now that Hume’s use of ‘affection’ appears to 
have been influenced by Hutcheson, and that the occurrences of ‘affection’ in the Treatise tend to be 
similar to his usage of ‘emotion’ in a way that, say ‘passion’ is not.  For more passages where both terms 
are present, see his usage at 1.3.16.3, 2.1.4.3, 2.1.11.3, 2.2.2.6, 2.2.3.1, 2.3.4.5 and 3.3.1.7.  
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Hume says that a passion received by sympathy in an animal “produces almost all the 
same consequences, and excites the same emotions as in our species” (2.2.12.6). 
‘Emotion’ is used to denote a wide variety of impressions, in this case all the passions 
and pains and pleasures susceptible to sympathetic contagion.29 
In addition to texts where ‘emotion’ appears to be used as a catch-all phrase, there are 
passages in which emotion is explicitly used as a sort of broader category, replacing 
multiple terms for different impressions of reflection with this single, apparently 
encompassing category. For example, at 1.1.1.12 Hume says, “To prove the ideas of 
passion and desire not to be innate, [philosophers] observe that we have a preceding 
experience of these emotions in ourselves.” Here passions and desires are collectively 
referred to as emotions. As was noted above, at 2.1.1.1 when the very category of 
impressions of reflection is presented, Hume says it consists of “the passions and other 
emotions resembling them,” suggesting that not only are our passions themselves a kind 
of emotion, but there are other passion-like emotions that are also included in the 
category of impressions of reflection. Later, in a discussion of sympathy at 2.2.5.21, 
Hume says that mirror-like human minds “reflect each other’s emotions” and that “those 
rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay 
away by insensible degrees.” Here emotion is presented as a particularly broad category, 
inclusive of all the feelings that can be ‘reflected’ in people through the sympathy 
mechanism, a mechanism that operates through the enlivening of ideas of impressions to 
the points of changing our ideas of others’ feelings into the feelings themselves (note that 
this for Hume includes the particular feeling attached to believed ideas, hence his 
inclusion of opinions). At 2.3.5.2 Hume speaks of “wonder, surprize, and of all the 
emotions, which arise from novelty,” and later in the same passage speaks of emotion as 
encompassing both our pleasurable and painful affections. Finally, at 2.3.8.13 Hume 
                                                 
29 Much more will be said about the sympathy mechanism later in this work. For now it may be worth 
pointing out that Hume thinks beliefs can be sympathetically adopted, as well as passions, pains, pleasures, 
etc. This makes the possibility that ‘emotion’ is here being used broadly enough to capture all possible 
sympathetically communicated mental events even more interesting. 
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reminds us that “[w]hat we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible 
emotion of mind,” again suggesting passion to be a kind of emotion, making emotion the 
broader category. 
This last piece of text, as well as a few others we have looked at, uses ‘emotion’ as a 
more general term in the context of discussion of the calmness or violence with which an 
impression of reflection is experienced.30 As was argued above, the division between 
calm and violent in Hume is not one of absolute categories, but rather a division that can 
either be made between impressions of reflection that are generally experienced either 
calmly or violently, or between particular experiences of impressions of reflection, which 
can be either calm or violent to varying degrees. So when Hume wishes to speak of 
passions as the generally violent impressions of reflection (themselves often identified 
with emotions), he contrasts them with ‘soft’ emotions, and includes examples like the 
subtle feelings that may arise when observing beautiful or deformed things (2.1.1.3). At 
both 2.1.1.3 and 2.3.8.13 Hume is happy to draw on the vulgar distinction between 
violent and calm emotions in order to identify the passions. All this suggests a use of 
‘emotion’ as a generally broader category in Hume than ‘passion.’  
An important question that still is unclear at this point is the degree to which ‘passion’ 
and ‘emotion’ should be understood as receiving distinct treatment in Hume. Certainly, 
there are places where they appear to be used interchangeably, but the question is 
whether this is because of their overlapping reference, or because Hume is treating the 
terms as synonyms. There are also instances where both are listed together, and it is not 
clear whether this is because they have different reference, or whether Hume is using 
synonymy as a literary device. For example, passages like 1.3.5.5 and 2.3.3.4, where 
passion and emotion are presented connected disjunctively, could be read either way—
potentially ‘emotion’ is adding something to the statement that ‘passion’ alone could not, 
but whether such a reading is appropriate is not yet clear. This question cannot be 
                                                 
30 More will be said about the relationship between emotion and the calmness/violence of a passion in later 
discussions. In particular, a closer look at 2.3.4, “Of the causes of the violent passions” will be considered.   
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answered here fully, as I have not yet provided a treatment of Hume’s concept of passion 
(this will be addressed more directly in Part Two of this work). I will, however, note 
some of the places where a distinction in scope of reference between ‘passion’ and 
‘emotion’ seems suggested.  
Consider the following passage, found in a discussion of the workings of the indirect 
passions in Book II: 
‘Tis evident, then, that when the mind feels the passion either of pride or humility 
upon the appearance of a related object, there is, beside the relation or transition 
of thought, an emotion or original impression produc’d by some other principle. 
The question is, whether the emotion first produc’d be the passion itself, or some 
other impression related to it. (2.1.9.5) 
There are several interesting things to note about the use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in 
this passage. First, the initial feeling we have when we experience one of the indirect 
passions (generally a pain or pleasure that we will then associate with the pain or pleasure 
of humility or pride31) Hume identifies as “an emotion or original impression.” This 
language is a bit confusing. It sounds as though Hume is equating emotions with 
impressions of sensation, not impressions of reflection as one might expect. And it is 
certainly true that Hume includes pains and pleasures among our impressions of 
sensation. It is also true that Hume identifies various passions as being painful or pleasant 
in nature. Perhaps, then, we can understand the category of emotion to include our pains 
and pleasures, which would in turn suggest that this category is indeed broader than that 
of the passions. This is not the only place where Hume identifies pains and pleasures with 
emotions. At 2.2.11.6, Hume is similarly describing the circumstances in which the 
indirect passions arise, and identifies the necessary feeling of pain or pleasure as a 
required emotion for occasioning the passion. Also at 2.1.10.11, Hume identifies pleasure 
and pride grouped together, and then uneasiness and humility, as emotions. Again, 
                                                 
31 A fuller discussion of the Hume’s proposed structure of the indirect passions will be offered in 1.6. 
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emotion appears as a broader category, in which both passions and certain sensations of 
pain/pleasure may be included. 
The passage at 2.1.9.5 also presents another interesting possibility: could the term 
emotion apply to all impressions of reflection? This would be to say that for Hume all 
reflective feelings could be described as emotions, even though only particular feelings 
may be rightly called ‘passions.’ This possibility finds support from instances where 
Hume appears to use ‘emotion’ and ‘impression’ interchangeably.32 A final intriguing 
piece of textual evidence to this end is found at 2.2.2.8, where Hume explains why 
travelling with a friend through generally pleasing terrain will excite neither the passions 
of love (for my companion) nor pride if the land has no connection to either person. In 
such a case there is an undeniable, generally pleasant felt experience, however, “… my 
emotions are rather to be consider’d as the overflowing of an elevate or humane 
disposition, than as an establish’d passion.” This distinction, between emotions as 
abundant feeling and emotions as ‘established passions,’ is particularly suggestive of 
passions being a particular kind of emotion, and the category of emotion itself extending 
to a broader range of felt experience.  
What conclusions can we draw at this point about the scope of the category of emotion in 
the Treatise? First, that there is good reason to think that ‘emotion’ can appropriately be 
used to refer to any impression of reflection, inclusive of the violent and the calm. 
Further, emotion is clearly used at times as a catch-all phrase for felt mental states 
generally, including not only passions, but also sentiments, affections, desires, and even 
the vivid feelings of believed ideas (as shared by sympathy). All this suggests that the 
scope of reference of the term ‘emotion’ in Hume is broader than that of ‘passion’—a 
claim which gains particular support from the observation that at times sensations of pain 
and pleasure are referred to as emotions. This last observation raises the question of 
                                                 
32 For examples of places where Hume appears to use emotion and impression interchangeably, see 2.1.5.6, 
2.1.9.5 and 2.2.8.20. Also 2.1.5.4, where sensations are called “peculiar emotions,” suggesting again that 
emotion straddles the divide of impressions into sensations and reflective impressions. 
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whether and in what way Hume’s use of emotion might straddle his distinction between 
impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. A good place to begin an answer 
to this question would be an exploration of ‘emotion’ in Hume as feeling and felt mental 
states. 
 
 
1.4 Emotion as feeling 
 
That emotions are felt mental events may seem very clear in Hume’s usage of the term. 
Indeed, to a modern audience the idea that feeling is a central part of the concept of 
emotion might seem too obvious to require much argument. However, this aspect of 
Hume’s usage is more significant than a contemporary reader may assume. Hume’s 
contemporaries, when they did use the term, generally used it in the sense of physical 
disturbance and agitation.33 When it was applied to aspects of human experience it was 
                                                 
33 Lord Kames is a striking exception to this general rule. He had an explicitly stated emotion/passion 
distinction in which ‘emotion’ is not used in the older sense of physical disturbance, but in a sense more 
akin to Hume’s usage. The work in which this distinction is found, Kame’s Elements of Criticism [Kames, 
H. H., Lord (1796). Elements of criticism. First American from the seventh London edition. Boston. 
 Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. University of Western Ontario. 16 Aug. 2009], was first 
published in 1762, some 23 years after the publication of Book II of Hume’s Treatise. The mutual influence 
of these thinkers ideas on each other is difficult to say—Kames and Hume were certainly familiar with each 
other’s work, but Kame’s theory of the passions generally, and his characterization of the emotion/passion 
distinction in particular, differ from Hume’s even while sharing some similar key approaches. I cannot 
comment here at any length on the potential influence of the ideas, but I will give a brief characterization of 
Kame’s emotion/passion distinction. 
 For Kame’s emotions are the feelings of pain and pleasure that he introduces as part of the 
necessary causes of passions. As such, he generally characterizes the emotions as mental events antecedent 
to the experience of passions. Emotion responses can occur spontaneously and without any kind of mental 
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tied closely to bodily disturbance and agitation. Annette Baier has suggested, following 
the Oxford English Dictionary, that ‘emotion’ didn’t appear used in the more modern 
sense of ‘feeling’ until the early 1800’s, well after the writing of the Treatise.34 This 
might lead a reader of Hume to assume his usage of ‘emotion’ is really intended as a 
reference to movement of ‘spirits’ and other bodily events connected to feeling. In this 
section I will present text to the end of arguing that though Hume was aware of, and 
sometimes took advantage of, the physiological connotations of the term ‘emotion,’ he 
saw the physiological as the realm of the anatomists and naturalists. His concern was less 
with emotions as physical movement taking place in the body, and more with emotions as 
the feelings of the mind that (perhaps) correspond to these movements.  
Of the over 100 uses of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise, only 6 of them explicitly present 
emotion as related to a physiological aspect of human experience. Hume, as was 
mentioned above, did not take himself to be engaged in speculation on the workings of 
the body—this he took to be the work for “anatomists and natural philosophers” 
(1.1.2.1).35 Nevertheless, he did on occasion speak in more physiological terms when 
describing various aspects of human mental experience. Those instances where ‘emotion’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
reflections (‘natural’ responses) or as feelings of pain and pleasure following on reflection on our ideas and 
impressions. In either case these feelings are fleeting if they are not accompanied by desire. Stronger 
emotions are felt with desire attached, and though the feeling of emotions attended by desire and emotions 
unattended by desire are the same, Kames characterizes the latter as ‘emotions’ and the former as the more 
enduring ‘passions.’ ‘Desire’ itself is characterized as an internal impulse that moves us generally to act. 
Therefore another way to understand his emotion/passion distinction is that passions are the feelings that 
move us to act, while emotions are more fleeting feelings that fail to move us. Passions require an object 
that they move us towards, emotions lack this. (See Elements of Criticism, chapter 2, part 1, section 1.)       
34Baier (1991), 310 n9. 
35 Hume also is careful to distinguish between the use of ‘impression’ to indicate the manner of production 
of the perceptions (for instance, physical impression of objects on the organs in some way) and the 
experience of the perceptions themselves, the latter being the use he makes of it. See the footnote to 1.1.1.1.  
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is used I will look at quickly here.  Most of the uses of ‘emotion’ that link it to 
physiological phenomena reference the ‘spirits’ in some way.36 For instance, at 1.3.10.10 
Hume speaks of the effects of “poetical enthusiasm” on the spirits as giving them 
“emotion.” Similarly, at 2.2.4.4 he talks of our tendency to seek lively entertainment to 
“excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain’d by 
some brisk and lively emotion,” since Hume takes the experience of feeling to be desired, 
even in some cases where the feeling is not pleasant.37 In keeping with this theme, Hume 
claims at 2.2.4.7 that “a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to 
the spirits.” At 2.2.8.4 Hume makes the claim that “ no object is presented to the senses, 
nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d with some emotion or 
movement of spirits proportion’d to it.” Note how this statement (which will receive a 
fuller treatment in a more complete context below) directly identifies emotion with 
movements of the spirits. In his discussion of how violent passions strengthen our 
                                                 
36Hume is likely following Malebranche (an author Hume is known to have been familiar with) and the 
general Cartesian line on the role of ‘spirits’ as the physical underpinning of our experience of emotion. He 
also may have been influenced, however, by Malebranche’s move to draw a distinction between these 
physical causes and the actual mental experience of emotions. He argues, “I cannot understand how certain 
people imagine there is an absolutely necessary relation between the movements of the spirits and blood 
and the emotions of the soul. A few tiny particles of bile are rather violently stirred up in the brain—
therefore the soul must be excited by some passion, and the passion must be anger rather than love. What 
relation can be conceived between the idea of an enemy’s faults, or a passion of contempt or hatred, on the 
one hand, and the corporeal movement of the blood’s parts striking against certain parts of the brain on the 
other?” [Malebranche, N., T. M. Lennon, et al. (1997). The Search after Truth. Cambridge; New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 338-339]. For Malebranche the connection is explained by his occassionalism, 
which entails no real causal connection between the physical movements and the felt experience. Hume is 
not an occassionalist, but he does seem to assume a distinction between the physical and the 
phenomenological. He is not concerned with the details of the physiology, and the kind of causal 
connection, but instead focuses on emotions and passions as felt events, which can be analyzed and 
understood independent of their physical underpinnings.       
37 There is the potential for any emotion to be a desirable kind of experience, for Hume, since he holds that 
“every thing, which inlivens the mind to a moderate degree” is agreeable (2.3.5.2).. 
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dominant passions even when they are opposites, Hume describes how “an opposition in 
the passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder, 
than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force” (2.3.4.5). Finally, Hume 
makes a slightly different kind of physiological claim at 2.1.5.8, where he references the 
organs “naturally fitted to produce the emotion” of pride.  
Clearly, in five of these uses Hume is using ‘emotion’ to mean the physical movement 
and agitation of spirits in the body. But it is also true that in each of these passages 
Hume’s overarching interest is in the feelings that movement and agitation occasion in 
our conscious experience, and the effects these felt mental events ultimately have. For 
instance, at 1.3.10.10 Hume is arguing that the feelings associated with the motions 
stirred up by poetical enthusiasms are qualitatively different from the feelings of real 
belief. The reference to physical agitation is incidental—what is important is the 
comparison of the feelings aroused by poetry and the feelings aroused in beliefs. At 
2.2.4.4 and 2.2.4.7 the case is the same, it is the felt experience of motion in the spirits 
that is pleasant to us, not the fact that there is physical motion occurring. The claim at 
2.2.8.4 that every perception is attended by some emotion can be seen as two-fold: first, 
that there is always some physical motion that happens when we perceive something, and 
second, that there is always some feeling accompanying what we perceive, even if it is 
very slight. The case is the same at 2.3.4.5 and 2.1.5.8. Hume references bodily events, 
even uses the term ‘emotion’ to describe the physical movement (as the term was 
commonly used in his time), but ultimately his concern is not with anatomy or bodily 
mechanics, but with movements of mind, and in particular, feeling.  
In the end, what we see in these passages is evidence that Hume takes there to be 
anatomical events corresponding to (at least some of) our mental events. Occasionally he 
is inclined to reference these bodily movements as part of his explanation for the 
workings of the mind. But his use of ‘emotion’ extends far beyond these isolated 
instances of physical explanation. And even in cases where it is used to reference the 
physical events, his ultimate concern is in emotions as felt experiences, not as mechanics 
of body. I would argue that, contrary to some claims about use of ‘emotion’ in the 18th 
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century, Hume’s use of the term, though still closely connected to connotations of 
physical events, is primarily concerned with feeling, not physical movement.  
Moving away from the physical underpinnings of emotion in Hume, I will look now at 
some textual evidence for conclusions we might draw in characterizing the feeling aspect 
of Hume’s emotions. A useful starting place is his distinction between feeling and 
thinking. While the basic distinction Hume takes to be self-evident to all upon reflection 
(1.1.1.1), he does provide us with some useful observations about these activities and 
their interactions.  
The first I will note is his contention that effort of thought disrupts the operation of 
feeling, and feeling in turn disrupts the operation of thought. “As the emotions of the soul 
prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection, so these latter actions of the mind are 
equally prejudicial to the former” (1.4.1.11). Hume argues this within the context of a 
discussion of belief. A believed idea for Hume is an idea that we experience with a 
particular feeling attending it. Hume finds that engaging in subtle reasoning decreases our 
experience of feeling, and therefore makes it less likely that careful calculation of thought 
will result in beliefs. On the other hand strong feelings, which can result in belief 
formation, often prevent careful thought and reflection. Why does Hume think these 
activities interfere with each other? He goes on to explain in this passage that, “The mind, 
as well as the body, seems to be endow’d with a certain precise degree of force and 
activity, which it never employs in one action, but at the expense of all the rest.” Emotion 
is feeling, one of the two basic activities of mind. Here we learn that to the degree that the 
mind is taken up in the activity of feeling emotion, it will compromise the imagination’s 
ability to engage in unfelt reasoning. The mind can only exert itself to a limited degree, 
and extremes of either activity (thinking or feeling) mean that effort cannot be made in 
the other. Note also that despite the analogy drawn to the body, emotions are placed in 
the realm of activities of mind. Hume is using them to mean feeling, not physical events. 
This kind of contrasting of feeling with the operation of reasoning occurs in many places 
in Hume. ‘Reasoning’ itself is of course a tricky topic in Hume, partly because he is 
inclined to talk about it in at least two ways: as the associations of ideas that constitute 
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causal reasoning on the one hand, and as the perception of relations that hold between our 
ideas on the other. It is the second kind of reason in particular that Hume frequently 
contrasts with our felt experience. He argues that the association of ideas “produces no 
emotion, and gives rise to no new impression of any kind” (2.1.9.4) and that reason 
“exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion” (2.3.3.8). It is exactly because of 
the lack of emotion attending the workings of reason that we are inclined to confuse the 
calm passions, instances of little or subtle emotion, with the workings of reason. Hume 
says that the calm passions, “though they be real passions, produce little emotion in the 
mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation” 
(2.3.3.8). Here again we see emotion directly identified with feeling, a kind of sensation. 
This sensation may be subtle, as is the case with the calm passions, but is still distinct 
from the activity of reasoning, as there is still emotion present. It is important to note that 
here Hume is understanding ‘reasoning’ in this case very simply as the activity of 
recognizing relations between ideas that are themselves merely copies of impressions. 
This difference from reason is another important characteristic of emotion; in a rather 
infamous passage at 2.3.3.5 Hume argues that “[w]hen I am angry, I am actually possest 
with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than 
when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.”38 Emotions are pure impressions, 
pure feelings, and not ‘copies’ of anything in our experience, unlike ideas. Feeling itself, 
we may say, is nonrepresentational for Hume, and emotions are identified with this kind 
of purely felt mental event.39 
                                                 
38 At 1.1.6.1 Hume also appears to assume that all impressions of reflection are non-representative. The 
passage at 2.3.3.5, and the reasons for its infamous status in contemporary Hume scholarship, will be 
considered at much greater length in Part Two, and in particular give consideration to the arguments 
Annette Baier has given for rejecting this passage as part of Hume’s considered view on the nature of the 
passions.  
39 See also 2.2.6.3, where Hume describes pride and humility as “pure emotions of the soul” because they 
are not attended by a desire that would point us to other ideas, and in light of which move us in a particular 
direction.  
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We may now question what kind of feeling is characteristic of emotions. A related 
question concerns their relation to the other kinds of feelings we have, namely those of 
pure sensation. Is the impression I have of the color red a kind of emotion? Or is there 
some distinction between kinds of feelings that Hume would like to draw? And what 
about the sensations of pain and pleasure, which (as has been pointed out above) Hume 
considers as impressions of sensation, but also identifies as emotions in various places?  
To answer these, let us begin by looking at a telling passage from Hume’s discussion of 
pride and humility: 
The second quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise 
consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they 
excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is 
a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure 
and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. (2.1.5.4) 
There are several important points that can be drawn from this passage. First, emotions 
are identified as the feelings, or sensations that are peculiar to particular passions. In fact, 
despite the amount of time Hume spends in Book II talking about the necessary causal 
conditions of various passions, it is the feeling peculiar to each passion that he explicitly 
identifies as “the very being and essence” of that particular passion.40 Emotions are then 
sensations, but, at least in this context, they cannot be the sensations Hume intends by his 
category of impressions of sensations, as the passions are of course impressions of 
reflection. If the sensation, i.e., emotion of a passion is its very essence, then that same 
sensation cannot be considered an impression of sensation. This makes further sense, 
when we reconsider what Hume intends by impression of sensation: namely, those 
sensations that “without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution 
                                                 
40 The question of whether Hume ultimately characterizes his passions as defined by their feeling, or by the 
circumstances and causes necessarily attending them is the focus of the debate between a sensationalist and 
cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions, which will be the focus of Part Two.  
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of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external 
organs” (2.1.1.1).  
But then what kind of sensations are emotions? Another point of importance that can be 
taken from the passage at 2.1.5.4 is that the emotions or sensations excited when we 
experience a passion are either painful or pleasant in nature. Pain and pleasure, as brute 
physical sensations, are not considered by Hume to be impressions of reflection, but 
rather impressions of sensation. So what of the painful and pleasant emotions that 
constitute the very essence of particular passion, which are themselves clearly reflective 
impressions, responses to ideas and impressions we have present to us (as opposed to 
spontaneously arising in us)? As was noted above, all pains and pleasures seem for Hume 
to be kinds of emotions. But the felt experience of pain and pleasure is neither 
exclusively found in impressions of sensation, nor impressions of reflection. A pain that 
comes from damage to our bodies, immediately felt in us without preceding ideas or 
impressions leading to it, is pain experienced as an impression of sensation. A pain of 
heartache from grief or lost love, on the other hand, is one that arises from preceding 
ideas and impressions. It is our own realizations, associations of various ideas and 
impressions, that brings about this kind of pain in us. Similar stories can be told to 
illustrate the difference between pleasures of sensation and pleasures of reflection. Pain 
and pleasure come in a variety of felt experiences, and in many of these cases may be 
appropriately called emotions. Whether every instance of pain or pleasure may be 
classified as an emotion (including my pain at stubbing my toe, or my pleasure at tasting 
chocolate), is not yet clear. Though there are other instances of impressions of sensation 
(the sight of redness, the taste of salt, etc), which, insofar as they are neither painful nor 
pleasurable, we have no reason at this point to think Hume might have qualified as 
emotions. In fact, the basic information given to us by our senses, when the object is not 
associated with anything that would inspire in us a passion (primarily things painful or 
pleasant to us), Hume at times identifies as producing no emotion in us, as in the case of 
“an ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither [myself nor my 
companion],” which causes “no emotion, or independent pain or pleasure” (2.2.2.5). 
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With a better understanding of Hume’s emotions as kinds of sensations (and distinct from 
other kinds of sensations), I will make one final point about the characteristic feeling of 
emotion. In his descriptions of the workings of sympathy Hume frequently uses the term 
‘emotion.’ At 2.1.11.3 Hume argues that the ideas we receive of the passions of others 
are converted by them into impressions by acquiring, “such a degree of force and vivacity 
as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original 
affection.” Here we see the distinction between a vividly held idea of a passion and the 
passion itself is the degree of force and vivacity attending it. When this vivacity reaches a 
certain point, it is enough to turn our lively idea into the passion itself, as that vivacity 
will result in “an equal emotion” to a passion experienced as a result of our own 
reflections on our ideas and impressions. We know already that the very essence of a 
passion is the particular emotion affiliated with it. Now we know that the sensation of 
that emotion is one of force and vivacity, such that increases in force and vivacity can 
turn mere ideas of the sensation of the passions, i.e., the emotion, into the passion itself. 
This is not the only place where emotion is described as a feeling of force, vivacity or 
liveliness (see 2.2.4.4, for instance). The feeling of an emotion brings with it a certain 
force; how this force affects our experience of that emotion, say in terms of motivation of 
the will, is not yet clear.  
In summary, in this section I hope to have shown the following about Hume’s use of 
‘emotion’ in the Treatise. That ‘emotion’ is used to denote feeling, generally as 
contrasted with the non-felt nature of reasoning (a distinction sometimes lost on those 
who mistakenly identify the calmly experienced passions with reason). This felt nature of 
emotion is over and above any reference to the physical motion of the spirits or other 
parts of the body that might occur concurrently. It is a kind of feeling that potentially 
interferes with certain kinds of reasoning (that which only involves associations of ideas), 
and in fact the potential for interference runs both ways. Emotions are sensations, but not 
identical to Hume’s category of impressions of sensation. They are rather the sensations 
of reflective impressions, and particular emotions constitute the very essence of particular 
passions. Emotions include a variety of distinct pain and pleasure experiences, most 
importantly those that arise from our reflections on ideas and impressions presented to us. 
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Finally, emotions are feelings of force and vivacity- an experience of a particular passion 
is distinguished from the mere idea of that passion by the degree of force with which it is 
felt.  
One of the most important things that has been noted in this section is that emotion in 
Hume includes a large variety of pleasures and pains. The next section deals with this 
observation specifically, and makes a case for the following claim: emotions in Hume are 
necessarily either painful or pleasant. In contemporary discussion, this is to say that 
emotion in Hume is necessarily valenced.    
 
 
1.5 Valence: Emotion as valenced 
 
Before looking at the textual support for the claim that emotions for Hume always have a 
positive (pleasurable) or negative (painful) valence, I will give a brief account of this 
term in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion.41 The classification of 
emotions by valence, i.e., by whether they are positive or negative, is common to many 
theories of emotion, both contemporary and historical. More controversial is the question 
of how to best understand what makes a particular emotion positive or negative. For 
instance, we may evaluate an emotion as positive insofar as it is ‘about’ something good 
(intentional valence). On the other hand we may evaluate the valence of an emotion 
                                                 
41 My presentation of the concept will follow closely the discussion of valence found in the entry on 
emotion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Charland, L. and R. Gordon (2005). Emotion. Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. D. Borchert, MacMillan. 2: 197-203]. 
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based on what the felt experience of that emotion is like (experiential valence). It should 
be no surprise at this point that Hume is inclined to classify according to the experiential 
valence of emotions. That is, he is concerned with whether an emotion feels painful or 
pleasant. The distinctly painful or pleasant nature of an emotion is an essential 
component of it for Hume. In particular, the valence of our impressions of reflection play 
a key role in how they associate with other impressions, produce new impressions (often 
particular passions), and at times act as opposing forces. I have broken the discussion of 
valence in Hume’s theory of emotion here into three parts. The first will deal generally 
with text supporting the claim that for Hume emotions are valenced, and argue further 
that in his view the pains and pleasures that constitute the valence of each emotion come 
in a variety of kinds, not merely degrees. In the second, 1.6, I will look at the role of this 
kind of valenced feeling in the production of our passions Finally, in 1.7, I will begin 
considering the way we are ultimately motivated by our impressions of reflection, and the 
vital role played by valenced emotions in experiences of willing. But to begin, I will start 
with a basic look at emotions as experientially valenced mental events.  
At 2.2.5.3 Hume argues that one of the reasons we tend to feel esteem (a species of love) 
for the rich and powerful is the pleasure we receive from the agreeable objects they own 
or control. He explains,  
We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without 
an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much 
in our common indolent way of thinking, ‘tis easy, either in reading or in 
conversation, to discover them… [E]very thing, which is agreeable to the senses, 
is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an 
image of that satisfaction, which it gives by its real application to the bodily 
organs. 
There are several interesting things we learn about the emotions here. Emotions are 
presented as the feelings of pleasure and uneasiness that we receive in response to the 
reflection on things that are beautiful and ugly, agreeable and disagreeable. Emotions are 
thus presented as valenced, sensitive reactions that are generally positive or negative in 
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nature. It is interesting to note that Hume specifies here that these are sensations of 
reflection; we perceive things that are beautiful, ugly, agreeable, or disagreeable, and 
upon reflecting on them (i.e., responding to our conscious experience of their ideas and 
impressions) experience emotions that are either pleasant or uneasy in nature. These 
emotions, however, Hume notes are not necessarily obvious to us (they are, perhaps, 
calm in nature), and it is not so much from a conscious awareness of always experiencing 
emotions of pleasure or uneasiness that we can conclude that beautiful/ugly or 
agreeable/disagreeable things always have this felt effect on us. Rather, it is when we 
note human behavior, such as the way in which things which please our senses are used 
in attempts to produce vivacity in thought (Hume gives the example of the use of imagery 
pleasing to the senses in poetry or conversation), that we realize there are two kinds of 
pleasant sensations at play. This is what Hume is explaining in the latter part of the quote 
above: when we reflect on the ideas and impressions of pleasant experience that come to 
the imagination upon the experiences of pleasant sensation, we experience a second kind 
of pleasant sensation, one of reflection. This is the valenced emotion that Hume argues 
arises whenever we experience something agreeable or disagreeable, beautiful or ugly.  
This passage also tells us something very important about emotions of pain and pleasure: 
painful and pleasant emotions are not identical to the sensations of pain and pleasure, 
which arise “from the constitution of the body” without “any antecedent perception” in 
the soul (i.e., impressions of sensation; 2.1.1.1). In the passage above Hume clearly 
distinguishes the sensations of body and the senses, including potential bodily pains and 
pleasures, from the sensations of reflection that are our valenced emotions. These 
reflective impressions are pains and pleasures of a different kind from impression of 
sensation, yet are also not properly considered passions (as even reflective sensations of 
pain and pleasure as such are never listed as passions by Hume). This clearly marks out 
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space in Hume’s category of secondary impressions for reflective impressions that are not 
passions.42  
A point of classification I take to be less clear at this point is the question of whether 
Hume thinks that the pains and pleasures of our original impressions of sensation qualify 
as emotions. That is, would Hume consider my felt pain at stubbing my toe an emotion, 
separate from the disagreeable reflective sensation such an event would occasion? It is 
tempting to make the clear division between pains/pleasures of original impressions and 
pains/pleasures of impression of reflection also the divide between non-emotion 
sensations of pain/pleasure, and emotions of pain/pleasure. This is especially attractive, 
as it appears to give a more defined role for emotions within the category of impressions 
of reflection: they become the sensations of reflection, a key part to any impression of 
reflection, but a broader category than the grouping of specific passions. But I do not 
think it is clear whether a claim of this kind can be justified. For now, I will note it as a 
potential, and intriguing, read on Hume’s use of ‘emotion.’   
One might also question whether it has yet been shown that Hume thinks all emotions are 
either positively (pleasurably) or negatively (painfully) valenced. I would argue that this 
is likely the case. There are often times where Hume argues as though painful and 
pleasant emotions together exhaust the category of emotions. For instance, at 1.3.10.4, in 
his discussion of the effects of beliefs and passions on each other, Hume argues that not 
only do beliefs excite passions, but passions also often encourage belief, and this is true 
“not only [of] such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain.” 
Here Hume treats the emotions arising from the perception of certain facts as either 
pleasant or painful, and appears to take these designations to exhaust the potential kinds 
of emotions arising from objects. Likewise, the passage at 2.2.2.5 suggests all emotions 
                                                 
42 Or perhaps, one might say they are not fully ‘established’ passions, taking a cue from Hume at 2.2.2.8. 
Either way, we now have a clear candidate for the “other emotions resembling” the passions that make up 
part of the category of impressions of reflection (2.1.1.1). 
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can be divided into either painful or pleasurable.43 Hume’s discussion of the effects of 
probability on the direct passions also appears to assume that emotions fall into these 
opposite categories.44 
That particular emotions for Hume appear to be categorized either as positively or 
negatively valenced may suggest a sort of scale with pleasure on one end and pain on the 
other, and lead the reader to conclude that the difference between the pains and pleasures 
of particular emotions is one of degree. In fact, this appears to not be the case for 
Humean emotions, which differ not only in degree of pain or pleasure, but also in kind. 
This point should not be too quickly passed over. Considering the elaborate structure that 
Hume offers as the causes and ‘circumstances’ that attend the various passions, it may be 
tempting to think of emotions, as the feeling aspect of a passion, as playing the role of 
determining first, whether the passion is painful or pleasant, and second, the degree of 
force or violence with which a particular experience of a passion is felt. On such a 
reading, emotions do not really act to distinguish between various passions; emotions 
merely establish valence and degree of feeling. Further distinction between passions 
would then be made according to their typical objects and causes. This seems at odds 
with Hume’s own pronouncement that the emotion of a passion, i.e., its sensation or 
feeling, is the “very being and essence” of the passion (2.1.5.4).  
                                                 
43 This is the passage about the stone that “caus[es] no emotion, or independent pain or pleasure.” There are 
two potential ways to read this passage. Hume may be using the ‘or’ to indicate identity—emotion would in 
that case be intended to mean an independent pain or pleasure (independent, presumably, from the basic 
sensations associated with the stone). Alternatively, the disjunctive may be in place to acknowledge the 
distinction between pains and pleasures that are impressions of sensation, and pains and pleasures that are 
impressions of reflection (emotions, according to the argument made above). In this case the ‘independent’ 
would mean independent of the pains and pleasures of emotions, sensations of reflection the perception of 
the stone might inspire. In either reading, the category of ‘emotion’ appears to be exhausted by the 
painful/pleasant dichotomy.   
44 See 2.3.9.10-11. 
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It is therefore of great significance that Hume speaks of a variety of kinds of pains and 
pleasures, which may bear more or less resemblance to each other. Whether these 
differences are actually sufficient to distinguish between different kinds of Humean 
passions, without reference to their causes, objects and ‘attending circumstances’ 
generally, is not altogether clear. Despite Hume’s contention at 2.1.5.4 that the feeling 
component of a passion constitutes the very essence of the passion, there are places 
where he makes other claims that seem to suggest some of the attending circumstances 
are essential for distinguishing between passions. The debate over whether passions for 
Hume are ultimately sensitive in nature, or are best understood in terms of their complex 
logical structures, I will discuss in Part Two of this work, and characterize as a debate 
between those who would give a sensationalist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions, 
and those who would give a cognitivist reading of his theory of the passions. For now, it 
will be sufficient to provide some evidence for the claim that, whether they are the 
feature differentiating between different passions or not, the valenced emotions come in 
varieties of pain and pleasure, not merely degrees. 
As has been pointed out in a previous section, there are many instances of use of 
‘emotion’ in the Treatise in which that single term is being used to reference a variety of 
passions or impressions that have been mentioned in the discussion in question. Of 
particular interest here are those instances in which multiple kinds of pleasant or painful 
impressions of reflection are grouped together as similar emotions. Take for example 
1.2.1.1, where Hume refers to surprise and admiration and “those agreeable emotions,” or 
2.2.9.18, where women inclined to feel pity and attraction towards condemned criminals 
“[feel] no such tender emotions” when they are exposed to the horrors of the punishment 
of the criminal on the rack, in which case uneasy emotional sensations overpower the 
variety of positive emotions that may have otherwise been experienced.  
This type of use may not be, by itself, enough to convince us of a variety of kinds of 
pleasant and painful emotions. Rather these could be taken as indications of multiplicity 
of instances of pleasure or pain, which may still nevertheless be argued to differ by 
degree, not kind of sensation. Consider, then, Hume’s discussion of love between the 
sexes at 2.2.11.2, where the appetite to generation (characterized here not as a mere 
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bodily impulse, but as a kind of passion) is characterized as pleasant in nature.45 Hume 
notes that in virtue of this, it has “a strong connexion with, all the agreeable emotions,” 
which he goes on to tell us include, among others, joy, mirth, vanity and kindness. This 
passage suggests two things: first, that there is a multiplicity of agreeable emotions; and 
two, that they are associated based on their resemblance to each other as pleasurable.  
It could still be insisted, however, that these agreeable emotions resemble each other 
exactly because it is the same pleasure, experienced perhaps to different degrees and in 
different contexts, that is felt with all of these emotions. So as a final piece of proof that 
Hume takes there to be different kinds of pleasures and pains, consider Hume’s insistence 
on the qualitative difference between self-love (pride) and love of a friend or lover at 
2.2.1.2: 
[W]hen we talk of self-love, ‘tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it 
produces any thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a 
friend or mistress. ‘Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortify’d by our 
own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries 
of others. 
 Here Hume specifically says that it is the sensation of self-love that differs from the 
sensation of love of others, the latter being characterized as “that tender emotion.” 
Though these kinds of sensations are both pleasant, and though we may be inclined to 
characterize both as kinds of love, differing only by object, Hume insists that we not 
understand pride as a form of love because the sensations are ultimately different. The 
same is true of the difference between humility and hatred. While these passions share a 
general valence (painful or pleasant), they ultimately differ in kind. We could assume that 
pride/humility experienced with the same degree of pleasure/pain as love/hate would not 
make the similarly valenced passions identical in feeling. Love of myself is pleasant, and 
                                                 
45 Hume qualifies that the appetite to generation is a pleasing emotion insofar as it is “confin’d to a certain 
degree” (2.2.11.2). See 2.3.5.4 for a possible Humean explanation of why this otherwise pleasing emotion 
becomes unpleasant when experienced in an extreme. 
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love of my friend is pleasant, but these pleasures are different sensations. And the 
sensation of a passion, for Hume, is its particular emotion. Therefore, this appears to 
make it certain not only that emotions are necessarily valenced feeling, but also come in a 
variety of kinds of positive and negative feeling. 
 
 
1.6 Valence: The Production of the Passions 
 
It has been established above that Hume took the valenced, felt emotion of a passion to 
be the essential characteristic of that passion. But this is not the limit of the role of pains 
and pleasures in the formation of our passions. Specifically, there are two extremely 
prominent roles that valenced feeling plays in the production of the passions. The first is 
in the perception of pain or pleasure itself that Hume takes to be the foundation of almost 
all of our passions and impressions of reflection generally. The second, specific to the 
production of the indirect passions, is Hume’s self-proclaimed innovation of the ‘double 
relation of ideas and impressions,’ which turns out to be a result of the way that 
impressions of reflection may be associated by similarity in valence of feeling. This 
section deals with the part played by valence in the production of the passions. I will pay 
special attention to the question of the role emotion specifically plays, understanding 
emotion as the valenced, felt aspect of an impression of reflection (as was argued for 
above). 
Hume tells us that the impressions of reflections generally are “in a great measure” 
founded on our ideas of pain and pleasure (1.1.2.1; 2.3.9.1). We experience primary 
impressions of sensation, which may include “heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or 
pain of some kind or other” (1.1.2.1). Obviously our primary impressions include a 
greater range of sensations than this (for instance, color, sounds of different pitch, etc), 
but Hume is interested in sensations that lead us to some idea of pain or pleasure, whether 
currently experienced, or potentially. And while he acknowledges that secondary 
  
46 
 
impressions may sometimes be a reflection of our impressions of sensation themselves 
(2.1.1.2), he emphasizes the role of our ideas of pain and pleasure as the foundation of 
impressions of reflection. He argues that “in order to produce an affection of any kind, it 
is only requisite to present some good or evil” i.e., pain or pleasure, and that the removal 
of that pain or pleasure results in an immediate removal of “most of our reflective or 
secondary impressions” (2.3.9.1). This is, essentially, Hume’s account of the origins of 
the valence of particular emotions and passions. And the story of the origins of valence is 
also the story of the origins of impressions of reflection period—as well as containing 
potential limits to the experience of the passions. His insistence that upon removal of pain 
or pleasure there is a removal of the impression of reflection plays a key role in his theory 
of motivation presented at 2.3.3. 
Hume offers several kinds of ‘propensities’ original to human nature to explain roughly 
three kinds of origins of impressions of reflection. The first, and core ‘original instinct,’ 
is the mind’s tendency to “unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil” (2.3.9.2).  
This instinct leads ‘directly’ to our experience of the direct passions. The direct passions 
are immediate responses to kinds of prospects and/or perceptions of pain or pleasure, 
whether found in our impressions of sensation, ideas of those impressions, or the ideas 
and impressions that are naturally generated from these. For instance, ideas and 
impressions of immediately present pleasure/pain give us joy/sorrow, while anticipated 
pleasure/pain gives us hope/fear.  Meanwhile, potentially attainable pleasures/pains cause 
in us desire/aversion, while reliable/unattainable pleasures/pains cause feelings of 
security/despair (2.1.1.4; 2.3.9.5-7). At the core of all these passions is a general desire 
for pleasure and aversion to pain, and that this is the original instinct that Hume sees as 
fundamental to our experience of impressions of reflection is evidenced in his insistence 
on the foundational role of pains and pleasures in the production of impressions of 
reflection. 
A second type of original instinct that causes in us a direct, valenced, felt, reflective 
response to our impressions and ideas, are certain ‘natural impulses’ which, “properly 
speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them like the other affections” 
(2.3.9.8). In this category of origin belong all the impressions of reflection that Hume 
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takes to be common to human nature, but not always explainable in terms of perceptions 
of (potential or present) pains and pleasures.46 Among these he lists desire for punishment 
for enemies (resentment), happiness to friends (benevolence), kindness to children, lust, 
hunger and a few other bodily appetites47 (2.3.3.8 and 2.3.9.8). Note the role played here 
by valence. While these are not reflective impressions derived from pain and pleasure, 
Hume still insists that they ‘produce,’ i.e. are experienced as pleasurable or painful. That 
is to say, the felt component (the emotion) of these impressions of reflection is still 
valenced, though their origins are not directly in the perceptions of pain and pleasure.  
The third type of origin of impressions of reflection is that of Hume’s indirect passions, 
those which are based on the same principle of general aversion to pain and desire for 
pleasure as the direct passions, but arise distinctly “by the conjunction of other qualities” 
(2.1.1.4). These are cases where the imagination provides us with various associations 
and beliefs that are related to the objects we perceive as sources of pain or pleasure. The 
perception of a delicious chocolate cake may in and of itself cause in me the direct 
passion of desire, as it is a source of pleasure. But facts surrounding the cake may also 
result in a great variety of indirect passions. If it is a cake I made, the conjunction of these 
‘other qualities’ to my beliefs about the cake may cause in me pride and ambition. If the 
cake belongs to someone else, it may cause both love and envy. If by comparison it 
makes my own attempts at cake-making look very poor, it may cause humility and 
malice. In all cases, facts about how pain or pleasure is presented to us make a difference 
for what we come to feel. The ‘other qualities’ conjoined to our ideas and impressions 
                                                 
46 Norton rightly points out that Hume’s insistence on this kind of original instinct in human nature is at 
odds with the views of authors like Hobbes, who sought to explain all impulses in terms of responses to 
pain and pleasure [Norton (2007), 531]. This difference is ultimately of importance for the moral theories 
of the respective thinkers. Hume is following a more ‘sentimentalist’ tradition, where human nature 
includes some key moral impulses and tendencies to certain social behaviours.  
47  For a discussion of bodily appetites as a kind of impression of reflection in Hume, see footnote 8 in Part 
One of this work.  
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that produce the indirect passions play a defining role in the ultimate valence of the 
passion, whether the initial impression be one of pain or pleasure.  
Hume tells us explicitly that the indirect passions are “always agreeable or uneasy,” 
which is to say, they are always valenced (2.3.9.4). He also tells us that the indirect 
passions contribute to the desires and aversions of our direct passions, which themselves 
in turn inform the formation of indirect passions.48 Note also that the mental events of 
these passions are not mutually exclusive (2.3.9.3)—I may at once feel both the direct 
passion of joy in pleasure received from eating the chocolate cake, and the indirect 
passion of humility as I realize that I am a poor cake-maker by comparison. These 
passions may both exist despite the opposing valence. They may even combine despite 
this opposition, the force of the subordinate passion ultimately adding force to that of the 
dominant passion. But more will be said about this characteristic of Hume’s impressions 
of reflection in a later section of Part One of this work (1.10). 
What is the role of emotion in all of this? Well, whether our impressions of reflection 
arise from our original instinct to avoid pain and embrace pleasure, some original impulse 
towards benevolence, revenge, etc (which does not arise from pain/pleasure, but does 
point us towards them), or, finally, the conjunction of other beliefs about our situation 
with perceptions of pain and pleasure, all the resulting impressions of reflection Hume 
takes to have a sensation that is either painful or pleasant. This felt aspect of the 
impression of reflection, I have argued above, Hume calls the ‘emotion’ of the 
impression. And it is their “very being and essence” to be a particular kind of pleasant or 
painful sensation. In fact, “upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality 
no pride nor humility,” suggesting more generally, that the removal of the painful and 
pleasant sensations means the removal of passions all together (2.1.5.4).  
                                                 
48 Jane MacIntyre offers an excellent discussion of this relationship between the direct and indirect passions 
in her paper, “Hume’s Passions: Direct and Indirect” [Hume Studies (2000) 26: 77-86]. 
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There is a further role played by the valence of the emotion in the formation of the 
indirect passions in particular. Hume presents the indirect passions as arising due to a 
‘double relation of impressions and ideas.’ Take Hume’s analysis of pride as an example. 
The passion of pride “by an original and natural instinct” always has the same object: the 
self (2.1.5.3). The causes of pride, on the other hand, are varied, but similar in that all are 
always in some way related to the self. Therefore, Hume concludes that these two related 
ideas (of the self and of some cause that is connected to the self) are necessary to produce 
pride. But they are not sufficient. Pride is an impression of reflection, and as such is 
characterized by the particular pleasant sensation that we experience as the passion. This 
pleasant sensation of pride, Hume points out, resembles, and is therefore associated with, 
the sensations of pleasure that the causes of pride typically give us.49 This is a relation of 
impressions, and is the second necessary component of producing the indirect passion of 
pride. The cause of pride must provide us an idea that has some relation to our idea of the 
self. The cause must further produce in us, independent of the pleasure of the passion of 
pride, a distinct pleasure, and without this pleasure the passion will not arise. The 
circumstances for producing an indirect passion generally, in Hume’s own words, are as 
follows: 
Here then is the situation of the mind as I have describ’d it. It has certain organs 
naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produc’d, naturally turns 
the view to a certain object. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion, 
there is requir’d some other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions 
and ideas may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first 
impulse. (2.2.11.650) 
                                                 
49 See 2.1.4.3 for Hume’s explanation of the way in which impressions may be associated by resemblance. 
Interestingly, this paragraph appears to suggest that resemblance between impressions is primarily a 
function of their positive or negative valence. Painful impressions resemble other painful impressions, 
pleasant impressions the pleasant.  
50 See also 2.1.5.9 and 2.2.2.5 on the workings of the double relation of ideas and impressions in producing 
indirect passions. 
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Thus we see that the emotion required to set the indirect passion-producing principles 
into action is the feeling of pain or pleasure produced in us by reflection on the things we 
are perceiving that act as causes. This emotion, Hume emphasizes, is distinct from the 
passion itself, again suggesting room in the category of impressions of reflection for 
emotions that are not passions, but are nonetheless valenced, felt, reflective impressions. 
Such emotions we now understand to be an essential part of the production of the indirect 
passions. In fact, they are what provide the ‘first impulse’ in producing the passions51; 
even though our nature is ‘naturally fitted’ to produce the passion when we have certain 
perceptions, without the feeling of pain and pleasure that constitutes a basic response of 
emotion to these perceptions, we will not experience the passion.  
The suggestion of a distinction in Hume between mere reflective feelings of pain and 
pleasure and full-blown passions such as pride and love is worth pausing to note. At the 
end of 2.2.2.7 Hume emphasizes that objects which produce pleasure or uneasiness in us, 
but do not provide the necessary relation of ideas to produce the appropriate indirect 
passion, “can never give rise to any constant and establish’d passion.” The suggested 
distinction is between valenced feeling that is somehow inconstant or ‘unestablished’ in 
nature and fully realized passions. Hume takes the next paragraph to expand on this a bit. 
This is where he describes travelling through a pleasant countryside with a friend. The 
beautiful scenery may “put me into good humour both with myself and fellow-traveller,” 
                                                 
51 The identification of the initial pain/pleasure that is part of the production of the indirect passions with 
emotion may on the surface appear to be in tension with the claim above that the emotion of a passion is the 
feeling that constitutes the very essence of the passion. In the former case it appears that emotion is a 
distinct element from the passion, causally prior. In the second, the emotion is constitutive of the felt 
essence of the passion. But these are not mutually exclusive roles for emotion to play if we think of it as the 
broader category of valenced feeling that I am suggesting here. In its productive role it is a simple feeling 
of some pain or pleasure. That simple pain/pleasure works in the production of the particular pain/pleasure 
of the passion in question. There is a separate emotion produced in the production of the indirect passion, 
this one identified as the essence of the passion.   
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but insofar as the country is neither related to myself or my companion it cannot cause 
the indirect passions of pride or love in us. Therefore the pleasant emotional responses, 
Hume tells us, “are rather to be consider’d as the overflowings of an elevated or humane 
disposition, than as an establish’d passion” (2.2.2.8). The emotions of pleasure or 
uneasiness that we receive from some of our perceptions may remain as more general 
either positively or negatively valenced feelings, if various other circumstances are not 
present (such as, in the case of the indirect passions, the double relation of ideas).52 We 
are therefore capable of experiencing general, valenced dispositions or feelings, without 
them constituting proper, fully formed passions. Presumably, given Hume’s emphasis on 
the felt nature of the passions, this difference is one of felt quality, not merely of 
attending belief structures. But more on this later.  
Here is a brief summary of what has been established in this section. Pain and pleasure 
play a key role in producing most of our passions, and the characteristic experience and 
(necessary) valance of the passions themselves is produced from these perceptions of 
pain or pleasure combined with the way our natures are ‘naturally fitted’ to produce 
certain passions. The painful or pleasant nature of indirect passions is itself essential to 
their production, as they cannot be produced without our associating their typically 
painful or pleasant experience with present, resembling emotions of pain or pleasure. 
These associated painful or pleasant emotions are distinct from the passions they are 
associated with and ultimately assist in bringing to be. They are not full-blown passions, 
but distinct impressions of reflection, without which the indirect passions could not be 
experienced. Valenced emotion, then, plays a central role in the experience of all 
                                                 
52 Why it is the attending circumstances are taken by Hume to be essential in the production of particular 
passions is a question that may be answered in various ways. We may, for instance, refer to Hume’s claims 
that we are by nature determined, both in physiology and psychological law, to find that the input of certain 
perceptions in conjunction with perceptions of pain or pleasure have an output of the experience of 
particular passions. Or, we may put emphasis on the fact that the relevant attending circumstances to the 
pains and pleasures have their effect on us in virtue of their being our beliefs, adding increased cognitive 
content to the production of the passions. This will be discussed further as the debate between the 
sensationalist and cognitivist accounts of Hume’s theory of the passion is explored.  
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passions, as well as in the production of many particular passions. Further, its role in the 
production of the indirect passions in particular reveals a telling distinction between fully 
realized passions, and these more general, valenced impressions of reflection. 
 
 
1.7 Valence: Emotion and Motivation 
 
I will consider one final point of discussion before moving away from the topic of 
valence and the emotions. Generally speaking, valenced feeling is at the centre of 
Hume’s theory of motivation and will. Clearly the Humean account of motivation will 
have the passions and feeling at its core. In this section I wish to consider the particular 
use Hume makes of valenced emotion in his explanation of the influences on our wills.  
Hume characterizes the will as the “[most] remarkable” immediate effect of pain and 
pleasure (2.3.1.2; see also 2.3.9.2). Though the will itself is not to be considered a 
passion, nor does he treat it as a particular faculty of the mind, Hume explains at the 
beginning of Book II, Part III that a discussion of the will is necessary in order to fully 
explain the passions.53 Hume’s will is “the internal impression we feel and are conscious 
of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of 
our mind” (2.3.1.2). But though this feeling of willing is not itself a passion, Hume does 
include the very closely related experiences of aversion and desire (or propensity) among 
the direct passions (2.1.1.4, 2.3.1.1). These passions arise according the perceptions of 
pleasure or pain we find before us as follows: 
 
                                                 
53 It is interesting to note that the will does not receive a treatment independent of Hume’s explanations of 
the passions—this emphasizes just how tied motivation and the passions are for Hume.  
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‘Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, 
we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid 
or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction… ’Tis from the 
prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object. (2.3.3.3)  
The section from which this passage is taken, “On the influencing motives of the will,” 
makes it clear that Hume is inclined to understand motivation and will in terms of the two 
direct passions of aversion and propensity. The feeling of ‘willing’ results when we find 
ourselves motivated following experiences of  our own aversions and propensities, 
themselves responses to the prospects for pain and pleasure we find before us. Aversion, 
a response against pain, we may assume has a negative valence, while propensity or 
desire, a response to the prospect of pleasure, would seem to have a positive valence.54 
Painful and pleasant feeling, therefore, are foundational for our coming to experience will 
and motivation. 
It turns out that this claim about the role of perceptions of realized or potential pains and 
pleasures in the production of the will is parallel to a claim Hume makes about the 
production of the passions generally: 
                                                 
54 This is not entirely satisfying. Unlike the other direct passions (grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and 
security) it is not immediately clear that all my experiences of aversion should be painful, while all 
experiences of propensity should be pleasant. For instance, persistent, but unattainable desires 
(propensities) would presumably take on a negative valence in our experience of them (think of Socrates’ 
characterization of the desire associated with eros in his Symposium). Hume could, perhaps explain this by 
saying that while our propensity itself has a pleasant sort of feeling, as it is the feeling of being well-
disposed to something and anticipating pleasure from it, the experience of wanting something likely 
unattainable will involved many other passions (perhaps jealousy or envy, grief, humility, etc) that have a 
strongly negative valence. The overall felt experience when we desire something (or wish to avoid 
something) will therefore be a reflection not only of the valence of the isolated direct passion of aversion or 
desire, but a culmination of all the passions and feelings associated with the pleasant or painful prospect. 
The mixing, transitivity and fluidity of the emotions in Hume is discussed in more detail in 1.8. 
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‘Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direct and indirect, are founded on 
pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, ‘tis only 
requisite to present some good or evil. Upon the removal of pain and pleasure 
there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire 
and aversion, and most of our reflective or secondary impressions. (2.3.9.1)55     
Hume goes on to explain that, in the case of the direct passions, it is the mind’s ‘original 
instinct’ to unite with pleasure and avoid pain that results in valenced passions that are 
direct responses to perceptions of potential pains and pleasures. These, it turns out, are 
also directly motivating. There is a sense in which all the direct passions may be thought 
of as various kinds of aversions and propensities, because the objects of the direct 
passions may always be considered as objects of desire or aversion. For instance, grief is 
a response to a certain pain, while fear is a response to a pain that may or may not occur 
(2.3.9.5-6). In both cases we experience a painful reflective impression from the presence 
of a prospect of pain. Will results when actions of body or mind may allow us to 
successfully follow our felt impulse to avoid or acquire these pains and pleasures 
(2.3.9.7).  
Hume also explains in 2.3.9 how it is that the indirect passions, which he argues 
elsewhere “are pure emotions of the soul, unattended by any desire, and not immediately 
exciting us to action” (2.2.6.3), can nevertheless contribute to our motivating impulses. 
They have this ‘indirect’ influence because of the way their agreeable or uneasy 
sensations increase our desire or aversion towards the objects of our indirect passions. 
Hume argues,  
[S]upposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure, and that 
arising from an object related to ourselves or others, this does not prevent the 
                                                 
55 The reason that Hume does not claim that all of our passions desist when pain and pleasure are removed 
is of course his contention that we have certain ‘original instincts’ which result in passions that arise from 
particular causes, regardless of the prospects of pain or pleasure the situations offer. Presumably, these 
passions are also potentially motivating.  
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propensity or aversion, with the consequent emotions, but by concurring with 
certain dormant principles of the human mind, excites the new impressions of 
pride or humility, love or hatred. That propensity, which unites us to the object, or 
separates us from it, still continues to operate, but in conjunction with the indirect 
passions, which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. (2.3.9.3) 
The indirect passions arise upon perceptions of things that are pleasing or painful to us, 
and associated with ourselves or others in appropriate ways to cause our predisposed 
natures to produce the said passions. Naturally, the objects, being pleasing or painful to 
us on their own, will cause the direct passions of desire and aversion as well (and perhaps 
the related reactions of joy/grief, hope/fear, etc). These directly motivating passions56 are 
still present when we experience the indirect passions. For instance, when I feel pride in 
the beautiful chocolate cake I have made, I will likely feel at the same time the direct 
passion of desire for the cake57 and perhaps joy in the cake. Thus I will have at least two 
distinct, pleasing impressions of reflection: the indirect passion of pride, and the direct 
passion of desire or joy.  We learn in 2.3.9.4 that, in fact, the painful or pleasant 
sensations that attend the indirect passions “give in their turn additional force to the direct 
passions, and increase our desire and aversion to the object.” They ultimately contribute 
to the motivation to perform certain actions. The indirect passions act as indirect 
                                                 
56 Note that the direct passions are called such because that they are direct responses to pleasure and pain, 
not because they are directly motivating (as may appear to be suggested here). As it happens they are both 
direct responses to pleasure and pain, and directly motivating, but the category designation comes from the 
former characteristic.  
57Note that Hume argues at 2.2.6.3 that pride and humility are “pure emotions in the soul, unattended with 
any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action,” as contrasted with love and hatred are always 
followed with particular desires. My claim about the chocolate cake in this case should not therefore be 
taken to be the claim that my pride in the cake is immediately followed by a desire that will excite me to 
action. Rather, I take it that in such an example it is plausible to posit a desire for the cake entirely distinct 
from my experience of pride, arising merely because of the pleasant qualities of the cake that will cause my 
desire. Hume’s point is about the way that force and impulse can be shared between passions. Indirect 
passions may thus come to supplement the force of the direct in contributing to motivation.  
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motivators of action in virtue of the force and feeling they ultimately contribute to our 
concurrently experienced direct passions. Thus, the valenced emotion component of both 
the direct and indirect passions can be seen to be the key to the motivating power of all 
passions.    
Valenced feeling acts as the key to motivation for Hume because of a characteristic it has 
that he is inclined to express in the language of force and impulse. This language and 
type of metaphor in Hume is worth noting. Both in his discussions of the production of 
particular passions and in descriptions of the effects they have, particularly in that 
‘remarkable’ effect of motivation and will, Hume uses this kind of metaphorical 
language. Throughout the Treatise, in fact, Hume is at times inclined to discuss the 
workings of the mind in a (somewhat) mechanical way. As found in his discussions of the 
passions, he makes particular use of the metaphors as it pertains to valence. Consider his 
discussion at 2.2.2 of various ‘experiments’ meant to prove that both a relation between 
particular ideas and a relation between particular impressions is necessary in order to 
produce the indirect passions. In his second experiment we are asked to consider a stone 
which belongs to either oneself or a companion, but presents us with neither pleasure nor 
pain, and then determine whether love, hate, pride or humility will arise in either of us. 
Hume answers the question as follows: 
‘Tis plain, that to consider the matter a priori, no emotion of any kind can 
reasonably be expected. For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and 
calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of 
pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves 
or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind 
perfectly free from any affection. (2.2.2.6)  
The object does not provide the independent emotion of pleasure or pain that we 
identified above as essential in the production of the indirect passions. Hume appears to 
be claiming here that in fact, a valence-neutral object, providing only the appropriate 
relation of ideas, provides only equal ‘impulse’ towards each passions, which is to say no 
new impulse, as relations of ideas operate without any feeling being produced. Though 
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our natures may be naturally fitted to produce the passions when the appropriate beliefs 
about the relations between myself or my companion and the stone are present, the 
impulse necessary to produce the felt passion is lacking, and the potential for the two 
passions is equal and will cancel each other out, as it were. The impulse of feeling is a 
necessary companion to the relations of ideas in producing the indirect passions. Without 
impulse, we will not be moved to experience a passion.  
Furthermore, equal impulses cancel each other out. Like equal forces going in opposite 
directions, two opposite emotions, equally associated with the same object will find any 
potential effect destroyed “leav[ing] the mind perfectly free from any affection or 
emotion” (2.2.2.6).58  This kind of approach to emotions in Hume often extends beyond 
the production of passions to the ultimate motivational outcomes of the passions we 
experience. Impressions of reflection generally are often treated as forces of motivation, 
moving feeling through ideas and deliberation, with infused vivacity potentially 
providing motivation for certain actions, and challenging or defeating potential motives 
for others. Fuller discussions of this apparent fluidity of the force and impulse of 
emotions and passions will be discussed in 1.10. For now it is worth noting that this 
metaphor of impulse informs how it is various passions are both produced and ultimately 
move us to act. And the source of the impulse appears to be the valenced feeling of 
                                                 
58 Hume offers more detailed discussion of this kind of phenomena at 2.3.9.13-17. In that section he offers 
the particulars of circumstances in which contrary passions may either combine, alternate, or cancel each 
other out entirely. Generally, his explanations have to do with how exactly contrary they are. Insofar as two 
passions with opposite valence are exactly contrary they will cancel each other out, otherwise they may 
combine their force and impulse, or we may experience a seesawing between them. Exact contrariety is 
determined, interestingly, not by the feeling of the passion (how would one determine what an exact 
opposite in ‘feeling’ was?), but by both the strength of the feeling and the accompanying relations of ideas. 
If the relations of ideas occasioning the passions are identical, and the opposite feelings they have equal in 
force, this contrariety will cause the passions to cancel each other out.    
  
58 
 
emotions, whether experienced as ‘established’ passions, or more general feelings and 
dispositions, not tied by relations of ideas to a particular passionate experience.59  
How then might we summarize what we have determined thus far about the role of 
valenced emotions in motivation for Hume? First, it is the valenced emotional response to 
pain and pleasure that, in most cases, results in our experience of willing.60 Valenced 
emotion, in any case, is necessarily present to motivate the will. Indeed, the influence on 
the will of both the direct and indirect passions can be explained with reference to their 
valenced feeling.61 Finally, we have begun to explain why it is for Hume that emotions 
play such a key role in motivation: they offer ‘force’ and ‘impulse’62, which unfelt 
relations of ideas do not. Therefore, whether it is in the formation of the passions 
themselves, or the influencing of the will, sufficient force and impulse comes from the 
feeling of valenced emotion.  
                                                 
59 Recall the wording at 2.2.11.6 where emotion is identified as providing the “first impulse” for the 
indirect passions. 
60 Again, the exceptions are the original instincts (see 2.3.3.8, 2.3.9.2, and 2.3.9.8), which are not responses 
to pains and pleasures, but passions we are naturally predisposed to respond with when faced with certain 
circumstances. Though they do not arise from perceptions of pain and pleasure, they are valenced, felt 
(albeit at times calm) responses, and it would seem to be in virtue of the impulse provided by their status as 
valenced emotion that they come to be motivating.  
61 Note that there are two ways that valenced feeling leads to acting: one, directly, through our natural 
propensity for good and aversion to evil, and two, through providing impulse and force of feeling through 
association with other passions.  
62 We must be careful in how we speak here, as talk about force or impulse as a kind of efficacious cause or 
necessary connection is rather unHumean, given his arguments concerning causality in Book I. It is clear, 
however, that Hume takes a certain amount of force and impulse, particularly as it is provided through 
passions, to be consistently antecedent to action. Therefore, the ‘force’ and ‘impulse’ must be understood in 
the Humean sense of strength and liveliness of feeling, some degree of which he takes to attend the 
perceptions constantly conjoined with action. The degree of force is therefore correlated for Hume with 
likelihood of particular action being taken.   
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One thing we have not addressed it how to understand the variations in strength and 
influence of our various emotional responses over our actions. To say that valenced 
emotion provides impulse is only beginning to explain motivation. The next section picks 
up on this question by looking at what Hume as said about the differences between calm 
and violent passions, and the implication of calmness or violence for the influence of the 
emotions, particularly over motivation.    
 
 
1.8 Calm and violent emotions 
 
Understanding motivation in Hume in terms of the impulse that comes from valenced 
feeling would appear to put force of feeling at centre stage. That is to say, if valenced 
feeling is what provides impulse, one would assume that stronger feeling provides 
stronger impulse. As has been mentioned, Hume at times employs a distinction between 
calm and violent passions [though he acknowledges it to be an inexact, vulgar and 
specious distinction (2.1.1.3)]. He explains that the passions he is interested in discussing 
in Book II are our generally more violently felt impressions of reflection. But these 
typically violent passions may be felt with very little emotion, while other, generally 
calm and subtle, valenced impressions of reflection, which Hume appears to not consider 
(proper) passions, may be experienced violently at times (he offers the example of the 
extreme raptures of poetry and music). As was established above, in either case we have 
an experience of emotion; it is the violence or the subtlety of the emotion that varies, not 
the question of whether emotion is experienced at all. When introducing impulse and 
power over the will into discussions of our various impressions of reflection, it appears to 
be a natural step to assume that the ‘violence’ of an emotion is an indicator of the 
strength or influence of that emotion. Alternatively, we may think that insofar as emotion 
is the felt component of a passion, it is somehow the amount of emotion attending the 
passion that determines the passion’s power to direct the will. But as it turns out, the 
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connection between the violence of an emotion and the power of an emotion to motivate 
and determine the will do not have the direct correspondence that one might expect. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at what Hume intends by the violence or 
calmness of an emotion, and what its connection might be to the ‘impulse’ and ‘force’ 
that he identifies as both informing the formation of other passions—and even the 
adoption of some beliefs—and the influence of our impressions of reflection over the 
will.  
How does Hume characterize the distinction between calmness and violence of 
impressions of reflection? The idea of violent perceptions is introduced at the very 
beginning of the Treatise, in Hume’s introduction of the ideas/impressions distinction, 
which differ in “force and liveliness” (1.1.1.1). This is the difference between feeling and 
thinking that Hume takes to be so familiar to all. But even in the context of this first 
presentation, Hume is quick to acknowledge that this distinction between felt and unfelt 
mental states must be considered carefully, as there are ideas that may be accompanied 
by great force, and impressions that may have little feeling, which has the potential to 
confuse this otherwise generally clear distinction. The following passage, therefore, may 
be considered Hume’s first introduction of the distinction between calm and violent 
impressions:  
[I]t is not impossible but in particular instances [ideas and impressions] may very 
nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very 
violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the 
other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that 
we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. (1.1.1.1) 
 To be clear, there are four types of mental experiences being distinguished here. First, 
our unfelt perceptions of ideas; these are copies of our impressions that we clearly 
experience as unfelt. Second, our forcefully felt experience of impressions, which include 
vividly felt sensations, passions and emotions. These first two categories are easily 
distinguished on the basis of the obvious feeling or lack of feeling they present. The third 
manner of perception presents more of a challenge in categorizing, as these are our ideas 
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that “approach impressions,” generally experienced in vivid dreams, madness, and when 
we are experiencing ‘violent emotions’. Likewise, the fourth type are impressions with 
very faint or subtle feeling, which due to their resemblance in this regard to the lack of 
feeling in ideas, may be mistaken for such (this confusion, of course, is the cause of the 
tendency to attribute certain influences on the will to reason63). Therefore, while all 
perceptions may be divided into ideas and impressions, this distinction cannot 
consistently be made based only on the presence or absence of violent feeling. On the one 
hand, impressions may have subtle, calm feeling; on the other hand, ideas may occur in 
the context of violent feeling, which can cause them to “approach to our impressions” in 
our felt perception of them.64 
In Book I of the Treatise there are a few more places where Hume gives us hints about 
how to understand his use of the notion of violence in reference to mental events. In 
discussing the ‘paradox’ he has presented concerning the idea of necessary connection at 
1.3.14.24, Hume describes this thesis as the “most violent” of the ideas he will argue for 
in the Treatise. Earlier in his discussion of causality, he had indeed noted that the 
association of constantly conjoined causes and effects creates in us such a habit of 
expecting the one to follow the other that “we cannot without a sensible violence survey 
them in any other [relation]” (1.3.11.4; see also 1.3.11.11). Violence then it seems would 
be required to make our beliefs other than they would be by custom and habit. The 
suggestion seems to be that what is natural and easy to our minds is generally 
experienced with little feeling—at least with no feeling of opposition. Of course some 
‘natural and easy’ beliefs and relations of ideas have some kind of feeling attached. 
Believed ideas themselves are differentiated from other ideas by the way they feel, and 
these Hume tells us must be “founded on something natural and easy” (1.4.1.11). What is 
natural and easy in thinking, therefore, appears to be direction of thought that agrees with 
                                                 
63 See 2.3.3. 
64 Note that Hume allows for cases where ideas do in fact become the very impressions they are ideas of—
this is the function of the sympathy mechanism.  
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the associations our mind tends, by nature and custom, to make between various ideas 
and impressions, as well as the beliefs that result (see for instance, 1.4.5.12, 1.4.7.7, 
2.1.4.4 and 2.1.9.1).   And the experience of resistance to what is in this way ‘natural and 
easy’ Hume describes as a form of mental ‘violence.’   
Hume’s application of the calm/violent distinction is given a more explicit, but slightly 
different characterization as he introduces it more formally in his opening discussion in 
Book II. Here the distinction is applied directly to different kinds of impressions of 
reflection, not to mental events generally. All impressions of reflection can be considered 
as either calm or violent in kind (though, as I have argued above, this is not a strict 
category distinction in Hume). Hume lists as a generally calm impression of reflection 
“the sense of beauty and deformity in action composition, and external objects,” while 
the generally violent listed are the basic passions (both direct and indirect). Paralleling his 
introduction of the thinking/feeling distinction in 1.1.1.1, Hume follows the introduction 
of the calm/violent distinction with this comment: 
This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently 
rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call’d passions, 
may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in some manner, imperceptible. 
But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from 
beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish’d from 
each other. (2.1.1.3) 
As was argued above, the calm/violent distinction does not turn out to be a strict 
distinction of categories (making it disanalogous to the ideas/impressions distinction), but 
rather a distinction between ways in which particular impressions of reflection may be 
experienced. As it happens, there are certain types of impressions that we perceive to be 
generally experienced calmly, others which we tend to think of as violent. That all 
impressions of reflection have the potential to be experienced either way seems implied 
in much of Hume’s discussion of the two manners of experience that follows in Book II, 
not unlike his contention about vivid ideas and subtle impressions in Book I.  
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It is also worth considering how the term ‘emotion’ is being employed in the quotation 
above.  While ‘passion’ is being applied to a subsection of the impressions of reflection, 
those which are generally experienced violently, ‘emotion’ appears to apply to both 
kinds. Our calm impressions are identified with a kind of emotion (a soft, almost 
imperceptible emotion), and later in the paragraph Hume identifies the subject of Book II 
as “those violent emotions or passions.” All impressions of reflection may be divided into 
calm and violent, and all either calm or violent impressions of reflection would appear to 
be kinds of emotions. This is further evidence that the category of impressions of 
reflection is a category of emotion, in which passion is a subcategory.  
I have argued above that Hume introduces the calm/violent distinction not as a strict 
division of class in his taxonomy, but rather as a kind of rhetorical tool to “proceed with 
greater order” in carrying out two key aims of his work in Book II. The first aim is to 
point the reader to the narrowed topic of his book on impressions of reflection; rather 
than discuss these generally, Hume desires to treat the passions in particular. The reader 
is lead to understand what Hume means by this category of the passions by considering 
the typically more violent emotions that we experience. The second purpose of the 
calm/violent distinction is to offer a way to understand the confusion of certain 
impressions of reflection with reason. The similarity in feeling between reasoning and 
calmly experienced impressions of reflection leads us to the false belief that we can be 
motivated by reason alone. Understanding that there are different kinds of passions, some 
that have a strong feeling that is difficult to ignore, others with subtle feeling easily 
missed or confused with unfelt reasoning is useful to Hume’s arguments, even if the 
division is “vulgar and specious” (2.1.1.3).   
The description of the calm passions in Hume’s discussion of the influencing motives of 
the will presents a slightly different way of thinking about the emotion of these subtly felt 
passions. Hume says,  
Now it is certain that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which though 
they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by 
their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. (2.3.3.8) 
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Here the calmness of the passions in question (passions which we often confuse with 
reason) is linked directly to the amount of emotion they produce in the mind. This is an 
interesting distinction- while in other cases Hume speaks about the violence produced by 
passions as emotions, here he suggests that passions produce emotion. This way of 
speaking is not unique to this passage, and indeed, in the next section of my discussion 
we will take a closer look at the language of ‘attending’ that Hume often uses when 
discussing emotion. Hume’s tendency to move in and out of, (a) talking about passions as 
kinds of emotion, and (b) talking of passions as somehow producing emotion or being 
attended by emotion, will turn out to be a key aspect of the dual treatment of our affective 
mental states that I will ultimately argue characterizes Hume’s theory of the passions 
(Part Two of this work). 
We now move to consider Hume’s characterization of violence of emotion in Book II. 
Generally speaking Hume appears to assume that his description of certain passions or 
emotions as ‘violent’ is sufficient to point us to the feelings that he intends. But at 2.3.4.1 
Hume sheds light on how he intends his use of ‘violence’ when he identifies it with “the 
disorder [the passions] occasion in the temper.” He makes the same identification again at 
2.3.8.13. Violence is disruption of order in the mind, while calmness is agreement with 
the order of the mind. This seems in keeping with his uses of ‘violence’ in Book I 
mentioned above. For instance, to try to adopt his thesis about the lack of necessary 
connection between constantly conjoined events that we take to be causally related is to 
attempt to adopt a belief that runs deeply contrary to the order that our minds establish 
via custom, and is therefore a kind of violence. This is a kind of felt violence (1.3.11.4), a 
felt disorder, but this is not to say that feeling is violence, since believed ideas are 
distinguished from non-believed ideas by the felt manner in which we experience them, 
and this feeling generally occurs through the well-ordered “natural and easy” associations 
we tend to make through custom. Therefore the (presumably) subtle feeling of a believed 
idea occurs when there is not a violence of mind, but an established and natural flow of 
associations of custom. Violence is interference with this, and such interference we have 
a sensible experience of.   
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Understanding violence of mind in this way also sheds light on what makes the calm 
passions calm. Hume identifies as the first kind of calm passion our “sense of beauty and 
deformity” (2.1.1.3), and goes on later to add to his list of “calm desires and tendencies”  
…certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and 
resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to 
good and aversion to evil, consider’d merely as such. (2.3.3.8) 
Thus, the calm passions are initially identified with passionate responses we naturally 
have in certain circumstances, passions that Hume identifies as instinctive. It makes sense 
to think that original instincts such as these would not disorder the mind, but are rather 
very much in keeping with the customary order of our mental experience, hence the 
tendency towards an absence of violence when they occur. Hume goes on in the next 
paragraph to explain that certain of these original instincts, such as the desire for 
punishment of one who has hurt me,  may be experienced with violence as well, but not 
because they themselves are disorderly to the mind. Rather, “[w]hen I am immediately 
threatened with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great 
height, and produce a sensible emotion” (2.3.3.9). It is the numerous associated passions 
and emotions that cause the violence and disorder of the experience of these typically 
violent, but ‘original’ passions. One could assume that the generally calm passions 
derived from original instinct could likewise be experienced with other, stronger and 
more disorderly emotions, and therefore also violently. 
The cases in which passions are experienced with little or no disorder of the mind (i.e., 
violence) are curious when we consider Hume’s insistence that, while they are 
impressions, they are “so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from ideas” 
(1.1.1.1), and can “become in a manner imperceptible” (2.1.1.3). One might question, if 
these mental events are unfelt, in what sense are they impressions, a category apparently 
delineated by the force of feeling of its constituents? Perhaps the key is noting that “faint 
and low” is an indication of degree of feeling, not of non-existence, while “in a manner 
imperceptible” suggests maybe a context (say, in the presence of other strong feelings) in 
which what is otherwise perceptible, but subtle, is rendered imperceptible. In fact, the 
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calm passions Hume suggests are a much more common part of our experience than we 
might think. He argues,  
We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without 
an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much 
in our common indolent way of thinking, ‘tis easy, either in reading or in 
conversation, to discover them. (2.2.5.3) 
Our evaluations of things, whether aesthetic, moral, or just as they relate to our own 
pleasures or pains, are products of impressions of reflection, and generally are 
experienced as calm passions. We realize that we are experiencing these calm passions, 
not merely the workings of reason’s associations, more by “their effects than by the 
immediate feeling or sensation” (2.3.3.8). One example of the telling ‘effects’ that Hume 
offers is the observation that when ‘men of wit’ and poets use reference to what is 
beautiful and agreeable in their discourse they have greater success in gaining the 
audience’s approbation. Reflecting on what is pleasing is agreeable to the imagination, 
because of the nearly imperceptible emotion which accompanies the reflection, and 
therefore reference to these things enhances the effect of the words spoken, or poem read 
(2.2.5.3). And although Hume is not explicit at 2.3.3.8 about what the effects of the calm 
passions he is referring to are, given that this statement comes immediately following his 
famous argument for the impotency of reason alone to motivate us, and the need for 
preference, it seems clear that the fact that we are moved to act according to certain 
thoughts at all serves as proof for Hume that these are passions having an effect.   
We have established how we can discover the effects of calm passions on the will; 
predictably, the effects of the violent are more obvious, though their potential for effect is 
limited in (perhaps) surprising ways. Hume argues that we cannot necessarily equate 
violence of passion with strength to motivate the will and the direction of thought. He 
explains this thesis as follows: 
‘Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the 
disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has 
once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of 
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the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated 
custom and it own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions 
and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every 
momentary gust of passion. We must, therefore, distinguish between a calm and a 
weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. (2.3.4.1) 
There is much to unpack in this passage. I will address three main points. First, that the 
influence of passions over the will is not proportionate to their violence, despite intuitions 
that given Hume’s system of motivation this should be the case. Violent passions are not 
necessarily strong; calm passions are not necessarily weak. Second, that the calm 
passions, i.e., the passions that have become a part of the ordered workings of our mind, 
through custom and habit, generally do not produce sensible agitation. And third, the idea 
that ‘gusts’ of passion are ‘attended’ by emotion and opposition, the latter likely referring 
to the disordering effect of violence. I will look at each of these in turn.    
First, then, let us look at the relationship between violence and strength. As has been 
mentioned above, Hume often uses mechanical metaphors in explaining the workings of 
the mind, and in particular frequently uses the language of ‘impulse’ when describing 
motivation and the associated emotions. Impulses can be combined, redirected, and 
opposed depending on what other impulses they meet, and what the ‘attending 
circumstances’ of belief and associated ideas are. In 2.3.3.6, when explaining how it is I 
may come to prefer “my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater,” and act 
accordingly, Hume explains the unexpected force of a passion which we know will bring 
us less pleasure than another passion in these mechanical terms: 
A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what 
arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more 
extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a 
hundred by the advantage of its situation. (2.3.3.4) 
Hume takes our beliefs, current perceptions, customary associations, the force and 
vivacity of our impressions and ideas, and so on, to be circumstances of mind with 
influence on the advantage of our various passions in influencing the will. In this case, 
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one would assume that it is the violence of the passion for our lesser good that ultimately 
tips the scale in favour of that impulse. But the metaphor suggests that how this comes to 
be the case is not as simple as, say, our spontaneously having a violent passion for a good 
we believe to be lesser. In the metaphor the passion for the lesser good is compared to a 
one pound weight, suggesting that taken by itself, in isolation, the passion is not of much 
‘weight’, i.e., not likely to move us against other passions. It is the circumstances of 
situation that result in the counterintuitive mechanical feat of the one pound weight 
raising the hundred pound weight. Attending emotions, beliefs, associated ideas and 
impressions, must be involved in giving the ‘one pound’ passion the advantage over the 
one hundred pound passion. It is likely things like the force and vivacity of current [and 
perhaps ‘near’ (see 2.3.4.1 and below)] impressions that ultimately provide the violence 
sufficient for the passion for the lesser good to overcome the passion for ‘my own 
acknowledged greater good.’ 
We can likewise imagine mental circumstances such that the calmer, more ‘rational’ 
passions, whether acquired in response to beliefs about what is most likely to produce our 
own good or through the natural instincts that cause us to be kind to children and prefer 
what is generally good, could come by situation to provide greater impulse and influence 
over our actions than the violent passions. Hume provides a couple of different ways of 
understanding the influence of such passions. In 2.3.4 he explains that one way the calm 
passions, i.e., passions attended by less emotion in the form of disordering violence, 
come to have the dominant impulse is that they may come to be experienced violently: 
[A]ll depends on the situation of the object, and... a variation in this particular will 
be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other. Both these 
kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil. But herein lies the difference 
betwixt them: The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, 
when remote, produces only a calm one... [we shall here] consider some of those 
circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or 
violent. (2.3.4.1)  
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The “situation of the object” that makes the difference in this case Hume explains to be 
our beliefs about the degree to which the desired good that the passion points us towards 
is near or remote. ‘Nearness’ and ‘remoteness’ we can imagine come in different forms. 
An object that is physically near to us will have the advantage of the force and vivacity of 
immediate impressions of sensation, increasing the ‘violence’ of our experience of it, 
while a physically remote object may have to rely on the weaker ideas of memory and the 
imagination. On the other hand, an absent object may be ‘near’ in the sense that it would 
be easy to achieve, making our idea of achieving it more vivid, while a similarly absent 
object that would take more work or time to achieve would be considered more remote. 
In any case, things like our beliefs about how immediate our pleasure may be, and the 
force of current impressions surrounding the beliefs and the passions may all contribute 
to the possibility of a passion being a violent or a calm passion. 
Nearness of the object is of course only one way that a passion (whether typically calm or 
violent) may come to be experienced as calm or violent. Hume goes on in this section to 
explain further how the context of accompanying passions and emotions make a 
considerable difference to the strength of our passionate impulses to determine our will 
and support a dominant passion. He explains in 2.3.4 that the accompanying emotion of 
one passion is easily transfused into another (this important point about the fluidity of the 
force and impulse of passions will be examined further in 1.10 of this work). Therefore, a 
passion which on its own would be too calm to move us, may have the advantage of the 
force and vivacity of accompanying emotions added to it, making it strong enough to act 
as the dominant passionate impulse. One way to think about this might be to say that the 
passion has become violent. 
But that a typically calm passion may acquire the force and vivacity of emotion to be 
experienced as a violent passion is not entirely satisfactory as Hume’s explanation for 
how it is we come to be moved by our calm passions. Clearly the calm passions are not, 
in every instance in which they are motivating, accompanied by violent emotions—if this 
were the case there would not be the tendency to attribute the motivating power of the 
calm passions to reason. Hume provides the explanation of how it is the calm passions, in 
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a calm manner, come to motivate us in his discussion of the effects of custom on our 
passions (2.3.5).  
He begins by explaining the effects of custom on the mind in this way: 
Custom has two original effects upon the mind, in bestowing a facility in the 
performance of any action or the conception of any object; and afterwards a 
tendency or inclination, towards it; and from these we may account for all its 
other effects, however extraordinary. (2.3.5.1) 
It might be useful here to establish what Hume intends when he talks about custom. 
‘Custom’ in Hume refers to anything “which proceeds from a past repetition, without any 
new reasoning or conclusion” (1.3.8.10). The idea here appears to be that the effect of 
repetition of mental events creates in the mind a tendency towards the same flow of ideas 
and impressions that it has repeatedly experienced in the past. This makes custom, in 
function, related to the natural principles of association our minds operate under (1.3.7.6). 
For example, in the Abstract Hume explains that custom is what causes us to move from 
our impression of a billiard-ball moving towards another to the idea of the second ball in 
motion. This kind of causal relationship is one we have observed enough times that our 
minds move easily and naturally from one idea to its associate. ‘Custom,’ therefore, 
refers both to the repetition of mental events in our lives, as well as the effects these 
repetitions have on our tendencies towards association.  
How it is exactly that a tendency towards certain associations develops (or particular 
flows of ideas and impressions become ‘natural and easy’ for the mind) is not entirely 
clear. Hume clearly takes our first hand experience of such trends to be strong evidence 
that our minds operate in this way. He also occasionally appears to be assuming a sort of 
physiological picture of the brain, as is found in writers like Descartes and Malebranche, 
where physical ‘traces’ in the brain deepen with time and repetition of particular 
impressions and passions, creating tendencies towards certain flows of spirits, and 
therefore, trains of thought. At 2.3.5.2, Hume explains that new ideas and actions are met 
with “a certain unpliableness in the faculties, and a difficulty of the spirit’s moving in 
their new direction.” Such difficulty “excites the spirits” and, “like everything, which 
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enlivens the mind to a moderate degree” is pleasurable. But this ‘unpliableness’ also fits 
the Humean definition of violence in the mind. It is a disordering of the natural and easy 
passages of thought and association. Therefore, the passions which excite and work 
against our customary tendencies are the violent passions. Our passions which are in 
keeping with our natural and easy associations (whether original instincts or acquired 
through custom), are experienced as calm passions.  
This puts into perspective the second point taken from 2.3.4.1: Hume’s claim that the 
calm passions come to “produce no longer any sensible agitation.” The calm passions are 
not a source of sensible agitation and disorder—but are they entirely without feeling? At 
various places Hume seems clear that calmness of passions does not amount to a lack of 
feeling, but rather a kind of ‘tranquility’ of feeling. Where violent passions produce 
disorder and felt agitation, custom produces facility, and facility Hume describes as a 
“very powerful principle of the human mind, and an infallible source of pleasure” 
(2.3.5.3). This particular kind of pleasure “does not so much consist in any ferment of the 
spirits, as in their orderly motion” (2.3.5.3), and in fact the pleasure of order may at times 
be strong enough to counteract the uneasiness and pain that may otherwise accompany 
the ideas and impressions we are experiencing. Of course, this subtle pleasure is a calm 
pleasure born of the manner of the experience of the passion (similar to how a violent 
passion takes some of its feeling from the disordering violence of its manner of 
experience). We may assume, as Hume has stated in other places, that aside from the 
calm pleasure of facility, calm passions and emotions are still impressions of reflection, 
and have, albeit subtle and nearly imperceptible, valenced feeling. 
The third point of discussion from 2.3.4.1 concerns Hume’s reference to “momentary 
gust[s] of passion.” These, he tells us, are attended by opposition and emotion. In light of 
the discussion above, we can understand these gusts of passion to be bursts of 
impressions of reflection not part of our settled ordering of the brain, and therefore 
disruptive to it, if brief. The context of the reference to gusts in Hume’s discussion is the 
contrast of the motivating effects of calm passions over fleeting, though violent, passions. 
The emphasis here seems to be on the staying power of the passion. Bursts of violence 
may not have a lasting effect on a will that has the constant influence of calm passions of 
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custom.  Such gusts of opposition and emotion, however, it is implied can have directing 
influence over the will—it is only through the effects of custom that the calm passions 
come to be able to dominate, and even at times convert the force and violence of our 
fleeting passions to their own ends, in directing the will. 
A summary of Hume’s take on the motivational effects of the calm and violent passions 
can be found in his own words in the final paragraph of 2.3.8:  
We commonly understand by passion a violent and sensible emotion of mind, 
when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original 
formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean 
affections of the very same kind with the former; but such as operate more 
calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquility leads us into a 
mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our 
intellectual faculties. 
Here Hume offers a reconciliation of his arguments with the common way of speaking 
about reason and the passions. Reason is defined in terms of the calm passions, and our 
tendency to confuse these with workings of the intellect (demonstrative and probable 
reasoning) is explained. He continues,    
Both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, 
and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every 
individual. Generally speaking, the violent passions have a more powerful 
influence on the will; tho` `tis often found, that the calm ones, when corroborated 
by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to control them in their more 
furious movements. 
The history and natural temperament of the individual affects the circumstances that may 
cause a passion to be calm or violent, as well as the strength that a calm or violent 
passion may have to motivate us. Interestingly, here Hume concedes that generally 
speaking, violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will. However, he then 
turns to put power over the passions in the reader’s hands, but saying that reflection and 
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resolution can help us control the violent impulses of such passions. Presumably, the idea 
is that we have some control over the repetition and custom that will lead to the 
development of stronger calm passions, capable of moving us in the face of violent 
opposition. Hume then concludes,  
What makes this whole affair more uncertain, is, that a calm passion may easily 
be chang`d into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the 
circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from an 
attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination. (2.3.8.13) 
This, of course, is where this section ends in explanation, and the next two pick up. The 
calmness and violence of passions, and the effect such a manner of experience has on the 
will, is influenced greatly by the tendency of the dominant passions (whether calm or 
violent) to ‘borrow’ and even convert force and impulse from attending passions and 
emotions. But before moving on to the discussion of these, here is a final summary on the 
relationship between emotion and violence/calmness.   
Calm passions are (or have) subtle feeling, though it shouldn’t be overlooked that they 
are still impressions of reflection, and therefore are kinds of emotions themselves. But we 
could also say that when we experience passions calmly, those subtle emotions are not 
attended by much additional emotion (such as the violence arising from passions which 
cause mental disorder). This is in contrast with violently experienced passions, which can 
be violent for two reasons: one, because the passion itself is disruptive to our natural 
patterns of thinking, disordering the mind and providing vividly felt impulse; or two, 
because the passion is attended with violent emotion, which lends its feeling and impulse 
to the dominant (perhaps even otherwise calm) passion that is driving our will. The 
effects of violence and emotion on the will are therefore only fully understood when we 
understand Hume’s use of ‘attending’ and his contention that the emotions are fluid and 
transient in their attending. The next two sections will treat these topics.  
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1.9 Emotion as ‘attending’ impressions and ideas 
 
This section examines instances where Hume talks about emotions as ‘attending’ various 
perceptions, both ideas and impressions. Effectively, it is the beginning of a discussion 
about how it is Hume talks about the operation of these valenced feelings in conjunction 
with our other mental experiences, a topic that will carry on over into the next section. 
The language of ‘attending’ in Hume’s explanations of the impressions of reflection has 
already appeared in the discussions above, frequently with the ‘attendee’ being some 
degree of emotion or force of feeling. Such emotions do not only attend passions for 
Hume—ideas too are at times described as being ‘attended’ by emotions (or even by full-
fledged passions). The purpose of this section is to add some depth to our understanding 
of what Hume means when he talks about ideas and passions as being ‘attended’ by 
emotion. This discussion is of particular importance in that an understanding of feeling as 
attending other mental events is the starting place for the final topic we will consider in 
examining Hume’s use of ‘emotion’: the very important Humean doctrines surrounding 
the transitivity, mixing and general fluidity of feeling and emotion in his picture of the 
human mind. 
The language of ‘attending’ shows up early in the Treatise. In the first section of Book I, 
Hume introduces his impressions and ideas distinction and argues that, “every simple 
impression is attended with a correspondent idea” (1.1.1.8). Here ‘attended’ appears to 
mean ‘is accompanied by.’ This type of use, generally referring to the way various ideas 
and impressions accompany each other, continues throughout Book I of the Treatise. 
  
75 
 
Hume also introduces there the idea that belief ‘attends’ memory and sensation,65 
meaning in Humean terms that ideas of memory and sensation are always attended, i.e., 
accompanied, by a degree of liveliness, force and vivacity that is lacking in our non-
believed ideas. This is a significant development—we learn from it that it is not only 
ideas and impressions that can ‘attend’ other ideas and impressions, but also that Hume 
will sometimes talk about the manner of perception as a kind of ‘attending’ feeling. In 
“Of the influence of belief” Hume extends this idea further by showing how the passions 
are favourable to belief by lending to our ideas the feeling and liveliness that naturally 
attends them, so that the ideas (now attended by feeling) “[resemble] the inferences we 
draw from experience,” i.e., the inferences we believe due to vivacity of immediate 
impressions of the objects in question, not borrowed vivacity (1.3.10.466). In a related 
vein, Hume talks at 1.3.11.2 about probability as being evidence “still attended with 
uncertainty”, another feeling or manner of perception (which we learn in 2.3.9 is an 
uneasy feeling). In short, along with discussions of various impressions and ideas 
attending each other, Hume is inclined to talk about feelings of various kinds (force, 
vivacity, pleasure, uneasiness, etc) attending impressions and ideas, often contributing to 
the ‘manner’ in which they are experienced.   
What one finds when tracing Hume’s use of ‘attention’ in the Treatise is that while it is 
not a technical term for Hume, it is a common metaphor used in his descriptions of the 
way various mental events are experienced in conjunction with each other, and at times 
combined. Sometimes the ‘attendee’ is a distinct idea or impression, while at other times 
it is a kind of feeling or vivacity that affects the manner of experience of the ideas and/or 
impressions in question. For instance, to say an idea of a present object is attended by an 
idea of an absent object that custom tells us is usually conjoined with the first (the case of 
                                                 
65For instances where Hume talks about belief attending impressions and ideas, see for example 1.3.5.7, 
1.3.8.8-10, 1.3.8.15, and 1.3.13.20. Hume alternatively at times talks about vivacity and liveliness as 
attending belief (see for example 1.3.10.7 and 1.3.13.13). 
66 See also 1.3.14.24, where Hume fears the typical “astonishment attending everything extraordinary” will 
cause his readers to find their contempt at his thesis concerning causality to be more lively.  
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causal beliefs), is to  say that what typically accompanies some idea or impression is 
another idea or impression. On the other hand, to say that an idea is attended by belief 
(force and vivacity), or that believed ideas are attended themselves by force and vivacity, 
is to suggest the ‘attendee’ is a kind of felt aspect of the mental event; the ‘attendee’ is 
some aspect of the manner of the experience.  
This sort of dual way of talking about what it is that attends ideas and impressions is 
reflected in the discussions of Book II of the Treatise as well. On the one hand, particular 
passions may be found to attend each other. For example, at 2.2.6.3, Hume says that the 
indirect passions are not attended by the direct passion of desire. The implication seems 
to be that the direct passions, on the other hand, are always attended by some form of 
desire or aversion, which makes them direct causes of action. On the other hand, there are 
also instances where a kind of feeling is spoken of as attending a passion, but not 
identical to the passion. Often these feelings are presented as being transferable between 
passions (and ideas). For instance, when talking about the indirect passions at 2.3.9.4, 
Hume says that pleasure attends the passion of pride, and may itself be deflected back to 
the direct passions, increasing our desire (for instance) for the things which give us pride. 
Here the attending pleasure is considered separable from the passion itself, and is able to 
spread over and attend other passions we may be experiencing. This feature of attending 
feeling that may move between ideas and impressions turns out to be very important for 
Hume. I would like to suggest that ‘emotion’ for Hume is often used to reference this 
kind of ‘attending feeling.’ 
One example of emotion being used in this way may be found in Hume’s discussion of 
the difference between calm and violent passions. Hume’s discussion at 2.3.4, “Of the 
causes of the violent passions,” explains calm and violent experiences of particular 
passions in terms of the feeling that does or does not attend them. When discussing the 
possibility of calm passions moving the will as a result of custom, Hume talks of the 
violent passions yielding to the force of custom “without that opposition and emotion, 
which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion” (2.3.4.1). Violent gusts of 
passion are here characterized as being attended by emotion. That same emotion may also 
act as an opposing impulse to that provided by our calm passions. The suggestion seems 
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to be that it is this feeling, the ‘attending emotion,’ that makes the experience of the 
violent passions violent. On the flip side, the calm passions “produce little emotion in the 
mind,” causing them to resemble the operation of reason, which is entirely without 
attending emotion (2.3.3.8).67 As has been argued above, this does not mean that calm 
passions are emotionless—rather, the emotion of a calm passion is more subtle.68 One 
might think of it in these terms: all passions are themselves emotions, but the instances of 
passion we describe as violent are attended by more obvious feeling (emotion) than those 
we describe as calm.  
There is reason to think the feeling or emotion attending a passion in this sense is, though 
intimately tied to the experience of the passion, not identical to the passion. One reason 
for understanding these emotions in this way will become clearer in the discussion of the 
fluidity and transitivity of emotion in the next section. Here we will look at another 
reason for understanding the emotions in this way: through a key discussion of ‘attending 
emotion’ found at 2.2.8.  
In this section Hume is seeking explain the ‘secondary passion’ of malice without 
appealing to new principles of mind. That is to say, he wants to show how this passion 
which “imitates the effects of hatred” (a passion we come by through ‘original instinct,’ 
which is to say that we are naturally predisposed to respond to certain kinds of objects 
and causes with that passion) arises indirectly, as a result of other original mental 
mechanisms. Among the natural tendencies of particular interest to Hume in his 
                                                 
67 For the claim that calm passions can be as “silent and imperceptible” as reason, and the supporting claim 
that reason operates without generating emotion, see also 2.1.9.4 and 2.2.2.6. 
68 One way of explaining the efficacy of the calm passions is, of course, with reference to general rules (see 
the previous section of this work, as well as Hume’s discussion at 2.3.4). But Hume also hints at the 
possibility that some emotions come to be experienced calmly (so calmly, in fact, that we tend not to 
recognize them as emotions) because the experience of these feelings is so typical for us. At 2.2.8.4 Hume 
claims that “custom may make us insensible” of the subtle emotion that attends almost every perception. 
Thus, calm passions may seem to be emotionless simply because the feeling of the emotion that typically 
attends them is so familiar or customary that we no longer are particularly sensible to it.    
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explanation is our natural tendency “to judge more of objects by comparison than from 
their intrinsic worth and value” (2.2.8.2). To explain this original tendency of judgment 
by comparison, Hume likens it to the bodily experience of warming one hand, cooling the 
other and then putting both in the same warm water. The results, of course, would be the 
feeling of cold in the previously heated hand, and the feeling of warmth in the previously 
cooled hand. Our judgment of how hot or cool the water is is dependent on the 
comparison with the state of the hand previously. Hume argues that judgments of the 
changes in the pleasure/pain we experience are similar—we judge the degree of 
pain/pleasure we are in by comparing immediately previous or typically familiar 
experiences of pain/pleasure with current impressions. Thus, 
A small degree of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation, 
as if less than it really is, and even sometimes the opposite quality. A gentle pain, 
that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather becomes a pleasure; as on 
the other hand a violent pain, succeeding a gentle one, is doubly grievous and 
uneasy. (2.2.8.2) 
Hume takes it as obvious that this tendency in judgment applies not only to sensations 
and pain/pleasure, but in fact to all our passions (2.2.8.3).69 His point seems to be that all 
impressions we tend to judge by comparison; that is, what we experience in a felt manner 
we judge relative to our typical or preceding feelings. What Hume takes to be less clear is 
how it is we come to judge of our ideas (and by extension the objects of our ideas) in the 
same way. If judging by comparison is a matter of comparing difference of feeling, how 
is it that we frequently make judgments about our unfelt ideas in the same way? To be 
clear, the phenomenon that Hume is seeking to explain is our tendency to judge the 
objects of our ideas to have certain properties relative to other objects we are inclined to 
compare them to. For instance, a hill will be judged to be tall in an otherwise flat 
                                                 
69 Thus, our joy will seem greater when it is preceded by a period of sadness; or (as in the case of malice) 
“according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an 
estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure” (2.2.8.8).   
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landscape, though it will be judged small if it is at the foot of a mountain range. Hence, 
with any given object we may “form such different judgments…and at one time admire 
its bulk, and at another despise its littleness” (2.2.8.3). Hume points out that we do this 
despite that fact that the ideas themselves, as copies of our impressions and the results of 
the functioning of our sense organs, need not vary for us to make varied judgments 
concerning them.70  
The tendency to judge according to comparison is an original principle of the human 
mind for Hume and it is explained in terms of feeling. The explanation of how it is that 
unfelt ideas are likewise frequently judged according to this principle is the following 
interesting claim that Hume introduces in this passage, but references several more times 
in Book II: 
I believe it may safely be establish’d for a general maxim that no object is 
presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d 
with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it; and however custom 
may make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to confound it with the 
object or idea, ‘twill be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and 
distinguish them.  (2.2.8.4) 
Unfelt ideas are subject to our tendency toward judgment by comparison because 
(almost71) all objects of thought are attended with some degree of emotion, which means 
they are all accompanied with some degree of feeling. This feeling may be exceedingly 
subtle and even generally undetected, but these are nonetheless distinct sensations from 
                                                 
70 See 2.2.8.3 for Hume’s brief comment on how “[t]he eyes refract the rays of light, and the other optic 
nerves convey the images to the brain in the very same manner, whether a great or small object has 
proceded…”. 
71 Hume presents this claim in the slightly weaker form in other places. He does think there are 
exceptions—ideas that are not accompanied by any emotion, but these he takes to be rare and non-typical.  
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the ideas themselves that we can discover by careful consideration of our experience, and 
the help of some of Hume’s trusty ‘experiments.’ 
Note that this is a passage where emotion appears to be equated with ‘movement of 
spirits.’ Thus, the modern reader may be tempted to simply assume this easy explanation 
of Hume’s claim: we generally understand today that all mental events have a 
physiological basis, and in particular that all perceptions have their beginnings in the 
activity of nerves and the firing of neurons. Could it be that this claim merely amounts to 
that? That is to say, could we read this paragraph as suggesting that Hume intuits a 
physiological component of all perceptions (including those of the imagination), and 
means no more than this?  
Clearly Hume takes the emotion that attends every object we conceive of to have a 
connection to some physiological event(s). But it cannot be accurate to say this is merely 
what Hume means by this new claim. As was discussed earlier in this work,72 there is 
good reason to think that Hume took there to be an important relationship between 
physiological events and our experiences of emotion. But he left thinking about and 
working out the physiology to the anatomists and naturalists. His interest was not in the 
physical side of these events, but the felt, mental side. Thus his claim about an emotion 
attending every object perceived is not a claim about spirits moving, it is a claim about 
feeling (though, as has been established, this is the kind of subtle feeling that Hume 
admits we commonly fail to note, despite its reality). This is also the only way to make 
sense of this new maxim as an explanation of the tendency to judge ideas of objects by 
comparison. Judgment by comparison is explained in terms of contrasting feelings, and 
judging according to resemblance and departure from preceding or typical felt 
experience. Thus, it is feeling that must accompany the ideas of objects we judge by 
comparison to each other, not mere physiology. 
                                                 
72 In section 1.4, “Emotion as feeling.” 
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The passage above is the first formal introduction of this seemingly important “general 
maxim” to Hume’s philosophy of mind. Hume illustrates this principle with reference to 
the felt effect of large objects, or vast numbers of objects on the observer: 
[‘T]is evident, that any very bulky object, such as the ocean, an extended plain, a 
vast chain of mountains, a wide forest; or any very numerous collection of 
objects, such as an army a fleet, a crowd, excite in the mind a sensible emotion; 
and that the admiration, which arises on the appearance of such objects, is one of 
the most lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying. Now as this 
admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of the objects, 
we may conclude… that ‘tis a compound effect, proceeding from the conjunction 
of the several effects, which arise from each part of the cause. (2.2.8.4) 
The compound effect of the felt emotion attending each distinct object or unit of 
extension in such cases is a feeling of admiration. And as this admiration is proportionate 
to the increase or decrease in size or number of the object or objects being admired, 
Hume takes himself to have shown that “[e]very part… of extension, and every unite of 
number has a separate emotion attending it, when conceiv’d by the mind.”73 Note that 
these attending emotions can’t be conceived merely as bodily sensations—compounded 
they become (in this case) the passion of admiration. They are not, therefore, simple body 
sensations, rather in Hume’s terminology they are a kind of impression of reflection, a 
felt response to the considered object. In this case, compounded, these feelings become 
                                                 
73 This claim somewhat echoes Hume’s discussion at 1.3.12.24, regarding our tendency to prefer the 
slightly greater number of chances to the lesser, even when the numbers are so great that we could not 
possibly feel the effects of all of them on our belief directly. Hume explains our preference with reference 
to general rules, and draws an analogy to the passions in the form of compounded desires. The similar 
claim is therefore somewhat between the lines: just as compounded desires result in a stronger overall 
desire, compounded impressions of some causal connection result in a strong feeling of conviction. 
Number of objects is relevant to the feeling we get from consideration of the objects, as attending emotion 
compounds. 
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the passion of admiration.74 And since he has shown them to be present in the case of 
number and extension, Hume adds that it therefore must be also allowed to be the case 
for those objects of thought , “which are always attended with an evident emotion” such 
as “vice and virtue, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery” and so on 
(2.2.8.4). Hence, we may state his new maxim in this way: Every object of thought, 
whether ideas of objects outside of us or any object of the imagination, is attended with 
some degree of emotion, rightly considered distinct from the things conceived 
themselves.  
Hume goes on in this section to link his conclusions about the tendency of the emotion 
attending every cognition to make us judge by comparison with his theory concerning 
general rules. “Every object is attended with some emotion proportion’d to it,” and 
because of judgments made by comparison, “a great emotion succeeding a small one 
becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary proportion” (2.2.8.6). In other words, 
though the object itself hasn’t changed, nor even has our idea of it, the amount of 
attending emotion changes when we judge by comparison that some object is actually 
bigger/smaller, hotter/cooler, more beautiful/uglier, etc…  This attending emotion 
(though, presumably, we do not always realize that is what we are responding to) we take 
to be directly proportionate to the actual object (here we have the application of a general 
rule). Therefore, 
… when the emotion increases, we naturally imagine that the object has likewise 
encreas’d. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of 
emotion to a certain magnitude of object; nor do we consider, that comparison 
may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object.” (2.2.8.6) 
                                                 
74 For more on compounded passions see 1.3.12.24: “’Tis evident... that when an object produces any 
passion in us, which varies according to the different quantity of the object; I say, ‘tis evident, that the 
passion, properly speaking, is not a simple emotion, but a compounded one, of a great number of weaker 
passions, deriv’d from a view of each part of the object.” See also 1.3.12.16 for a description of the maxim 
of compounded effects.  
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Hume’s discussion of the emotion attending every idea is meant to provide 
proof/reasoning for a claim he takes us all to find easily observable and familiar: the 
tendency to compare things and pass judgments based on how things are measured 
against each other, not against some constant standard. It is this tendency to compare that 
is being used in order to explain malice and envy. But the mechanism of comparison is 
itself explained as an independent (and therefore, one would assume, independently 
important) principle of the human mind. And its operation in the case of ideas is 
explained with the claim that an emotion attends every object. This “new discovery of an 
impression, that attends every idea” (2.2.8.7) is mentioned again at 2.2.8.14 and 2.2.10.9 
(where he uses the phrase, “almost every kind of idea is attended with some emotion”), 
and must be taken seriously as a posited feature of the mental landscape that Hume was 
committed to. 
I would like to suggest that Hume’s insistence on an attending impression to the 
cognition of every object carves out a role for the emotions in Hume that is unique to 
emotion, not shared with the specific passions. Though passions may attend ideas (just as 
ideas may attend other ideas, or passions etc), there is a special category of attending 
impressions here: the felt impressions that attend every object. The term Hume most 
often uses for this kind impression is ‘emotion.’ Therefore, I would like to suggest that 
emotions, as something distinct from passions (particularly the ‘fully established 
passions’ discussed above), are the kind of impressions that attend every perception.  
This claim is more about conceptual distinctions in Hume than technical language. The 
difference I have suggested here between emotions and passions in Hume is obviously 
not one that he articulated, and there may be good reason to think that he himself had not 
consciously committed to making such a clearly labeled technical distinction between 
emotions and passions. In fact, despite the consistency with which Hume calls the 
attending feelings either ‘emotions’ or the more general ‘impressions’ throughout most of 
2.2.8, at the very end of his discussion he abruptly becomes looser in his language, for the 
first time using ‘passion’ when discussing the attending impression: 
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...no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, or by the passions they 
separately produce, unless they be united together by some relation, which may 
cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or 
impressions, attending the ideas; and may preserve the one impression in the 
passage of the imagination to the object of the other. (2.2.8.20) 
A few things can be said about this passage. First, Hume’s sudden choice to label the 
attending impressions to certain ideas ‘passions’ directly follows the use of various 
examples of objects eliciting aesthetic responses (poetry and painting at 2.2.8.18 and 
2.2.8.19 respectively). Such ideas may very well be attended by fully formed passions, 
not the less specific feelings of emotion. That is to say, it could be that the claim that all 
objects of thought are attended by some emotion need not exclude the possibility that this 
emotion is really the felt component of a fully formed passion. It is likely Hume would 
allow that there is a distinguishable attending emotion that is a component of that 
passion. In some sense, all passions are ‘compounded’ for Hume. This is made clear 
when he offers the following description of the identity of a passion:   
…[W]e must consider, that ‘tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain 
or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent 
and tendency of it from beginning to the end. One impression may be related to 
another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along 
suppos’d in the preceding cases; but also when their impulses or directions are 
similar and correspondent. (2.2.9.2)  
This ‘maxim’ is repeated formally at 2.2.9.11: 
But ‘tis a maxim, which I have just now establish’d, and which is absolutely 
necessary…That ‘tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure, 
which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency 
of it from the beginning to the end. 
If a passion is properly characterized by a collection of mental events and tendencies, 
then certainly the attending emotion will be a component part of the passion. Thus, 
  
85 
 
reference to the attending ‘passion’ may not only be loose use of terminology by Hume. 
It may also suggest that the attending emotion is frequently a component of a broader 
experience of passion that is also rightly spoken of as attending the cognition in question. 
Hume’s language at 1.3.12.24, where his discussion seems to anticipate the maxim he 
presents at 2.2.8 concerning the effects of attending impressions, is similarly loose. There 
he uses both the terms ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ to designate a particular kind of attending 
impression that once compounded results in a full passion. In this discussion, however, he 
draws a helpful distinction between the ‘compounded passion’ that is a result of the large 
quantity of object(s), and the ‘simple emotion’ that attends each discrete unit in question. 
Thus, though he does refer in this passage to the attending emotions as ‘passions’, he 
illustrates that the kind of conceptual distinction I am suggesting between fully 
characteristic passions and simple felt emotions still obtains. 
In summary, in this section I have sought to show the following. For Hume almost all 
perceptions of objects (impressions, ideas, passions, etc) are attended by emotion. This 
attending emotion is not to be understood as identical to the perceptions, but rather a 
distinct accompanying feeling (possibly with physiological underpinnings). It is likely 
that these feelings largely constitute the manner of experience of each particular 
perceptions, as well as play a large role in how we come to judge, understand, and have 
passionate reactions to the things we perceive. They can be appealed to to explain the 
violence or calmness of experiences of particular passions, as well as the judgments we 
make by comparison of various ideas and impressions.  
The next section will look at the emotions as they play a role in the transitivity, fluidity 
and mixing of ideas and impressions in Hume’s picture of the passionate mind. This topic 
is essentially related to what has just been established concerning attending emotion. I 
will argue that attending emotions are the feelings that move between and transform 
passions. There are several ways that Hume explains the interactions, oppositions and 
mixing of impressions, but I will argue that his writing suggests a useful conceptual 
distinction between the static “established passions,” which are in a sense more cognitive 
in nature, with a set character and structure, and the more transient emotions, valenced 
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feelings that attend all perceptions and can bleed into one another, become one another, 
and under very particular circumstances, oppose one another.  
But before moving on to the discussion of the transitivity, fluidity and mixing of the 
emotions, I want to note two areas of Hume’s broader philosophy of mind that seem of 
particular interest in light of the thesis about attending emotions established above, and 
what will be said about the interactions of these attending impressions of reflection in 
what follows. Both Hume’s doctrine of belief, and his doctrine of the sympathy 
mechanism make reference and give important place to attending emotions. Consider first 
this statement concerning the nature of believed ideas: 
[B]elief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity 
is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the 
violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon 
either of them. It is too weak to take hold of the mind, or be attended with 
emotion. (2.3.6.1075) 
As was discussed at the beginning of this section, a believed idea for Hume is an idea 
attended with a certain vivacity, which is itself sometimes characterized as a felt manner 
of experiencing an idea. In the quotation above there is an obvious link drawn between 
that attending vivacity that is necessary for belief and attending emotion. One way to read 
this passage even seems to suggest that the feeling accompanying the believed idea that 
makes it a belief is the same as the feeling of the attending emotion that will make this 
believed idea a basis for passions. That is, the attending emotion may play the role of 
differentiating believed ideas from mere ideas. This (perhaps) surprising claim will 
receive further treatment in the next section, where I will try to work out more about the 
relationship between attending vivacity and attending emotion. 
It is also worth considering Hume’s sympathy mechanism in the context of these two 
sections. Consider the following:  
                                                 
75 Italics are mine. 
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In general we may remark that the minds of men are like mirrors to one another, 
not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of 
passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay 
away by insensible degrees. (2.2.5.21) 
The mechanism itself is not explained here, but Hume’s claim in this passage is certainly 
supported by his account of the principle of sympathy, whereby ideas we have of the 
passions of others gain enough force and vivacity to become the very impressions we 
perceive experienced in our own minds. Though the introduction of the sympathy 
mechanism at 2.1.11 focuses on the principle as a communicator of passions, this passage 
talks about the reflecting of “emotions”, which are then broken down into “passions, 
sentiments and opinions.” I have, of course, argued that ‘emotion’ is a broader category 
than passion, so the inclusion of both passions and sentiments is not surprising. The 
inclusion of opinions in the list of ‘emotions’ reflected between people is more 
surprising. Opinion arguably may be thought as a kind of belief, which is itself clearly 
not an emotion. But if one assumes that attending emotion is what makes an idea a belief 
(as was suggested above), it is easy to make sense of Hume’s inclusion of opinion among 
the emotions reflected between human minds. So two new things must be considered as 
we look at the next section: first, whether Hume’s claims about the workings of sympathy 
suggest an identity relationship between attending vivacity and attending emotion; and 
second, how precisely it is that sympathy operates to transfer beliefs between people, or 
even attending emotion more generally.   
 
 
1.10 Emotions as transient, fluid and mixing 
 
Book I of the Treatise makes clear the central role played by Hume’s associationism in 
his picture of mind. This is no less the case for his theory of the passions than it is for his 
epistemology, as has been evidenced by the story he tells about the production of various 
  
88 
 
passions (particularly the indirect passions) through the relations between certain kinds of 
ideas and impressions. But it is not merely the production of the passions that is governed 
by his associationism, but also their influences, effects and interactions. In Book II of the 
Treatise Hume presents a picture of the mind where the basic mechanics of his 
associationism is taken to the next level. His project is to explain much of human 
experience and psychology in terms of the foundational principles governing the mind he 
has presented in Book I, along with the odd new principle or maxim, as he calls them, 
thrown into the mix. These new governing mental rules tend to either be derivative from 
the basic principles found in Book I, or be facts about the nature of the mind that Hume 
notes from experience, attributes to our original nature, and takes to be evident in virtue 
of common experience.   
The project of explaining all mental experience in terms of his basic principles and 
maxims, Hume himself admits, is ambitious. In the latter part of his discussion of the 
influences on the will, close to the end of Book II, and after trying to account for the 
influence of violent passions, calm passions, general rules, custom, the imagination and 
contiguity in space and time, he comments: 
Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call’d, diversifies 
human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from 
themselves in different times. Philosophy can only account for a few of the 
greatest and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and 
more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her 
comprehension. (2.3.8.13)  
At the beginning of Book II Hume had stated that, “having said all I thought necessary 
concerning our ideas” he has the ambitious goal of “now explain[ing] those violent 
emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects” (2.1.1.3).  Though it is 
certainly less dramatic, the contrast between the opening statement of ambitions for his 
work on the passions and the admittance of limitation by the end of the book parallels the 
contrast between Hume’s ambitious, even boastful opening to his epistemology in Book I 
and the famously uncertain bout of melancholy in 1.4.7. But the difficulty noted in Book 
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II is importantly different in that Hume seems confident that he has successfully provided 
the basic tools in the form of maxims and principles governing the mind to at least make 
a start at explaining any particular ‘event’ in the internal wars we experience between our 
calm and violent passions, along with all the other variations of associated emotion and 
vividly felt ideas. His challenge, it turns out, is the complexity with which our ever 
changing mental states fluctuate, interact and ultimately determine our actions and 
characters, according to his principles and maxims.  
The transient, fluctuating nature of felt experience turns out to be the key factor in this 
‘wheeling’76 of the mind. While associations of ideas can cause the imagination to run 
through images, it is only once these ideas are infused with feeling that they come to 
produce beliefs, passions and motivations, and really come to shape thought, action and 
experience. Hume’s attempt to outline how this works through his theory of the passions 
is a considerable expansion from his ambitions in Book I, and Hume himself seems to be 
acknowledging in the quote above that any such attempt will come up short due to the 
complexity of mental experience. I would like to try to paint a general picture of how it is 
our minds move between impression and their associated ideas (and vice versa), and how 
these ultimately come to motivate us and contribute to belief on Hume’s account.77 I will 
argue that it turns out that an understanding of attending emotion, as discussed in the last 
section, can very helpfully inform the picture of how it is our mental states operate with a 
kind of fluidity of emotion, mixing various passions and emotions, as well as 
transitioning between particular ‘established’ passions.    
                                                 
76 A metaphor used by Hume at 2.2.2.9 when discussing the change we can anticipate on our state of mind 
upon the introduction of new relations of ideas and impressions (and the removal of others) from our 
situation: “I immediately perceive the affections to wheel about…” 
77 Another function this movement of the mind certainly plays is the establishing of character. This is a 
very interesting topic, that Hume says very little directly about, though I will not have opportunity in this 
work to pursue it much further than the occasional mention of the effects of and on character in the various 
interactions of ideas and impressions that make up the mind’s activity.  
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Hume makes the following statement about the fluctuating nature of the passionate mind: 
‘Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that 
passion alone, without any change or variation. Human nature is too inconsistent 
to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. (2.1.4.3) 
The essential characteristic of changeableness of the mind is what this section is about. 
Hume offers this characterization in his initial discussion of the principles behind the 
variety of causes that excite pride and humility, a discussion which of course leads 
eventually to his positing a necessary double relation of impressions and ideas. This 
mechanism for generating the indirect passions relies upon the mind’s tendency to have 
us “cast our view on every side” (2.3.3.3) and naturally discover associations.   In 2.1.4 
Hume offers a characterization of this kind of passion driven association. This is a useful 
starting place for our discussion of the transitivity, fluidity and mixing of the various 
impressions of reflection.  
He starts off his explanatory process by offering the basic principles under which all the 
change and variation of the mind will occur.  He begins by reminding the reader of two of 
his basic principles of mind: the association of ideas and the association of impressions. 
He introduces the first by saying,  
‘Tis impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any 
considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. 
(2.1.4.2) 
 As the later passage quoted above states, changeableness is an essential characteristic of 
mind. But that changeableness isn’t without rule or principle. Hume goes on to say,  
But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule 
and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one 
object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it. When one idea is 
present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows 
it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction. (2.1.4.2) 
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Thus he introduces a general principle that should be the means of explaining every 
instance of thought or perception not generated directly by sense experience—or at least 
will be when paired with a similar principle regarding the association of impressions: 
‘Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well 
as among ideas; tho’ with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by 
resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance. 
(2.1.4.3)  
Impressions may resemble each other to various degrees, particularly (it will turn out) 
with regard to valence. These then are the two main principles governing the apparent 
chaos of our ever changing mental landscape. And Hume goes on to tell us that the two 
kinds of association have an important effect on each other: 
[‘T]is observable of these two kinds if association, that they very much assist and 
forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both 
concur in the same object... those principles, which forward the transition of 
ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in 
one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. (2.1.4.4)  
This passage takes some unpacking. The first question is, in what sense do the 
associations of ideas and the associations of impressions “assist and forward each other?” 
Hume offers the example of a man who has received some injury from another, and 
therefore finds himself “apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear and 
other uneasy  passions” (2.1.4.4). This is presumably because of the resemblance between 
his feelings of injury and other uneasy passions—thus we have association through 
similar valence. His current experience of, say anger, caused by the injury, has a negative 
valence. Should he come across other objects that could act as the cause of a similarly 
negatively valenced emotion (say fear), the association of resemblance will mean he will 
easily go from feeling anger to feeling fear. But one may still press on Hume: why does 
the association make me more likely to feel the uneasy feeling of fear? For the moment, 
let us just keep this question in mind.  
  
92 
 
The passage next tells us that the tendency to experience these new passions, associated 
with the original by uneasy feeling, is apparently increased if the potential cause of the 
uneasy passion is found in or near the person who was the initial cause of injury. While 
the earlier association was one of impressions, this is an association of ideas. Our idea of 
the individual who caused us injury will lead us to think of the things near to him and 
vice versa—and clearly an idea of the individual as the subject of the new passion would 
be strongly associated with our idea of himself as the subject of the original passion. This 
association of ideas, Hume is claiming, will make the tendency to feel the associated 
uneasy impressions stronger. So, I will be more likely to react with fear in response to his 
threats after I am already feeling angry due to the injury he caused me. As now there is 
not merely an association of similar uneasy passions, but also one of ideas of the causes, 
Hume notes a “double impulse” bestowed on the mind. It is more likely that I will come 
to feel fear if I am already feeling angry (due to resemblance of uneasy passions), but it is 
even more likely that I will feel the fear if its subject is the same as or related to the 
subject of the anger (due to resemblance of ideas). This is the double impulse, brought 
about by association. But here I repeat the question from above: why should association, 
the mechanism of resemblance (and in the case of ideas, contiguity and causality), 
increase the likelihood of feeling and being moved in a certain way?  
The point of the question is this: we understand from Hume why one thing may make us 
think of another (whether ideas or impressions). But resemblance alone does not provide 
impulse (otherwise the associations of mere un-believed, ideas in the imagination would 
carry impulse and lead us to have certain impressions). Rather, it must be the case that the 
resemblance and association provides a means for pre-existing impulse and feeling to 
move between various ideas and impressions, i.e., various perceptions. This is what takes 
the Humean mind from a mere observer of associations to a feeling, believing, motivated 
agent. 
The real importance, then, of the associations of impressions and ideas that Hume is 
outlining in 2.1.4 is that they provide the general guideline for how impulse and feeling 
are transferred in the mind, which is (broadly speaking) the topic of this section of my 
discussion of emotion. Much of Book II, it turns out, is concerned with illustrating 
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exactly how this works, and in particular how it results in the formation of passions, as 
well as their interacting, intermingling, ability to motivate the will, and even their 
violence or calmness.  
Let us consider some basic examples of how impulse and feeling move through the mind 
in the Humean picture. As has been stated above, passions that resemble our current 
impressions in valence are more likely to be experienced than those of the opposite 
valence.78 Thus, I am more likely to feel fear after someone has done me injury than I am 
to immediately feel joy. This sort of mental movement from one passion, or emotion, to 
another one with similar valence (and then another and so on) is not unique to humans 
either; Hume comments of animals that “their minds are frequently convey’d thro’ a 
series of connected emotions” just as ours are (2.1.12.8).  
Of course it is not the valence of the emotion alone that can cause such a ‘connected 
series’ of feelings. Hume tells us at 2.1.5.9 that in the case of pride and humility, “[t]he 
double relation betwixt the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an 
easy transition from the one emotion to the other.” This may seem initially surprising, as 
unlike our first example, here the succeeding passion is opposite in valence to the 
proceeding. But Hume’s point is that we find in experience that we can go very quickly 
from feeling pride to humility—his example is of a beautiful house that one owns being 
damaged and becoming an eyesore. In such a case, Hume is arguing, our feelings of 
humility upon realizing that the house that once gave us pride is now a source of pain to 
ourselves and others are actually propelled partly by the feeling that had accompanied the 
pride. Our humility will be felt more keenly and more readily because the very feeling 
that attended the pride is now fed into our new passion. Hume explains,  
Tho’ pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects, and in their 
sensations, they have notwithstanding the same object; so that ‘tis requisite only 
                                                 
78 See for example 2.2.3.6, where Hume uses the example of being angry when injured though no injury 
was intended to illustrate that, “there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger, and the relation 
of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas.”  
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to change the relation of impressions, without making any change upon that of 
ideas. (2.1.5.9) 
Pride and humility both bear the same relationship to our idea of the self, as it is the 
object of both passions. In the case of the damaged, once-beautiful house mentioned 
above, the ideas involved remain the same (my idea of my house, I associate with my 
idea of my self), it is only the impressions that have changed (though the house once gave 
a pleasant impression, it now gives a painful impression; while the first was associated 
with the pleasant feeling of pride, the latter is associated with the uneasy feeling of 
humility). Thus, in this case the flow of connected feelings will be guided not by 
associations of resembling impressions, but instead associations of ideas. 
But as was mentioned above, there is something particularly curious about this case of 
the flowing of feeling: when we move from pride to humility, and the feeling and impulse 
of the passion of pride become the feeling and impulse of the passion of humility, there is 
a shift in the valence of the feeling in question. The felt impulse of the pride was pleasant, 
and yet this same impulse becomes pain when it ‘flows’ into the passion of humility. 
Thus, though pride is always pleasant, and humility is always painful, the feeling and 
impulse in them, which through associations moves us through a cycle of connected 
passions, need not retain the valence characteristic of the passion it attends. Hume in fact 
offers this as a new maxim in a later section as follows: 
It is a remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion, which attends a 
passion, is easily converted into it, though in their natures they be originally 
different from, and even contrary to each other. (2.3.4.2) 
The context of this passage is Hume’s discussion of the causes of violent passions. He is 
seeking to explain how excitement of incidental passions may lead our dominant passions 
to gain more strength and ‘violence,’79 even in cases where the feeling and impulse being 
                                                 
79 I am going to assume in this discussion the understanding of ‘violence’ and ‘calmness’ that I argued for 
in section 1.8, where calmness was not characterized as a lack of emotion, but rather violence is disruptive 
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provided by incidental passions is opposite to the character of the feeling of the dominant 
passion.80 What he says, effectively, is that though the appropriate relations of ideas and 
impressions are always necessary for the creation of the passions,81 when two passions 
already exist independently emotion is easily transferred between them, resulting in the 
dominant passion often ‘consuming’ the other.82 The vivacity and feeling that is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
and disordering emotion, while calmness is emotion that is in keeping with natural tendencies of mind and 
is only subtly felt. 
80 Note that missing from Hume’s theory of the passions is any real account of how it is we come to acquire 
these ‘dominant passions.’ This is perhaps not surprising, as it is likely no explanation was ever intended. 
Hume, like many of his contemporaries, assumed that different people have different ‘governing passions,’ 
and these character traits are likely to be idiosyncratic and not the right sort of thing to be reduced and 
incorporated into Hume’s general rules. It may be interesting, however, to speculate on a Humean 
explanation of the presence of dominant passions. In the context of this discussion, Hume uses the example 
of someone who is in love, and finds all incidental responses of passion surrounding their beloved 
(including little annoyances) merely feed their dominant passion of love for the individual. In such a case 
the ‘dominant passion’ is likely dominant in the sense that it is the most strongly felt for the individual at 
that moment. Thus additions of feeling and impulse from the incidental passions we experience are easily 
engulfed by the predominant feeling. There are also cases, however, where Hume talks about dominant 
passions in terms of tendencies of character (see for example 2.3.4.1). Thus there may be no immediate and 
strongly felt experience of such a passion in order for current incidental passions and emotions to feed it. In 
such a case an underlying ‘calm’ passion may come to be experienced violently. What Hume has not 
explained is how we come to have these dominant tendencies towards passions as part of our characters. He 
probably comes closest to offering an explanation in his discussions of the effects of custom (primarily at 
2.3.5).    
81 This statement may require qualification, if we consider the production of passions through the sympathy 
mechanism. The question of how it is passions are adopted sympathetically is a difficult one, though, which 
I will address in some detail in Part Two of this work.  
82 For another instance where an attending emotion adopts the opposite valence to its original, see 2.2.8.4: 
“…tho’ that emotion be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with others, and by its agitating the 
spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production of admiration, which is always agreeable.” 
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transferred from one passion to another may therefore find its valence convert to match 
the feeling of the new passion.    
This “remarkable property of human nature” is a very important new maxim of mind for 
Hume; it is a maxim concerning the tendencies of attending emotion. It is the principle 
“that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant” (2.3.6.1)83. 
Consider the importance of this additional principle to the basic Humean picture of mind. 
Hume posits that all perceptions can be categorized as either ideas or impressions. Our 
mind finds itself inclined to cycle through ideas and impressions, not merely as new 
information is presented to us via the senses, but also, and perhaps predominantly, 
according to rules of association. But to have one idea or impression recall another isn’t 
necessarily for it to be strengthened or increased in efficacy (in terms of, say, 
motivational power, or belief). To have this kind of strengthening there needs to be a 
mechanism for the transfer of vivacity, force, feeling, etc., between perceptions. Hume 
implicitly makes this point in the following: 
In a word, no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, or by the passions 
they separately produce, unless they be united together by some relation, which 
may cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or 
impressions attending the ideas; and may preserve the one impression in the 
passage of the imagination to the object of the other. (2.2.8.20, my italics) 
This passage is meant to emphasize the need for a relation of ideas in order for there to be 
transitions between ideas.84 But the secondary point is that the transitioning of ideas is 
what leads to the transferring of attending emotion, and the preservation of fluid, 
transient feeling between varied perceptions. But for Hume such fluidity of feeling 
cannot be the function of passions generally speaking. Pride, for instance, experienced as 
                                                 
83 This principle is also stated at 2.3.5.2 in the following form: “...every emotion which procedes or attends 
a passion, is easily converted into it.” 
84 Hume makes this point at 2.2.8.14 as well.  
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a ‘fully established passion,’ and has a particular, valenced feeling, as well as typical 
‘attending circumstances,’ i.e., types of objects, subjects, causes, etc.85 Passions so 
conceived are not the right sort of thing to move between associated perceptions, in part 
exactly because Hume wants to be able to account for instances where the force and 
impulse of feeling attending one perception is added to another even when the valence 
and particular character changes from what it was to match what it now attends. The 
Humean maxim that “any attending emotion is easily converted into the predominant” 
introduces a principle into his theory of mind that allows feeling and force to flow 
between ideas, but at the same time be fluid in its felt character such that it is malleable to 
the cognitive content and logic of the thoughts it comes to attend.  
 This maxim and the reading I have offered of it, strengthen the case for a need for (at 
least conceptually) a real distinction between ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in Hume. At the 
very least, we can align these concepts with the distinction between Hume’s ‘fully 
established’ passions and his ‘attending emotions’. A distinct passion may arise in us, but 
the emotion, the felt component, will, in ‘attending’ our dominant passion(s) easily 
become part of that felt experience, even when it means a complete turn about in the 
valence of the emotion. While passions are, in a sense, consistent in their identity and 
certainly in their characteristic valence (even if our experience of the passion is fleeting, 
or becomes mixed with others), emotions can flow between impressions and ideas, and 
should they attend a new passion, easily adopt the valence and characteristic feeling of 
the new passion they attend. Emotions may therefore be both transient between passions, 
and fluid in the kind of feeling they bring to our experience. 
This conclusion, in a sense, completes the analysis of the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume that I 
have been seeking in Part One of this work. But I will not leave this topic just yet—some 
demonstration of how Hume shows these attending emotions to work in the movements 
                                                 
85 Recall that for Hume, “’tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which 
determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end” 
(2.2.9.2).   
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of feeling in the Humean mind will be useful. I will also suggest a couple of places where 
attending emotion can be seen to have an influence in a slightly different way: namely, in 
the cases of belief and sympathy. 
 Generally speaking, then, Hume appears to talk about the interaction of emotions with 
each other and the various impressions and ideas in the cycling of the mind in three ways. 
First, as playing a role in transitions between different, but similar passions, which are 
brought to mind through association. In these cases attending emotions flow between 
distinct but related passions, adding force and impulse to the passion they come to attend. 
These are instances in which “the relation of impressions [may] operate upon a very 
small relation of ideas” (2.2.3.6), i.e, cases where the similarity between resembling 
passions will make it easy for us to move from one to another, even when there are not 
the relations of ideas present to support the new passion. Thus, though I may know very 
well that the injury I receive is accidental, and therefore do not hold the appropriate 
beliefs concerning offense to cause anger, the similarity of the impressions may cause me 
to nonetheless come to feel anger through association. In these cases, the attending 
emotion is transferred between similarly valenced passions. Association causes one 
passion to be brought to mind because of its similarity to another, and the transfer of 
attending emotion provides the impulse and feeling for us to actually move to feel this 
new passion. 
The second way that Hume talks about emotions and passions cycling in the mind 
highlights the new maxim that attending emotion will take on the valence and feel of the 
dominant passion. These are cases in which, though there is not an association of 
impressions, there is either, (a) an association of ideas that makes the flow of passions 
easy (such as the case of the transition between pride and humility at 2.1.5.9, as explained 
above), or (b) there are two independently arising passions, one of which is dominant and 
consumes the other, adopting its attending emotion. In both cases (a) and (b) the 
attending emotion is changed to adopt the characteristic feeling of the new (dominant) 
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passion.86 Therefore such cases add to the transient nature of emotions a certain fluidity 
in the felt nature of the experience. As was emphasized above, such examples draw 
attention to the distinction between attending emotion and established passions in Hume. 
The former can retain its identity as a continuous felt impulse, even while aspects of that 
felt experience change, fluidly adopting the felt character of the dominant passion. 
Passions are consistent in their characteristic valence, while emotions have a fluidity of 
feeling and the impulse of attending emotion can flow between the various impressions 
and ideas that arise in the wheeling of the mind. Thus, though Hume talks about 
particular passions arising as a result of some ‘affecting object’ being present, it is the 
emotion that attends the passion that may go on to “[pass] by an easy transition to the 
imagination; and diffus[e] itself over our idea of the affecting object” (1.3.10.4) and 
presumably be carried to other ideas that we associate with our idea of the said object. 
Hume gives examples of this at 2.3.4.3, focusing on the cases of the person in love (who 
finds all their little annoyances come to contribute to the overall feeling of love with the 
beloved), the politician (who agitates anxiety so that the feeling may extend to the 
passion he is intending to raise), and the soldier advancing into battle (who’s thoughts of 
friends, fears of the enemy, etc, all combine to buoy up his courage). All of these are 
examples of “the conversion of the inferior emotion into the predominant” (2.3.4.3).  
In the first two kinds of interaction, the attending emotion flows between perceptions, 
suggesting that in the moment what we experience is a single kind of feeling. The 
character of this feeling is determined by the passion that our minds have most recently 
turned to by association or that is dominant (either as a result of character/custom, or the 
momentary strength of the passion in question87). But of course this isn’t always our 
experience—sometimes (perhaps mostly) we feel a multiplicity of types of feeling, and in 
                                                 
86 See 2.3.4.4 for another explanation of the adopting of “new force and violence” by dominant passions.  
87 It may be pointed out here that this is one of Hume’s explanations for the change of calm passions into 
violent passions: “[A] calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, 
or of the circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of force from any attendant 
passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination” (2.3.8.13; my italics).  
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fact it is not unusual to find the mind a battleground for opposition between conflicting 
feelings. Hume was, of course, aware of this aspect of mental experience, and 
accommodates it in what I have identified as his third way of talking about the cycling of 
the mind: what I will call the ‘mixing’ of passions and emotions.  
Hume himself, of course, talks about the mixing and even the ‘confounding’ of different 
passions in his section, “Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and 
malice” (2.2.9). Here, Hume acknowledges that certain passions (in this case pity and 
malice), despite having a characteristic valence (pity is uneasy, malice is a kind of 
pleasure), are generally mixed with feelings of the opposite valence (pity is accompanied 
by love and/or tenderness, malice by hate and/or anger). This mixing of oppositely 
valenced feelings “it must be confess’d,” Hume says,  
…seems at first sight to be contradictory to my system. For as pity is an 
uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity shou’d 
naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and malice love. (2.2.9.1)   
Hume must find a way to accommodate these apparently mixed passionate experiences in 
his system. To explain this Hume needs to characterize passions not as a momentary 
feelings (which he nevertheless wants to insist determines their felt character88), but 
rather as “the whole bent or tendency of [the passion] from the beginning to the end” 
(2.2.9.2). The direct passions, it turns out, are as much characterized by the typical 
desires and impulses that arise from them, as they are by the feeling they present us with. 
                                                 
88 The topic of Hume’s characterization of the passions I have not yet tackled directly, and this is a 
conscious choice. Part Two of this work will open with a discussion of the debate between cognitive and 
sensationalist theories of emotion as they pertains to Hume’s work. As may be becoming clear in the work I 
have done here on ‘emotion’, I believe that Hume had aspects of both theories at work in his picture of the 
mind. In particular, I believe that passions are more ‘cognitive’ for Hume than emotions, which are more 
like the pure feeling of the sensationalist account. As for Hume’s characterization of the passions 
specifically, there appears to be some tension in what he wants to say about them, depending on whether he 
is focusing on them as feelings or as part of a broader cognitive picture. But more will be said about this in 
Part Two.   
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Thus, when two direct passions have a resembling “direction or tendency to action,” their 
association will result in them typically presenting together. Hume is therefore able to 
argue that despite the lack of resemblance of impressions, resemblance in tendency will 
cause association, which will result in the familiar chain of passions that tends to lead 
pity to feelings of love, and malice to feelings of hate, and so on.   
But this is not a case of a clean transition from one kind of feeling to another, the 
phenomenon that was discussed above. Rather, in the cases of pity and malice, we will 
experience both painful and pleasant feelings at the same time. This is an example of the 
mixing of emotions, as opposed to the transitioning between passions. Hume still insists 
in such cases on a unity of the felt experience; he says that pity and love, malice and hate, 
“so totally mix together as to be indistinguishable” (2.2.9.4). This unity of felt 
experience, despite diversity of types of passions, is an interesting aspect of the mixing of 
impressions of reflection that is emphasized in other places as well. One of the most 
famous examples is in Hume’s comparison of the mind to a stringed instrument (a 
metaphor which carries over to his description of the workings of sympathy in Book 
III89):  
Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find, that with regard to the 
passions, ‘tis not of the nature of a wind instrument, which in running over all the 
notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases; but rather resembles a 
string-instrument, where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound, 
which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extreme quick and 
agile; but the passions are slow and restive: For which reason, when any object is 
presented, that affords a variety of views to the one, and emotions to the other; 
tho’ the fancy may change its views with great celerity; each stroke will not 
produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be 
mixed and confounded with the other. (2.3.9.12)  
                                                 
89 See 3.3.1.7. 
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This passage is part of Hume’s explanation of the passions of hope and fear (both 
mixtures of grief and joy). So here we find that mixtures of feeling actually constitute the 
characteristic feeling of some of Hume’s compound passions. Such mixtures may be 
experienced as a blending of feelings, like the blending of different notes on a resonating 
string instrument.  
But the mixture of passions and emotions does not only occur in the manner of blending 
sound. Carrying on his discussion in this section, and after reminding us of the possibility 
of the dominant passion consuming the attending emotion (in what I have identified with 
the transitivity and fluidity of emotion), Hume  then offers three ways that in the 
alternative scenario of ‘mixing’ the passions may interact: 
‘Tis observable, that where the objects of contrary passions are presented at once, 
beside the increase of the predominant passion (which has been already explain’d, 
and commonly arises at their first shock or recounter90) it sometimes happens, that 
both the passions exist successively, and by short intervals; sometimes, that they 
destroy each other, and neither of them takes place; and sometimes that both of 
them remain united in mind. (2.3.9.13) 
The final case, in which the passions “remain united in mind,” is presumably the case of 
the blending sound and creation of compound emotions as discussed above, so I will say 
no more about it here.91 The first two cases, however, are new to our discussion. In the 
                                                 
90 This phenomenon has also, of course, been already explained in this section—though Hume does add an 
extra tidbit here about the tendency of dominant passions to adopt the attending emotion of other passions 
in his specification that this is most commonly what happens in the initial ‘shock’ of the two passions 
existing at once. Presumably, what he means is that when the dominant passion first arises it will often 
‘consume’ the attending emotion of the currently felt passions, but that once established, other feelings may 
continue to pop up, and may come to be mixed with our experience of the dominant passion, as opposed to 
consumed by it.   
91 Hume goes on to characterize it in this discussion as passion which “instead of destroying and tempering 
each other, will subsist together, and produce a third impression or affection by their union… The 
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first instance, our experience is of successive feelings, a kind of emotional flip-flopping. 
This may happen in instances where we are unsure of what to believe.92 As we consider it 
more likely that we will obtain what we desire we feel the pleasure of hope; as we 
consider it more likely that we won’t attain what we desire, or will attain what we are 
averse to, we feel the uneasiness of fear. This kind of vacillating between emotions may 
also occur as we have experiences that cause distinctly different passions at the same time 
or in short succession. Hume gives the example of a man who at once loses a lawsuit and 
finds out about the birth of a child, and finds his mind moving between the events and 
associated emotions (2.3.9.14).93 Mixing of passions in these cases one might think of as 
a kind of mechanical mixture; the parts are clearly distinguishable, though our overall 
experience involves both.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line, if that expression may be 
allowed; and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions…” (2.3.9.16).  
92 This entire discussion, in fact, arises in the context of Hume’s exploration of the effects of beliefs about 
probability on our direct passions.  
93 Hume also gives an example of the experience of multiple, apparently incompatible emotions in Book III 
(one of the only three passages where Hume uses the term ‘emotion’ in that book) that is slightly different 
from the examples given here, and is worth noting: “The seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind: 
And the emotions they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from the real consequences of 
objects, but their feeling is different. Nay, these emotions are so different in their feeling, that they may 
often be contrary, without destroying each other; as when the fortifications of a city belonging to an enemy 
are esteemed beautiful on account of their strength, though we could wish that they were entirely destroyed. 
The imagination adheres to the general view of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce, from 
those which arise from our particular and momentary situation” (3.3.1.23). The case given here is not 
entirely clear as to whether it falls into the category of the subordinate passion being consumed by the 
dominant, or a kind of vacillating between the contrary passions. What is clear, and interesting to note, is 
that there is clearly a dominant passion set here (the wish that the enemies strength is destroyed), which 
Hume has identified with the “general view of things”, to be contrasted with feelings that are “particular 
and momentary.” This distinction seems related to the difference between passions and emotions that I am 
seeking to establish.   
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The remaining case is the case of opposition of contrary passions or emotions. Opposition 
is an important phenomenon in the Humean explanation of the mind (think of its role in 
particular in his discussions of motivation), but surprisingly particular in the 
circumstances under which it may occur.94 In some sense, this is the opposite of the 
‘mixing’ of emotions—this is the case in which they do not co-exist, either as vacillating 
emotions or blending, but rather are too much in conflict of feeling or impulse to co-exist, 
and some resolve must be attained. In some circumstances they will actually cancel each 
other out, “and leave the mind in perfect tranquility” (2.3.9.15). But there are also cases 
in which the conflict between opposing passions appears to constitute a kind of violence 
in the mind, itself producing a new (third) emotion. Consider the following:  
‘[T]is observable that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion 
in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two 
affections of equal force. This new emotion is easily converted into the pre-
dominant passion, and encreases its violence, beyond the pitch it wou’d have 
arrived at had it met with no opposition. (2.3.4.5)  
In this passage we learn a couple of things. First, that opposition that does not end in a 
‘cancelling out’, will end with the establishing of a dominant passion, which presumably 
will adopt the attending emotion of the previously contrary passion. But the second thing 
we learn is that the dominant passion will also adopt the new, third emotion that has been 
stirred as a result of the violence that is the disruption of mind cause by opposition. Thus 
                                                 
94 At 2.2.8.20 Hume says a bit about this: “We find from experience, that the want of relation in the objects 
or ideas hinders the natural contrariety of the passions, and that the break in transition of thought removes 
the affections from each other and prevents their opposition.” Opposite feeling isn’t always enough to 
result in opposition—the ideas and objects that are involved in the production of the passions need to be 
related in the right way to cause the impulses of the two opposite passions to oppose one another. This 
requirement for opposition is likely what Hume means when he talks about the potential to “shock[] in a 
direct line” at 2.3.9.16. There are instances where opposing emotion will mingle, not push against each 
other. Failure of opposite emotions to actually oppose each other is also explained in the case discussed at 
3.3.1.23.  
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opposition has the potential to strengthen whatever passion wins out, making it even 
more efficacious than it would have been had it not been opposed. Hume uses this 
phenomenon to explain our experience of increased joy in forbidden pleasures.  
Note that in the case above, the new emotion produced by opposition cannot be identified 
with any particular passion. It is more like an attending feeling readily attached to some 
idea or impression that will determine its character. This again emphasizes the distinction 
between attending emotion and established passions that I am seeking to make. It also 
highlights an important aspect of what this attending emotion is: something that Hume in 
other places calls ‘vivacity’. Vivacity, along with terms like ‘force’, and ‘liveliness,’ 
plays an important role in Hume’s theory of mind; he relies on it in his explanations of 
belief and memory, for instance. It shows up in relation to emotion in Book I: 
A painter, who intended to represent a passion or emotion of any kind, wou’d 
endeavour to get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion, in order to enliven 
his ideas and give them force and vivacity superior to what is found in those, 
which are mere fictions of his imagination. (1.3.5.5)  
The painter’s desire to acquire vivacity through observation of emotion is surely an 
attempt to make use of the sympathy mechanism for artistic purposes. The principle of 
sympathy means that the passions, pains and pleasures of others, “must strike upon us in 
a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is 
easily converted into an impression” (2.2.7.2). Given the diversity of felt experience that 
has been established in this analysis of the emotions (and the suggested distinction 
between these and passions), we can anticipate that the application of Hume’s sympathy 
mechanism will not be as straight forward as he perhaps makes it appear in his initial 
presentation of the mechanism at 2.1.11. I will discuss the puzzles in the application of 
this principle at length in Part Two. For now, I wish to point out that one of the things 
that appears to be communicated at times are the feelings of vivacity. That is to say, it 
would appear that attending emotion can be acquired through the sympathy mechanism, 
and its vivacity added to whatever our dominant passion of the moment is. This kind of 
phenomenon can help explain instances where we come to feel ‘sympathetically’ a 
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passion that we do not actually observe in the person we are sympathizing with. Thus, as 
in an example Hume gives, we overlook the “greatness of mind” of someone facing with 
difficult circumstances, and feel the pain and grief over their circumstance even when 
they don’t (2.2.7.5).95     
This must also be at play when we find that the sympathy mechanism may result in the 
adoption of beliefs (a claim Hume makes in several places). Believed ideas for Hume are, 
of course, instances of ideas attended by a particular feeling, or experienced more vividly 
than our non-believed ideas. But this reminder of the sensitive nature of belief in Hume 
must give us pause in light of what has been said concerning attending emotion. If 
attending emotion is a transient vivacity and fluid manner of feeling that may attend 
various ideas and impressions, what is its relation to the vivacity that results in a believed 
idea? Indeed, Hume is quick to point to the effects of emotion and passion on belief. 
Consider the following two passages: 
[A]nything propos’d to us, which causes surprise and admiration, gives such a 
satisfaction to the mind, that it indulges itself in those agreeable emotions, and 
will never be perswaded that its pleasure is entirely without foundation. (1.2.1.1) 
As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting of the passions, so the 
passions in their turn are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as 
convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, do upon that account 
become more readily the objects of faith and opinion. (1.3.10.4) 
Emotion, both positively and negatively valenced, lends a kind of vivacity to our 
thoughts that can create, and even cement, believed ideas. Whether attending emotion is 
exactly what results in belief in these cases is not clear, but the prospect is interesting to 
consider, as beliefs then become a part of the cycling of ideas and impressions that has 
been the topic of discussion in this section. Hume insists that our believed ideas merely 
                                                 
95 It should be noted that Hume explains this phenomenon in terms of the effects of general rules, but I take 
it that the two approaches are compatible. 
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‘approach’ impressions, and maintains a distinction between these vividly experienced 
ideas and our actual impressions. But it is less clear that the attending feeling that creates 
belief can be as easily separated from feeling more generally, and in particular the kind of 
attending emotion that I have discussed here. For now, though, I merely wish to flag this 
for the reader’s consideration: how is it that attending emotion affects and interacts with 
our beliefs? 
As Hume himself points out by the end of Book II, there are innumerable ways that the 
associations of ideas and impressions come to influence the mind, particularly insofar as 
they spread impulse, vivacity and feeling through attending emotion. Hume makes an 
effort to explain many kinds of psychological experience in these terms, and I have given 
a few examples. But for our purposes here, it is not necessary to try to track all that Hume 
managed to argue for—and not only because Hume’s project is incomplete to begin with. 
The main point that I am seeking to make here is that there is a central conceptual role 
given to what I have identified as attending emotion in Hume. Associations of ideas and 
impressions alone do not explain our mental landscapes. The introduction of the impulse 
and feeling of attending emotion is necessary to shape belief, motivation and individual 
character. Further, I have argued that attending emotion can be usefully distinguished 
from the categories of specific Humean passions. In the next and final section of Part 
One, I will recap what has been argued for concerning ‘emotion’ in Hume, culminating in 
the claims of this last section. I will then begin to ask some broader questions about the 
role of emotion and passion in Hume’s philosophy of mind—setting up for the 
discussions of Part Two of this dissertation.  
 
 
1.11 Summary: What we know of ‘emotion’ thus far 
 
Every usage of ‘emotion’ in the Treatise has been referenced—and in many cases 
commented upon—at some point in Part One of this work. Since no usage has been 
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overlooked, we arguably have a very good sense now of the types of discussions in which 
‘emotion’ plays a prominent role for Hume. We also can draw some conclusions about 
the nature of emotion in Hume based on the reoccurring roles and themes that have been 
uncovered. I have argued that there is good reason to posit an important conceptual role 
for ‘emotion’ in Hume, in particular when thought of as ‘attending emotion.’ I have also 
argued that it is distinct from the conceptual space filled by his more dominant term, 
‘passion.’ But before moving on to the application of this thesis to broader interpretive 
work on Hume (the aim of Part Two of this dissertation), I will, one, pause to clarify the 
kind of distinction I am arguing for (particularly in light of the kinds of objections that 
might be raised to it), and two, offer a summary of what has been established about 
Humean emotion thus far. In this latter analysis I will strive not only to present a recap, 
but also make clear which of those claims made in the proceeding sections that I take to 
be clearly established, which seem probable (though perhaps difficult to insist upon, 
given that Hume did not make the conceptual distinction clearly himself), and finally 
highlight a few important questions that I take to be suggested by my reading, and in 
need of further treatment.  
 First then, a word about my intention in developing a conceptual place for ‘emotion’ in 
understanding Hume’s philosophy of mind that is distinct from that of ‘passion’. There is 
indeed textual evidence, in the form of usage in particular passages, that at times Hume 
used these terms to denote distinct concepts in discussions where he uses both. But as 
there are also textual uses of these terms in which Hume appears to not offer any 
particular distinction (often where he could be taken to be using the terms 
synonymously96), this claim needs to be supported by more than a collection of isolated 
quotes that suggest a distinction. Alternatively, one might grant that Hume clearly 
employs the terms ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ to suggest different things in different 
discussions, but argue that there is no consistent conceptual distinction in his use, and that 
such a distinction is therefore unimportant to understanding his philosophy of mind. Both 
                                                 
96 Revisit the discussion of synonymy in Hume in 1.1 of this work for my take on why we should not be 
overly concerned about such instances. 
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of these types of objections I have tried to address in my method of analysis. My focus 
was not merely on individual instances of the use of ‘emotion’ in Hume (though many of 
these did receive in-depth treatment), but also on collecting and interpreting these 
passages according to similar themes and claims made therein. In this way it is my hope 
that individual uses have been shown to be part of consistent trends in how Hume 
addresses certain themes. Though Hume has not articulated a clear distinction, and at 
times seems a bit non-technical in his use of the terms (this is, of course, not a tendency 
in Hume’s writing reserved for his use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ alone), I think a case 
can be made for a conceptual distinction between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ that not only 
has textual support, but lends itself to a clearer and more nuanced understanding of 
Hume’s explanations of the workings of the mind in Book II, particularly as they pertain 
to our passionate nature and motivation.  
The nature of my thesis in Part One, therefore, is not an insistence on having uncovered 
heretofore unacknowledged explicit technical distinctions in Hume’s terminology of 
mind. In contrast to the kind of conceptual distinction I am arguing is implicit in Hume, 
there are examples of clear, explicit distinctions between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ to be 
found in treatments of the topic by other authors following the publication of the 
Treatise.97 Not only is the conceptual distinction I am suggesting exists in Hume not in 
content the same as these later treatments, but it is also not explicit in the same way. I 
take it that the analysis I have given above shows that Hume was indeed employing 
‘emotion’ differently from ‘passion’ at times, but he did not make the clear, technical 
category distinction in the way that later theorists would. In fact, Hume’s treatment of the 
passionate nature of the mind throughout the Treatise, and in Book II in particular, 
involves a certain looseness in language use, and a tendency to draw on common 
understanding to point the reader to the experiences and feelings Hume desired to discuss 
                                                 
97 For instance, both Lord Kames and Alexander Crichton developed clear emotion/passion distinctions, 
though both are different from Hume’s implicit conceptual distinction. 
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and explain.98 Take as an example Hume’s distinction between calm and violent 
passions: initially presented as though part of his taxonomy of mind, but just as quickly 
withdrawn as a clear distinction of kinds, as opposed to a common way of speaking that 
might direct the reader to the varieties of experience Hume is seeking to explain. This 
tendency toward loose use of the key terms in his discussion is further highlighted by his 
initial identification of the passions with the violent emotions—an identification he is 
certainly not committed to as he acknowledges the existence of calm passions, and (as 
has been argued for above) ultimately makes the calm/violent distinction on the basis of 
manner of experience of passion, not according to particular passions.  
Despite these tendencies towards loose use of the apparently technical language in Book 
II, I do think that underlying his theory (and the general trends found in his word choice), 
Hume has a conceptual scheme that involves a plurality of types of affective mental 
events, or, as Hume would call them, ‘impressions of reflection.’ Recall his consistency 
in describing the contents of this category of impressions as “the passions, and other 
                                                 
98 When considering Hume’s tendency towards the loose use of terminology, we may do well to remember 
the following advice offered by Ãrdal:  
A modern reader, brought up to believe that a philosopher must emulate the scientist by developing a 
strictly defined technical terminology, is likely to consider Hume’s use of language loose and unscientific. 
It must be remembered that although he sought to introduce the ‘experimental method into Moral Science’, 
he was essentially a man of letters, writing for the educated reader of his day, and not a specialist 
addressing himself to other specialists. The style is varied according to the context; the same doctrine is 
expressed in many different ways. It is essential to try to follow the drift of the argument, rather than to 
take a forceful statement of doctrine out of context, on the assumption that it contains the essences of 
Hume’s thought at the time of writing. [Ãrdal, P. (1966). Passion and value in Hume's Treatise. Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2]. 
 
The counsel to “try to follow the drift of the argument” instead of focusing on single passages is what I 
have sought to do in developing this conceptual distinction according to a broad reading of the use of 
‘emotion’ in the Treatise. 
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emotions resembling them” (2.1.1.1).99 Particular passions receive detailed treatment and 
characterization in Book II, providing a picture of the rules and logic governing these 
individual members of the category of impressions of reflection. But the characterization 
of the category of passions generally suggested by the treatment of individual passions is 
too narrow to do everything that Hume requires of feeling, particularly of feeling that is 
‘reflective’ in nature (i.e., not impressions of sensation). Therefore Hume’s conceptual 
scheme must include, along with space for particular passions which can be investigated 
and understood as distinctly characteristic feelings and their consistently observed causes 
and ‘attending circumstances,’100 space for feeling that can change in character and move 
fluidly between ideas and impressions, both shaping their experience, and being shaped 
by their content. The culmination of what I have argued for in Part One of this project is 
the claim that Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ tends to direct us to this latter part of his 
underlying conceptual scheme.  
Here, then, is a reminder of what I take to have been established in the preceding nine 
sections, in the form of a summary of the claims that can be made about the nature of 
‘emotion’ in Hume: 
Section 1.2 addressed the place of ‘emotion’ in Hume’s taxonomy of the contents of the 
mind. It is clear that emotions are a kind of impression. Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ also 
generally makes it clear that he considers them to be a kind of secondary impression, or 
impression of reflection, in particular.101 Passions, the most explicitly treated member of 
                                                 
99 See also 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.2.1.  
100 See 2.1.2.1. Or, consider Hume’s statement at 2.1.1.3 that Book II seeks to offer an explanation of the 
“nature, origin, causes, and effects” of the particular passions.   
101 Interestingly, the question of whether emotions are entirely contained in the category of impressions of 
reflection is not at this point clear to me, though I think it is likely the case. The cause for uncertainty is, of 
course, certain sensations of pain and pleasure that are ‘original’ in the sense that Hume requires in order 
for a feeling to classify as an impression of sensation. Such sensations are not the same as, say, my 
sensation of red in seeing an apple, in that they have a more direct effect on my actions and passions, which 
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the category of impressions of reflection, are initially identified as the typically ‘violent 
emotions of the mind,’ though they need not always be experienced as such. I have 
argued that the calm/violent distinction is not a proper part of the taxonomy of the 
impressions of reflection for Hume, but rather should be thought of as different manners 
in which passions may be experienced. Section 1.3 added to this analysis the claim that 
for Hume ‘emotion’ appears to be a term with broader application than ‘passion.’ It 
would seem that any impression of reflection may be referred to as an ‘emotion’, whether 
it is experienced calmly or violently, and whether or not it can be identified with a 
particular passion. The key characteristic of an emotion is that it is a felt state of mind. 
The status of emotions as felt mental events in Hume was discussed in 1.4, where it was 
argued that though there may be concurrent physiological ‘movement’ in the mind and in 
the spirits of an individual, Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ is meant to point us to feeling, not 
aspects of our physical experience. These feelings may interfere with reasoning through 
associations of ideas, and such reasoning likewise tends to interfere with how we feel 
emotions.102 I suggested that emotions be considered the sensations of our reflective 
impressions, and highlighted that for Hume the felt, emotional component of a passion 
constitutes the very essence of that passion. It was also established that emotions come in 
the form of pains and pleasures arising from reflection on our present ideas and 
impressions, and that emotions are a source of vivacity and force, which can distinguish 
the mere idea of a passion from the experience of the passion itself. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
in turn seems to suggest they operate more like emotions do for Hume. But I take this point to be not 
terribly important. Emotion as a kind of impression of reflection is certainly Hume’s focus when using the 
term.   
102 Why this is the case is not explicitly explained in Hume, though given the claims made about the way 
attending emotion moves between ideas and impression according to associations (as was discussed in 
1.10), we can perhaps imagine why this would be the case—and why such interference tends to run both 
ways.  
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Of the claims made to this point in the analysis, there is little I take to be controversial, or 
not clearly to be found in the text. Perhaps the newest thesis would be the direct 
identification of the emotion of a passion with the characteristic felt essence that Hume 
makes central to understanding individual passions. Though this is stated explicitly at 
2.1.5.4, the significance of this statement is only felt once we assume that there is real 
distinction between emotion and passion (as opposed to reading this as merely a claim 
about the centrality of the felt nature of a passion to its identity). To this point in the 
analysis, uncontroversial as it is, the potential distinction between emotion and passion is 
vague at best.  
Part of the reason for this, of course, is that I have not as of yet pursued a characterization 
of ‘passion’ for Hume. What is perhaps becoming clear is that the more in-depth the 
analysis of ‘emotion’ gets, the more questions arise as to how ‘passion’ is to be 
understood on the same issues. I have suggested some textual evidence at this point in the 
analysis that emotion is a broader category than passion, and inclusive of the passions. 
But without a clearer idea of how passions in particular are characterized, it is difficult to 
see exactly why they are to be considered a subcategory of emotions (if that is in fact the 
best way to understand their relationship to the broader category of emotion). The 
question of a characterization of ‘passion’ in Hume I will take up in Part Two of the 
dissertation, as well as a consideration of the scholarship on the issue—a body of 
scholarship, I should mention, that is considerable.  
However, there is a characterization of ‘passion’ in Hume that arises implicitly in my 
discussions in sections 1.5-1.10. I want to draw the reader’s attention to it now, as it has 
its beginnings in the claim just now made that emotions can be considered the felt 
component and essence of the particular passions. This does not yet go very far in 
distinguishing emotion from passion (after all, the claim appears to be that they are 
essentially the same!), but I believe that as the analysis of ‘emotion’ I offer in the second 
half of Part One progresses, it becomes clear that it is possible to pry the two concepts 
apart, particularly as the contrast between attending emotion and fully realized passions 
becomes apparent.  
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 Carrying on in the recap, then, the discussions of the valenced nature of emotion in 
Hume offered some more depth to the understanding of the feelings that make up the 
essential character of the individual passions. I argued in 1.5 that emotions appear to be 
always valenced for Hume, and that the pains or pleasures associated with each 
experience of emotion come in a variety of kinds, not merely degrees. I also suggested 
that these pains and pleasures of reflection are distinct, for Hume, from the pains and 
pleasures of bodily experience. In 1.6 I argued that pain and pleasure play a key role in 
the production of the individual passions, and that in the case of the indirect passions 
specifically we see particular valenced emotions not merely playing the role of the 
‘essence’ of the particular passion, but also providing the distinct pleasure or pain of 
reflection that is necessary in the production of that passion, via the double relation of 
impressions and ideas. This distinction in Hume between the pain or pleasure of the 
indirect passion, and the separately arising pain or pleasure involved in the double-
relation of ideas and impressions that produces the passion turns out to be very important 
to the analysis of emotion, as it provides evidence in Hume of emotions that are not 
identical to passions. These valenced emotions are not passions, or at least, not fully 
realized passions. Rather, they play an essential role in the production of fully realized 
passions. Thus this section concluded with two established roles for emotions: they may 
be the valenced, felt component of individual passion experiences, but also may be the 
valenced feelings that contribute to the production of the indirect passions. 
I next considered the role of emotions, understood now as the valenced sensations of 
reflection, in motivation. The role turns out to be central, as most of our willing begins in 
our valenced emotional responses to pain or pleasure, and even the willing that begins in 
our original or natural propensities is experienced as valenced feeling. Both the direct and 
indirect passions are shown to have influence over the will as a result of their valenced 
feeling. This is because that force and impulse comes from valenced feeling. Passions are 
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motivating because what “constitute[s] their very being and essence” are these valenced 
“peculiar emotions they excite in the soul” (2.1.5.4).103       
Exactly how it is this force and impulse directs the will is more nuanced than might first 
be assumed, and this was explored in section 1.8 on calm and violent emotions. Force of 
feeling appears to fill the key role in motivation—how then can Hume explain instances 
of motivation where calm feeling trumps violent feeling? I argue that strength of impulse 
provided by an emotion is not identical to its force in the sense of its ‘violence.’ 
Violence, I argue, amounts for Hume to the disorder caused by mental events that go 
against custom, habit and the otherwise ‘natural’ course of thought our minds take. It is 
not identical to motivating strength of passions, nor is it rightly understood merely as the 
measure of emotion involved. The analysis also showed how violent passions may be 
dominated by calm passions, and in fact have the impulse of their force harnessed to the 
direction of the calm passion (that is, in some cases, how calm passions may come to be 
experienced violently). This phenomenon is explained in terms of the transfer of force 
and impulse between impressions and ideas via attending emotion, bringing the analysis 
to its last two topics: the question of attending emotion, and the transitive and fluid nature 
of emotion. 
The move into the last two topics of discussion in my analysis I take to include the more 
original, and perhaps by extension controversial, claims in my analysis. The claims made 
in sections 1.2-1.4 regarding, taxonomy, scope of reference of the term, and the basic 
characterization of emotion as feeling are generally taken directly from text and therefore 
(I would assume) uncontroversial. The claims of 1.5- 1.8 take us further into an analysis 
of the text as the basic concept of emotion established in 1.2-1.4 is found to operate 
according to the themes of valenced feeling, production of passions, motivation and 
                                                 
103 I take it that the approach of my analysis and the arguments made in 1.7 are sufficient to explain why I 
take all passions to ultimately be motivating for Hume, despite his comments about the indirect passions as 
“pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action” 
(2.2.6.3). See 2.3.9.4 for a reminder of Hume’s account of how the indirect passions contribute to 
motivation, albeit ‘indirectly.’ 
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violence/calmness. In the last two sections I begin to move away from what is obviously 
found in Hume to an attempt to fill out a more robust conceptual role for ‘emotion’ as he 
has used it and distinguished it in various discussions. The culmination of this discussion 
is the identification of emotion as a key player in the feeling-driven nature of the Humean 
mind, as it is distinguished from passion as the attending, transient and fluidly-valenced 
impressions of reflection that provide for the diversity of mental experience. Virtually all 
ideas and all impressions for Hume are attended with emotion. Attending emotion can be 
thought of as a (conceptually, if not phenomenologically) distinct feeling that may dictate 
the felt manner of our perceptions, and affect the judgments and beliefs we form, as well 
as informing our passionate reactions and our actions. Their conceptually distinct role 
from the passions becomes finally clear in section 1.10, where the difference between 
attending emotion and fully established passions is illustrated to be the consistent nature 
of the latter (with a characteristic valence that is essential to the identity of that passion, 
and a particular set of causes, objects and subjects) and the transient, fluid, ‘mix-ability’ 
of the former (characterized as a valenced, motivating vivacity and force, that may move 
between different passions, impressions and ideas, and even change in valence and 
feeling to match the impressions they come to attend).  
Thus Part One concludes with a Humean conceptual scheme of the workings of the mind 
in which emotion (as distinct from particular passions) plays an essential role in 
providing explanation for the diversity of mental experience. Hume’s governing mental 
principles assume the existence of reflective feeling of the transitive character that I have 
argued we should identify with ‘emotion’ in Hume. And indeed, I hope to have shown 
that this term is the one that Hume most readily uses when describing the kind feelings 
that fill this role. Passions are treated differently, more usually characterized as being a 
category consisting in a list of named impressions of reflection with particular, 
identifiable and consistent characters, causes, and objects. The characterization of 
‘passion’ that I would suggest arises in my analysis is of impressions of reflection with 
particular valence and distinctive emotions, which cannot change and that same passion 
continue to exist. A ‘fully established’ passion for Hume has such a set character, and 
beyond the feeling particular to it will have a certain logic and structure of attending 
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beliefs, causes and objects that give it a more ‘cognitive’ flavor than the more fluid and 
changeable ‘emotions’ (more on this in Part Two of this work).  I would suggest that one 
source of confusion in Hume’s use of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ is that he is inclined to talk 
about the connection between passions and emotions in two ways. Sometimes a particular 
passion is understood as a particular emotion (instances in which he talks of passions as 
‘original existences’). At other times Hume is inclined to talk about ‘fully established 
passions’ inclusive of their ‘general bent or tendency from beginning to end,’ with 
characteristic causes and objects. These are not identical to emotion, but are rather 
attended by emotion, or even produce it. Why he should talk about emotion in these two 
ways will be addressed in Part Two, where I will look at both the sensationalist and 
cognitivist tendencies in Hume’s theory of the passions. The apparent tension between 
these two approaches that appears to be inherent in his system, I will argue, can be 
somewhat explained and reconciled with the introduction of the emotion/passion 
distinction I have introduced here into his conceptual framework. 
But before moving on to that discussion, I want to flag a couple of important questions 
that my account of emotion has raised and not yet answered. The first is with regard to 
the relationship between emotion and vivacity. In 1.10 I suggested that attending emotion 
often introduces new vivacity to our experience of certain ideas and impressions as it 
moves between them. It is clear that Hume takes felt experience to influence the 
likelihood of our adopting beliefs, and we also know that the difference between a 
believed idea and an idea we understand to be a ‘mere fiction’ is one of the felt manner of 
experience. The question that all this appears to raise is, to what degree may we identify 
the feeling of vivacity that constitutes a believed idea with the attending emotion that 
flows between ideas and impressions and ultimately adopts valence that results in our 
willing? Though Hume is clear that believed ideas themselves do not become 
impressions, rather they approach impressions in their felt experience, he does talk about 
them both as being lively ideas and as being attended by vivacity. This same language of 
‘attention’, of course, is used in his discussions of attending emotion. One is lead to 
question whether they are not related, or perhaps in some instances identical, phenomena. 
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Should it be the case that attending emotion is able to constitute the difference between 
believed and non-believed ideas, there would be fascinating implications for Hume’s 
theory of motivation. I have argued above that valenced emotion is key to the motivating 
power of the passions. Should beliefs turn out to be attended at times by emotion, then 
they would appear to have potential power to motivate. This would perhaps seems 
contrary to Hume’s famous claim that “Reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the 
passions” (2.3.3.3), if one were to assume that beliefs are merely the product of cold 
reasoning. On the other hand, the vivacity that distinguishes believed ideas is no where 
suggested by Hume to have a particular valence, something I have argued is likely 
essential for emotion in Hume. This appears to drive the attending feelings being 
compared here farther apart. I will not speculate further here. But this question of the 
relationship between attending emotion and attending vivacity in believed ideas will be 
picked up in the second half of Part Two, as will the question of what my theory of 
emotion in Hume might mean for his theory of motivation. On this latter topic, it is worth 
noting that emotion shows up often as a key term, and appears frequently to be used as a 
technical term, in Hume’s more technical discussions of motivation (see 2.3.3.3-4 in 
particular). 
Finally, it is perhaps clear at this point that the term ‘emotion’ shows up frequently in 
Hume’s discussions of the sympathy mechanism. Indeed, in Hume’s technical 
presentations of the mechanism it appears to surface as more of a technical term than 
perhaps in some of his other discussions. There is a particular puzzle regarding the 
application and working of the sympathy mechanism in the case of the indirect passions. 
The workings of the sympathy mechanism more generally are no less puzzling, when 
examined in detail. In particular, the question of how ‘fully established’ passions with 
characteristic causes and objects are communicated between people is less clear than we 
may assume at first glance. Further, despite the references to the term ‘emotion’ in the 
context of sympathy discussions found in Part One of this work, I have not commented 
yet on how emotion might work in the operation of that Humean mental mechanism. I 
will consider this question in one of the last sections of Part Two, and propose not only a 
potential solution to the apparent puzzle in the application of sympathy to complex 
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passions, but also suggest a way to think about the role emotion plays in this kind of 
communication of feeling, sentiment, and even belief.   
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PART TWO: The use of a concept of emotion in 
Hume’s overall theory of the passions 
 
2.1 Introduction: ‘Emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the 
literature on Hume 
 
The question of what Hume intended in his introduction of the term ‘emotion’ in the 
Treatise has not, that I am aware of, been the primary focus of any thorough scholarly 
investigation. This includes the kind of close textual analysis I have offered in Part One. 
This does not mean, however, that there have not been interpretations of Hume’s use of 
‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the literature on Hume. There are even instances where a 
distinction has been posited that has some significance for the overall understanding of 
Hume’s theory of the passions. The direction taken by these numerous interpretations is 
remarkably varied—there are even accounts that offer the same general type of division 
between the two kinds of mental states Hume is seeking to distinguish, but assign 
‘passion’ where the other assigns ‘emotion’ and vice versa!104 The diversity of 
interpretations alone makes a survey of some of the claims of interest to us here, 
particularly combined with some of the reasoning given behind the accounts. I will 
consider some of the positions I take to be of particular interest, offering some response 
to the claims made in support of my own reading, though this will not be my main focus. 
In fact, most of these accounts do not make strong enough claims, nor are they the 
product of the sort of careful textual analyses that would make them ‘objections’ to what 
I have said so far, as opposed to bald statements of a contrary opinion. Generally I will 
                                                 
104 Consider, for instance, Philip Mercer’s claim that passions are the more violently felt impressions of 
reflection, while emotions are the calmly, almost imperceptibly felt impressions of reflection, compared to 
Annette Baier, who explicitly aligns emotions with violent impressions of reflection, and passions with the 
more cognitive and potentially calm.   
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offer the reader these variations on interpretation for consideration with the aim of easing 
this discussion into a consideration of the scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions. 
Indeed, most theorists who have an opinion on Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ are really 
interested in his theory of the passions, or even more broadly speaking, in his moral 
theory. Therefore, though I may on occasion seek to clarify what I have already argued 
for in light of the interpretations being considered, my main intention in presenting this 
material is to introduce some of the trends in readings of Hume’s theory of the passions. 
I will begin by giving in some detail the account offered by Thomas Dixon,105 as his take 
on Hume is somewhat unique in that its context is not a Hume-centered work, but rather a 
conceptual history of discourse on affective mental states more generally, with a 
particular interest in tracing the move from ‘passion’ as the dominant, but not sole term 
of this discourse, to the more recent era in which ‘emotion’ has become the dominant, 
and generally sole term. I will then offer a brief survey of some of the various accounts 
that have been offered by Hume scholars—varied not only in their content, but also in the 
degree to which the authors take it to be an important question. I will finish this section 
with what I take to be the strongest effort made towards developing a real distinction 
between emotion and passion in Hume, found not in a work on his philosophy of mind, 
nor his moral theory, but rather in a paper on his essay on tragedy by Alex Neill. This 
account, though not identical to mine, has some interesting similarities and agreements, 
for which reason I think it merits some particular consideration here.106    
                                                 
105 Dixon, T. (2003). From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. 
Cambridge, UK; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
106 I came across this article late in my process of writing this dissertation, after the analysis of Part One 
had already been completed. I was extremely pleased to find some of my main interpretive moves mirrored 
in this paper, particularly since I had seen them nowhere else to that point. That two more focused 
considerations of the emotion/passion distinction in Hume should independently arrive at similar 
conclusions was encouraging, and I take it that the similarities between my account and Neill’s strengthen 
my case.  
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We begin then with the account that Thomas Dixon offers in his book, From Passions to 
Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category. Dixon of course notes 
‘passion’ as the dominant term in Hume’s discussion, but also acknowledges that 
‘emotion’ shows up not infrequently in his discussions of affectivity. Dixon has 
suggested that the liberal use of the term ‘emotion’ by Hume in his Treatise of Human 
Nature was “the earliest sustained use of the term in the English language in a way that is 
similar to present-day usage.”107 However, Dixon sheds little light on Hume’s intention in 
using the term ‘emotion’, spending only a little time on the question before moving ahead 
with one of the main focuses of his book: a detailed discussion of those who picked up 
the term and used it with such vigor over the next century that it became the dominant 
term for affective experience. Generally speaking, Hume’s use of the term is left as 
somewhat mysterious, frequent, but nonetheless apparently secondary to his use of the 
term ‘passion’. But this notwithstanding, I will present the details of the insightful 
suggestions that Dixon does make. 
Dixon argues that generally Hume seems to “intend ‘emotions’ to be read as a rather 
vague and general term to mean something like ‘feelings’ or ‘movements’ or ‘agitations’ 
of the mind.”108 He notes that it has been suggested that Hume’s use of the term in this 
way may have been adopted from Descartes’ use of  ‘émotion’ as “a broad umbrella term 
                                                 
107 Thomas Dixon (2003), 104. It should be noted that not everyone I have spoken to agrees with the claim 
that Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ was the first sustained use English use of the term, and point to contemporary 
and earlier English authors who used the term as counter examples. The question, however, is whether in 
these older cases ‘emotion’ is being used in the older sense of (physical) disturbance and motion, or in a 
way “similar to present-day usage” as Dixon claims Hume is. I am not sure at this point whether Dixon’s 
claim is accurate. What I am interested in arguing is that Hume’s use of the term is at the very least 
bridging the older use of the term with the contemporary, and further, that understanding Hume’s use of the 
term can shed light on the nature of the category of ‘emotion’ that we have ended up with in present-day 
discourse.    
108 Dixon (2003), 105. Note that ‘feelings,’ ‘movements’ and ‘agitations’ are distinct kinds of phenomena- 
to say that ‘emotion’ means these things it to say quite a bit. In particular, it strikes me that feelings and 
movements/agitaions are importantly different from each other.  
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for the movements of the soul.”109 To a certain degree, Dixon argues, ‘emotions’ filled 
“an undefined role, while ‘passions’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘affections’, remained the 
established categories that Hume favoured.”110 He suggests that at times there seems to 
be a contrast for Hume between emotions as closely connected to sensation on one hand, 
and other more cognitive (that is to say, more intellectual) passions on the other.111 
However, as ultimately both are included in the category of secondary impressions, 
Dixon sees little in the text to support any sort of consistent distinction between the use of 
the terms. Indeed, he suggests, often Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ appears to be identical 
with his use of ‘passion,’ making the terms in Hume more or less synonymous.  
Dixon argues that Hume’s apparent conflation of these terms is related to the increasing 
secularization of the topic that he was engaging. Hume wanted to do for the science of 
the mind what Newton had done for physical science. As such, passions were to be seen 
as forces, “mini-agents…‘choosing means’ to achieve desired ends.”112 This picture of 
the passions also fit well with the metaphor of motion and disturbance found in 
Descartes’ émotion. Hume’s approach to the science of mind apparently motivated the 
adoption of ‘emotion’ as a term to group all kinds of related affective mental phenomena 
that in the past had been separated, but that Hume recognized now as playing a unified 
and important role in the ‘mechanics’ of the mind. 
                                                 
109 Dixon (2003), 13. 
110 Dixon (2003), 101. 
111 Baier takes a line similar to this suggestion. Dixon ultimately finds that as passions and emotions are 
both included as impressions of reflection there is no real basis for distinguishing them from each other in 
this way. Baier, on the other hand, (as will be discussed below) tries to align emotions with ‘violent’ as 
opposed to ‘calm’ passions, and thereby maintain the distinction in terms of sensation. I am inclined to 
agree with Dixon that the emotions’ status as impressions of reflection seems to present problems for such 
a reading.  
112 Dixon (2003), 106. 
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Dixon offers a useful starting point here for understanding Hume’s choice of the term 
‘emotion.’ Certainly Hume would have been familiar with émotion as found in Descartes, 
and there seems little question that his adoption of the term is at least a partial inheritance 
from Descartes. Further, his Newtonian science of the mind frequently finds expression 
in physical metaphor throughout the Treatise,113 particularly in the form of discussions of 
moving and opposing forces. The connotations of agitation and movement are surely 
intentional. But what textual evidence could be offered for the claim that ‘passion’ and 
‘emotion’ are being used more or less synonymously? I would suggest (and in fact have 
in Part One) that the textual evidence generally points to the opposite conclusion. I take it 
that my analysis has shown that when the term ‘emotion’ is used in conjunction with or in 
contrast to ‘passion’ it is because there is a conceptual distinction in operation. There is a 
diversity in the characterization of the mental events being discussed that we overlook 
when we assume ‘passion’ to be synonymous with ‘emotion’ in Hume’s work. 
Moving away from Dixon, let us consider briefly what some other commentators have 
said about the relation between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in Hume. Norman Kemp Smith 
has suggested (in a move that flips the claim I made in 1.3) that Hume uses the term 
‘passion’ broadly, “as covering all the various instincts, impulses, propensities, 
affections, emotions and sentiments of the animal and human mind,” excluding only 
pleasure and pain.114 115 This characterization appears to assume emotion to be a sort of 
subcategory to passion. I have argued, of course, that textual evidence supports the 
                                                 
113 Take for example the following passage from 2.3.3.6, particularly relevant to this discussion. “A trivial 
good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most 
valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound 
weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of situation.” This mechanical picture of the workings of 
various and competing desires suggests that an understanding of passions and other related emotions as 
motions with varying degrees of force given their “situations” would be useful to Hume’s discussion.  
114 Kemp Smith, Norman (1941), The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan), 162. 
115 It is interesting to note that Kemp Smith goes so far as to suggest that belief for Hume is a passion 
[Kemp Smith (1941), 11].  
  
125 
 
reverse claim. But it is interesting to note that what Kemp Smith understands to be the 
broad category of ‘passion’ is very much like the broad category of impressions of 
reflection that I have suggested Hume aligns with ‘emotion.’ That is, there is something 
similar in the kind of distinction we are making, between particular kinds of impressions 
of reflection and “all types of feeling” considered more generally,116 though the 
assignment of terminology in this instance appears to be reverse. Kemp Smith’s reasons 
for attributing ‘passion’ to the broader category do not draw on textual analysis as I have, 
but rather rest on an argument for Hutcheson’s influence in Hume, and attribute the same 
use of ‘passion’ to both.117 Hume’s project was clearly influenced by Hutcheson, but I 
would argue his choice in terminology to reference various aspects of felt experience in 
his conceptual scheme differs in this regard.   
Other commentators have been less inclined to note a distinction at all.118 Pal Ãrdal 
appears to use ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ more or less synonymously in his discussion, as 
Hume himself appears to at first glance.119 Like Hume, there are places where he is more 
inclined to use ‘emotion’ (for instance, in discussing the violent passions he explains 
them as having greater ‘emotional intensity’), but he does not address the variation in 
terminology.  His use of both terms is also presumably influenced by the fact that in 
contemporary discussion the term ‘emotion’ is considered as having replaced ‘passion,’ 
but that really they have the same reference in the discourse. Ãrdal is not the only 
commentator to use the terms this way—in fact, it is a very common move in discussions 
of Hume’s moral theory. 
The glossary in the Nortons edition of the Treatise offers some sense of the ways Hume’s 
various terms for affective mental states have been viewed in the general scholarship, and 
                                                 
116 Kemp Smith (1941), 44. 
117 Kemp Smith (1941), Chapter II, “Hutcheson’s Teaching and its Influence on Hume.” 
118 Barry Stroud, for instance, falls into this camp [Stroud, B. (1988). Hume. London, Routledge]. 
119 Ãrdal, P. (1966). 
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generally used with only very fuzzy distinction. In this glossary entry for ‘emotion,’ 
‘passion’ is not suggested as a synonym; however, ‘emotion’ is listed as a synonym for 
‘passion’, and is defined as: “a secondary impression, that is, an impression of reflection 
‘arising either from the original impressions [of sensation] or from their ideas’ (2.1.1.2), 
or arising from certain natural instincts (2.3.9.8).”120 ‘Emotion’ is interestingly given a 
four-fold definition: it is “a feeling that may attend a passion, resemble a passion, be 
related to a passion, or be produced by a passion.”121 The textual references that are given 
as support for this definition are predictably many of the same passages that I have given 
careful attention to in Part One. It is interesting to find in the Nortons edition the 
enumeration of apparent uses and functions of ‘emotion’ in Hume.122 
The Nortons’ glossary entries, however, appear to suggest, if nothing else, a kind of 
confusion about the use of the various terms for affective mental states in Hume. The 
suspicion that there is confusion in the understanding of Hume’s terminology choices is 
born out in an article by Louis Charland.123 Charland argues that Hume does appear to 
introduce the term ‘emotion’  in order to refer to something distinct from passion, a kind 
of more fleeting, attending feeling, that is to be contrasted with his more complex and 
                                                 
120 Norton (2000), 579. 
121 Norton (2000), 575. 
122 It may also be of interest to note Norton’s entry for sentiment: “(1) used to convey various connotations 
of feeling and opinion; cf. French sentiment. 1.3.13.9; 1.3.14.8; 1.4.1.5; 2.1.11.1-2; 2.2.8.2; 2.3.1.9. (2) 
passion, affection, emotion, or a thought or feeling prompted by a passion. 1.4.1.11; 1.4.2.37; 2.1.11.7; 
2.2.6.5; 2.3.9.4” [Norton (2000), 581]. 
123 Charland, L. (2010). [“Reinstating the Passions: Lessons from the History of Psychopathology.” Invited 
chapter for The Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Emotion. P. Goldie, editor. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 237-263]. It is interesting to note that while most accounts of the conceptual history of 
thought about affective mental states have characterized it as the movement from the concept of passion to 
that of emotion, Charland in this article presents a history of passion and emotion, ultimately lamenting the 
loss of a useful category of passions as affective states of long duration, to be contrasted with the more 
fleeting ‘emotions.’ 
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cognitive accounts of passions such as the indirect passions. This, Charland says, may 
have been innovative of Hume, but it also appears (particularly when one looks at it 
through the secondary literature) to be somewhat confused. Specifically, he takes Hume 
to have failed to properly or clearly distinguish between ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, even 
while he was popularizing the use of both terms in discussions of mind (a trend that 
eventually ended in emotion being the category that dominated the discourse). 
In a different strain, Philip Mercer offers a taxonomy of the contents of the Humean mind 
that he claims is influenced by Ardal and Kemp Smith. Yet he offers his own, somewhat 
unique, passion/emotion distinction, in which he claims that “properly speaking we 
should call the violent impressions ‘passions’ and the calm ones ‘emotions’.”124 This 
interpretation is presumably derived from comments from Hume such as that found at 
2.1.1.3, where the passions are identified with violent impressions of reflection, while the 
calm are described as “decay[ing] into so soft an emotion as to become, in a manner, 
imperceptible.” Hume’s use of emotion in this paragraph, which aligns it with calm 
passions, is of course in contrast to his discussion at 2.3.4, where calm passions are 
distinguished from violent in that they “[direct] the actions and conduct without that 
opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion” 
(2.3.4.1). Considering the appearance Hume gives here of nearly contradicting himself, it 
is not surprising that commentators should come to opposite conclusions without 
recourse to the kind of in-depth analysis of the distinctions that I have offered. 
And opposite conclusions have indeed been reached. In fact, the most common reading in 
recent scholarship (not unlike Dixon’s) aligns ‘emotion’ with our more violently felt 
passion states. Consider Amy Schmitter’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia on emotion 
in the 17th to 18th century. She argues of Hume that “[w]hen the word ‘emotion’ itself 
                                                 
124 Mercer, P. (1972). Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between Sympathy and Morality, 
with Special Reference to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 22. 
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appears in his writings…it seems to mean simply some kind of motion.”125 Here we have 
a return to the more Cartesian understanding of emotion, where the violence or disorder it 
occasions is understood either as a metaphorical motion and disturbance in the mind, or 
as the phenomenological side of actual physiological motions and excitement.  
This appeal to the more mechanical and physical sense of ‘emotion’ is also found in the 
account offered by Annette Bair. The emotion/passion distinction that Baier offers is best 
understood in conjunction with a footnote she provides with the following O.E.D. 
account of the now “obsolete sense” of the term ‘emotion’: “A moving, stirring, agitation, 
perturbation (in a physical sense).”126 Locke and Shelley are both cited as having used the 
term in this older sense, and it is in this way that Baier takes it Hume uses the term. The 
footnote also suggests that the earliest English use of the term in the more modern sense 
of ‘feeling’ can be dated to 1808. This is in disagreement, of course, with Dixon’s claim 
that Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ had more in common with our modern use. It also seems to 
be in disagreement with Hume’s own placing of the term in the category of impressions 
of reflection. Though Hume was very likely drawing on the term’s connotations of 
motion and disturbance, as argued by Dixon and myself above, as impressions of 
reflection, emotions cannot be understood to reference purely physical phenomena.  
Baier is of course conscious of this to a degree; she is certainly not arguing that emotions 
for Hume are physical disturbances. But non-physical ‘disturbance’ for Hume can be of 
one of two kinds: an impression of sensation or an impression of reflection. Baier wants 
                                                 
125 http://plato.standford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD8Hume.html . Retrieved March 18, 2010. 
Schmitter goes on to point out that, “Like Hutcheson, however, [Hume] seems to take passions to be 
relatively low-order perceptions, in contrast to the reflective character of sentiments.” This claim for a 
distinction between passion and sentiment in Hume along the lines of passion as more sensitive and 
sentiment closer to felt beliefs (generally moral judgements, in the context of discussions of Hume’s moral 
theory) is common in Hume scholarship, particularly on his moral psychology. Hume never makes the 
distinction explicit himself (not unlike the case of emotion), but I would concur that there seems to be good 
textual reasons for thinking Hume was assuming some kind of conceptual distinction. 
126 Baier (1991), 310. 
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to suggest that emotions are more akin to impressions of sensation than impressions of 
reflection such as the passions, perhaps running parallel to the physical disturbances 
associated with the experience of strong passions. But I do not think this reading is quite 
right. As I argued in Part One, Hume is more concerned with emotions as reflective 
feelings, than he is with their potential physiological underpinnings. Emotions are not 
merely sensations tied to the body: they are explicitly noted as impressions of reflection 
every time this category is introduced. I believe that Hume is moving beyond the older 
meaning of the term, and perhaps farther beyond it than Baier gives him credit for. But 
Baier has reasons for positing this kind of passion/emotion distinction that go beyond a 
discussion of terminology, and play a role in her reading of Hume’s theory of the 
passions generally, and in particular her explanation of 2.3.3.5 in light of the cognitivist 
reading she seeks to give of Hume’s theory. I will discuss this, and ultimately respond to 
Baier’s claims, in 2.4. 
I will finish this section with a look at a different account of the emotion/passion 
distinction that, as in Baier’s case, is required to play an important role in the author’s 
overall interpretation of Hume. But this account is not offered within the context of 
exploring Hume’s theory of mind, or even his moral theory, but rather his aesthetics and 
approach to the problem of tragedy. In “ ‘An Unaccountable Pleasure’: Hume on tragedy 
and the Passions”127 Alex Neill seeks to give a Humean account for the puzzle of how it 
is that the negative passions we experience when taking in a tragedy somehow result in 
pleasure—and do so to the extent that Hume is able to claim that audiences “are pleased 
in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, 
sobs, and cries…”.128 Neill argues that for Hume there is authentic distress at the tragic 
events the audience takes in, as well as authentic pleasure that is somehow a result of this 
                                                 
127 Neill, A. (1998). ““An Unaccountable Pleasure”: Hume on Tragedy and the Passions” Hume Studies 
24(2): 335-354. 
128 Hume, D., E. F. Miller (1987). “Of Tragedy.” Essays, Moral, Political and Literary. Indianapolis, 
Liberty Classics, 1.22.1.  
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uneasy affectation. He argues that Hume is drawing on the ‘mutability’ of the passions to 
explain this phenomenon. This mutability he argues must be understood in terms of 
Hume’s account of “affective conversion,”129 an account that requires an emotion/passion 
distinction.  
Neill argues that there is good reason to think that generally speaking for Hume the 
hedonic tone of any particular passion is essential to it (a claim I would agree with). He 
supports this in part by noting that Hume’s account of the production of the indirect 
passions requires that we understand them as having a particular hedonic charge (or 
valence). Therefore, he takes it that the challenge of explaining the pleasure we derive 
from unpleasant passions evoked by tragedy in Humean terms is the challenge of coming 
up with a  story where there is a transition of feeling and a subsequent change in hedonic 
character of a part of our current feeling, without loss of identity of the passion being 
experienced. After all, the pleasure experienced in watching a tragedy is often concurrent 
with the pain that the portrayal produces. But the unpleasant passions themselves cannot 
be also pleasant, without compromising their identity. 
 Neill’s solution is the following:  
As it is in almost all of his talk of conversion in the Treatise…Hume‘s claim in 
“Of Tragedy” is that it is the “emotion”-the “impulse” or “vehemence” or “spirit” 
or “movements”-associated with the “melancholy passions” that is converted or 
given “a new direction” in our experience of tragedy. And given contemporary 
usage, in which the term “emotion” is commonly used to refer to what Hume calls 
the “passions,” it is worth noting that (although on this as on other matters he is 
less than consistent in his terminology) Hume does not treat the terms “passion” 
and “emotion” as coextensive.130   
                                                 
129 Neill (1998), 338. 
130 Neill (1998), 46. 
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Neill argues that generally Hume does not speak of the passions when he presents 
conversion of painful feeling to pleasant: rather he is inclined to talk about the emotions. 
He references the maxim that I discussed at length in 1.10, that “any emotion, which 
attends a passion, is easily converted into it” (2.3.4.2). This is the case even in instances 
where the emotion must change to adopt the hedonic character of the passion it is 
‘converted’ to, which of course is precisely the situation in the case of pleasure from a 
tragedy. 
The case he makes for the distinction between passion and emotion is not as fully 
developed as mine, but makes many similar points: he notes the language of emotion 
‘attending’ passions, as well as passions both being followed by and causing emotion. He 
focuses on emotion as movement and violence of feeling. Here our interpretations part 
ways: Neill takes it that the calm passions are experienced without emotion, and further 
makes the claim that the hedonic character of a passion is not essentially tied to the 
emotion of that passion. I will not recite my arguments against these claims here. Neill’s 
analysis of this distinction is not the focus of the paper, nor does he delve very far into 
the text to find support. His basic thesis returns to the case of tragedy specifically, and is 
as follows: 
On this picture, our experience of tragedy has two main affective components: 
aesthetic delight, generated in us by the display of artistry in a well-written 
tragedy, and the “uneasiness” of “the melancholy passions” which are generated 
by our sympathy with the characters. The former is the “predominant” component 
of the experience, and it appropriates some of the emotion (movements, impulse, 
spirit, vehemence) of the weaker negative passions to itself, thus increasing its 
“force.” However, it is the emotions or movements produced by the negative 
passions that are appropriated and converted, rather than the negative passions 
themselves…The latter contribute to pleasure—as Hume puts it, they “afford the 
highest entertainment”—by generating emotion which is appropriated by and 
hence “swells the delight which eloquence raises in us,” but that is not to say that 
the negative passions themselves are transformed into aesthetic delight, nor that 
they are somehow experienced as pleasurable while nonetheless retaining their 
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identity. What is true, however, is that the appropriation of their “movements” 
renders them less forceful or turbulent than they would have been otherwise—
this, I suggest, is what Hume means when he says that in our experience of good 
tragedy the negative passions are “smoothed, and softened, and mollified.” And 
the result is that the character of our experience overall is pleasurable: “the soul ... 
feels on the whole a strong movement, which is altogether delightful’’.131 
Neill’s account is extremely interesting for my project, insofar as it arrives at some of the 
same conclusions as I have about the transient, fluid, mixable nature of emotion in Hume, 
though the approach that brings him to this conclusion is different. Whereas I was 
looking for an account of the mechanics of the Humean mind as is found in the Treatise, 
he was looking for the Humean psychological explanation of a phenomenon in Hume’s 
writing on aesthetics. That the same general mechanism of conversion of impulse and 
emotion between distinct passions was arrived at lends strength to both of our cases.  
Here I will end my brief account of some of the readings of a potential emotion/passion 
distinction in the literature. One aspect that I hope has become apparent is that there is a 
general trend in the scholarship towards the suggestion that if there is some distinction 
between emotion and passion in Hume, it is that emotion appears to be more sensational 
in nature, even tied to bodily feeling, while passion seems a more highly cognitive 
category, involving beliefs and associations that often make their characterization hard to 
offer without reference to mental events beyond the immediate felt experience.132 This is 
the kind of distinction to be found in Baier, who I take to have heavily influenced current 
discourse on the topic of Hume’s theory of the passions. Such a distinction, between 
affective mental states that are pure sensation and affective mental states that also 
involved beliefs, attitudes, associations of ideas, etc., is itself a distinction between 
general trends in reading Hume’s theory of the passions overall, and indeed, in forming 
                                                 
131 Neill (1998), 347. 
132 The one clear exception to this is Mercer. 
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any theory of the passions. At the level of contemporary debates on philosophy of 
emotion, theorists are still generally divided between cognitivist and ‘sensationalist,’ or 
what are now often called James-Langesian theories of the nature of emotions. I would 
argue that this same debate is to be found internal to Hume scholarship on his work on 
the passions. Therefore, I will now turn to look at how Hume scholars have characterized 
Hume’s theory of the passions with a focus on arguments for either a cognitivist, or 
sensationalist reading of Hume.    
 
   
2.2 The debate between sensationalist and cognitivist 
interpretations of Hume’s passions 
 
Book II’s account of certain particular passions is certainly quite detailed and exact. Its 
general conception of the passions as a category, however, is less clear. Beyond the basic 
designation of a type of impression of reflection, Hume offers little in the way of overall 
characterization of this category. The result in the scholarship has been a fairly wide 
range of interpretive directions, all taking their cues from various aspects of his treatment 
of the individual passions, as well as his claims about the nature of motivation, in which 
passion plays a central role (as it does in his moral theory, another common source of 
theorizing about his characterization of the passions). The reasons for the variety in 
readings have a lot to do with the question of whether Hume conceived of the passions as 
‘original existences,’ essentially felt in nature, or as part of a more complex cognitive 
event, that involves beliefs, desires and logical relations between ideas. Both readings 
have considerable support in different aspects of the text. But before launching into an 
overview of the cognitivist/sensationalist debate as I will argue it is found internal to 
scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions, it would be useful to offer a 
characterization of the debate as it is found in the scholarship within philosophy of 
emotions more generally. After this brief overview, I will turn to consider the basics of 
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the debate as it has arisen in interpretations of Hume. After this set up, the next two 
sections will deal with the textual evidence for each position, as well as some of the 
arguments that have been given by advocates of each reading.  
Jesse Prinz has suggested that “[t]he history of emotion research can be regarded as a 
battle between two opposing sides,” cognitivism and non-cognitivism.133 The debate as 
he characterizes it is over whether “emotions essentially involve judgments or thoughts,” 
or if they are fundamentally felt in nature and in that sense are ‘non-cognitive.’134 A brief 
account of how these approaches may be unpacked is perhaps best started with William 
James.135  James famously identified emotions with bodily states—a non-cognitive theory 
in the extreme. He argues that, “the emotional brain-processes not only resemble the 
ordinary sensorial brain-processes, but in very truth are nothing but such processes 
variously combined.”136,137  His identification of emotion with physical processes is not 
meant to overlook the felt aspect, however; on the contrary, he is arguing that when an 
emotion is excited “the bodily changes follow directly on the perception of the exciting 
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.”138 The felt 
perception of a bodily state is identical to the emotion for James.  
                                                 
133 Prinz, J. (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. New York, Oxford University Press, 50.  
134 Prinz (2007), 50.  
135 I will give a brief treatment of James here, but it should be noted that this type of non-cognitive 
approach is generally attributed to Carl Lange as well, who advanced the theory around the same time and 
independently of James. See Prinz (2007), 55-56 for a summary of the two accounts.   
136 James, W. (1884). “What is an Emotion?” Mind 9(34): 189. 
137 It should be noted that James clarifies in his article that he only means to look at “those [emotions] that 
have a distinct bodily impression” [James (1884), 189], though he also argues that without any bodily 
experience there is no real emotion.  
138 James (1884), 189-190. 
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For the James-Lange type of position,139 as it has come to be known, Prinz says 
“emotions can occur without judgments or other cognitions. Emotions have no essential 
connection to cognition.”140 This is at the heart of a non-cognitivist account. Though 
there have been variations on the James-Lange tradition that agree and disagree on 
particulars in various ways, it is this claim that these particular kinds of cognitions are not 
necessary constituents of emotions that set them apart from the cognitivist theories.      
But common experience tells us that often we take the beliefs and ideas we have 
surrounding an emotion to be an essential part of the experience of that particular 
emotion. This is the sense of the more cognitive theorists of emotion, prominent among 
whom is Robert Solomon. Solomon points out that feeling is not all there is to having an 
emotion, and goes so far as to say that “even if [feeling] were essential to having an 
emotion, it would not be at all interesting.”141  Emotions are not rightly characterized by 
their feeling (after all, he argues, there are instances of emotion that appear to have little 
or no feeling attached), but rather by their intentionality, conceived as “mental acts and as 
propositional attitudes” of the individual subjects experiencing them.142 It is not enough 
to identify certain beliefs and objects as part of a causal story about the emergence of 
emotions; Solomon says that in fact “it is the person’s view of his or her circumstances 
                                                 
139 I should note that I am generally considering the so-called ‘feeling theories’ of emotion to fall under the 
James-Lange camp. Though these are more in the historical tradition of Cartesianism, and taken to be “the 
common-sense view that emotions are feeling…whose source is…internal rather than external and through 
the senses,” [Solomon, R. (1977). “The Logic of Emotion.” Noûs, 11(1), 42], I think that close 
consideration of the work of thinkers like Descartes who are grouped in this tradition, tends to reveal them 
to find physiological underpinnings of passionate experiences, such that they could easily be in agreement 
with the general project of the James-Lange approach. At the very least, both types of theories appear to be 
in agreement about the centrality of the felt aspect of the passions in determining identity.   
140 Prinz (2007), 53. 
141 Solomon (1977), 43. 
142 Solomon (1977), 44. 
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which is essential to emotion.”143 An extremely cognitivist statement of Solomon’s 
theory is captured in Prinz’s summary of Solomon’s position as arguing that “emotions 
are evaluative judgments that provide the structure of our world.”144 Solomon thinks the 
interest in the passions lies in “the total demolition of the age-old distinctions between 
emotion and reason, passion and logic…[Emotions] are extremely subtle, cunning, 
sophisticated, cultured, learned, logical and intelligent.”145 Emotions on a cognitivist 
account bear only a causal connection to the feelings they produce; what is essential to 
them are the judgments and beliefs of the individual that informs their formation.  
A basic summary, then, of the two dominant schools of thought on the nature of emotion 
is, on the one hand, emotions identified as essentially felt experiences (possibly with 
particular physiological underpinnings) that are complete without reference to beliefs, 
objects, judgments, etc, and other more ‘cognitive’ acts of mind, and emotions, on the 
other hand, as essentially consisting in beliefs, judgments, and characteristic relations 
between these things, and the typical objects indicated by the emotion’s intentional 
structure. Prinz identifies this as the debate between cognitivist and non-cognitivist 
theorists of emotion. I have already, in this work, characterized the debate in terms of 
cognitive vs. sensationalist theories of emotion, and this would be a good time to note 
why I have used (and will continue to use, in the context of the debate in Hume) this 
terminology.  
The cognitive/non-cognitive distinction as it applies to contemporary debate is of course 
anachronistically applied to Hume. In fact, the apparent presence of posits typical of both 
types of theories in Hume’s account of the passions may be in part due to a lack of 
conceptual division of this sort in the discussions of his time. But this is not to say that 
                                                 
143 Solomon (1977), 45. 
144 Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York, Oxford University Press, 
8. 
145 Solomon (1977), 45-46. 
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there was not a developing awareness of the question of whether passion should be 
identified as purely sensation, or as involving belief and ‘reason.’ Dixon argues that 
Hume’s take on passions (and his introduction of ‘emotion’) occurred at a time when 
there was a trend towards so called ‘sensationalism’ in the growing number of secular 
accounts of the passions.146 According to Dixon, through the 18th and 19th centuries there 
was a tendency to categorize theories of mind according as they fell on a scale that had A 
Priorism on one end and sensationalism on the other. The former viewed mental faculties 
as innate to the soul, the latter took them to be the products of experience. Sensationalism 
was closely associated with ‘associationism,’ a school of philosophy with its roots in 
Locke and the understanding that all the contents of the mind come from either 
experience, or internal reflection on that experience (Hume, of course, being another 
forerunner of this type of theory). The difference between the two approaches is, first, 
“the often derogatory overtones” of the sensationalist designation, and secondly, that 
sensationalism was “more crudely reductionist, and explained complex phenomena as 
mere aggregates of basic bodies sensations, whereas the latter explained them as 
properties of complex learned associations, and gave a greater role… to the mind’s power 
of reflection.”147 
Dixon argues that for Hume the passions were removed a step from their physiological 
underpinnings because they were characterized as impressions of reflection. His account 
doesn’t identify him directly with the sensationalist program (though Hume’s thought 
certainly seemed to feed into the views of later theorists who would be accused of 
sensationalism, such as Thomas Brown). But the sensationalist approach I take to be 
more appropriately applied in questioning the nature of Hume’s theory of the passions 
than seeking to determine if there is a James-Lange theory of emotions to be found in 
Hume. Hence my decision to characterize the feeling-centric accounts of Hume’s theory 
                                                 
146 See Dixon (2003), chapter 4, “The Scottish creation of ‘the emotions’: David Hume, Thomas Brown, 
Thomas Chalmers,” 98-134. 
147 Dixon (2003), 100. 
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of the passions as ‘sensationalist’ in nature, as opposed to James-Langesian or non-
cognitive. 
My acceptance of the designation ‘cognitivist theory of emotion’ for readings that resist 
the attribution to Hume of a simple, sensationalist account of passion, on the other hand, 
is consciously done in order to acknowledge one of the central claims that commentators 
who give Hume such a reading are often seeking to make: namely, that Hume’s theory 
anticipates the contemporary cognitive theories of emotion that are often espoused by the 
same authors who find them in Hume. This is perhaps most clearly seen to be the case in 
the well-known analysis of Hume’s theory of the passions offered by Donald 
Davidson.148 In the article that provides Davidson’s highly cognitivist reading of Hume 
he evens states that his is not a claim that “this is what Hume really meant; it is what he 
should have meant, and did inspire.”149 
I have to this point characterized the debate between cognitive and non-cognitive 
(sensationalist) theories of emotion, but I perhaps have not sufficiently motivated the 
debate to those unfamiliar with it already. The non-cognitive account, with its emphasis 
on feeling, is very much in line with our experience of emotion. Though our common 
sense view may not include the assumption that our emotions are simply aggregates of 
physical sensations (as the James-Lange approach holds), we do tend to think of them as 
fundamentally felt, and often pre-cognitive experiences. Hence the tendency in our folk 
psychology to contrast them with acts of reasoning. But there are good reasons to 
question whether the felt experience is sufficient for understanding the nature of our 
emotions. Consider the following statement, taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry on emotion:         
That emotions typically have formal objects highlights another important feature 
of emotional experience which feeling theories neglect, and which other 
                                                 
148 Davidson, D. (1976). “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride.” The Journal of Philosophy, 73(19): 744-757.  
149 Davidson (1976), 744. 
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psychological theories attempt to accommodate: emotions involve evaluations. If 
someone insults me and I become angry, his impertinence will be the aspect of his 
behavior that fits the formal object of my anger; I only become angry once I 
construe the person’s remark as a slight; the specific nature of my emotion’s 
formal object is a function of my appraisal of the situation.150 
Feeling theories appear to fall short insofar as they fail to recognize the place evaluation, 
judgments and attitudes play in our experience of emotions. What is particularly puzzling 
about the case of Hume’s theory of emotions, is that he appears to be at once explicit (and 
rather insistent!) that his theory take the passions to be fundamentally and essentially 
feeling states, and yet provide very detailed accounts of the (he claims) ‘causal’ 
conditions under which they by nature must arise. Despite his clear initial claims about 
the simple, felt nature of the passions, as Book II progresses his characterization appears 
increasingly cognitive.  
Jeremy Neu151 comments on just this apparent tension, and critiques Hume for presenting 
passions as felt states with thoughts incidentally attached. He argues that this is a 
backwards portrayal of the nature of emotions. Neu emphasizes the importance of beliefs 
to emotions, and argues that Spinoza presents a better picture of emotions, where they are 
thoughts with affect incidentally attached. Neu claims that the only thing that 
distinguishes Hume’s passions (and presumably his category of emotions generally) from 
mere sensations is the causal story he tells for each. Of Hume’s initial account of the 
difference between original impressions and impressions of reflection he says,  
                                                 
150 http://plato.standford.edu/entries/emotion. Retrieved March 18, 2010. The point here is about appraisal 
theories in particular, but I take it to have general application as a critique of non-cognitive theories by 
cognitive theorists.  
151 Neu, J. (1977). Emotion, Thought, & Therapy: A Study of Hume and Spinoza and the Relationship of 
Philosophical Theories of the Emotions to Psychological Theories of Therapy. Berkeley, University of 
California Press. 
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This is a genealogy. Causal ancestry is what distinguishes impressions of 
reflection from impressions of sensation…[We], however, must enquire whether 
emotions viewed as impressions with a peculiar causal history will do justice to 
the phenomena at all.152   
According to Neu emotions for Hume are merely “discreet and simple feelings with a 
complex causal history.”153 His so-called ‘causal history’ account of the passions Neu 
sees as backwards, putting their sensitive nature ahead of their cognitive nature, and 
making them little more than impressions of sensation with a different back-story.   
This is the kind of critique of Hume that cognitivist readings are typically trying to avoid. 
A more diplomatic commentator on Hume’s use of both the ‘essentially felt’ and 
‘naturally suited to certain causes’ accounts of the passions is Amelie Rorty.154 Some of 
the details of her approach are worth considering now. She claims that for Hume, 
[T]he passions bear extremely complex relations to representational ideas and to 
beliefs. For the passions are not in and of themselves representational: taken 
simply as psychological facts, they are only contingently connected with 
representational ideas. While they are in principle capable of motivating, their 
particular motivational directions—to pursue this or avoid that—depend on the 
beliefs and ideas with which they are conjoined.155 
Rorty here understands the passions primarily with an eye to the motivating power that 
Hume attributes to them. This motivating role she takes to be very much informed by our 
ideas and beliefs. On the Humean account, the passions may be the only forces acting on 
                                                 
152 Neu (1977), 7-8. 
153 Neu (1977), 152. 
154 Rorty, A. O. (1982). "From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments." Philosophy 57: 159-171. 
155 Rorty (1993), 172. 
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our wills, but how they come to move us depends on their individual natures as they 
relate to our ideas, impressions and beliefs. As Rorty puts it in considering the 
motivational power of the indirect passions in particular,  
…the motivational direction of indirect passions is given by the idea with which 
it is conjoined [2.3.9]. It is this basically mutually reinforcing associative 
conjunction between passions and specific correlated ideas that effectively 
(though not strictly logically) makes the passions cognitive.156 
Thus she seeks to offer a way to think of Hume’s passions as cognitive, while still 
acknowledging the importance of his claim that they are essentially impressions, without 
reference. Hume of course says that it isn’t merely our immediate sensations “which 
determine the character of any passion, but the whole bent and tendency of it from 
beginning to end” (2.2.9.11). Rorty’s point is that analytically we may very well be able 
to isolate a particular, nonrepresentational feeling as being at the core of a passion. But 
psychologically, the mental state is one that involves both affect and particular ideas and 
beliefs. She would likely argue that Neu is wrong in his claim that Humean passions are 
mere feelings with thoughts incidentally attached; there seems nothing incidental about 
the ideas and beliefs that help form the character of a passion.157 
Rorty often describes the passions in Hume as “motivating attitudes”, “primary” or 
“internal sources of action.”158 Elsewhere she argues that beginning with the theories of 
Descartes and Hume ‘passions’ gradually made the conceptual change to ‘emotions.’ 
                                                 
156 Ibid 
157 Rorty has argued that ‘sentiments’ are Hume’s middle ground between ‘reason’ and ‘passion’, and the 
answer to the Hume interpreter’s desire to preserve a cognitive rationality in the face of Hume’s claim that 
“Reason is and ought only to be a slave of the passions”. Sentiments are “calm indirect dispositional 
passions”, that are “attitudes towards objects which are conceived as good or evil” [Rorty (1993), 173]. She 
describes them as both “motivating passions” and “sound well-formed general cognitive attitudes.” 
158 For example, Rorty (1990), 256; Rorty (1993), 178. 
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“Instead of being reactions to invasions from something external to the self,” she argues, 
“passions became the very activities of the mind, its own motions.”159 This sort of 
reading of the difference between passions and emotions reflects in part what Hume was 
trying to touch on by using the term, and perhaps creating the category, of emotions. 
Taking Descartes’ French word for the motions and agitations of the mind and turning it 
into an English word to represent the impulses of a mechanical science of mind made 
room for Hume to talk about our sources of motivation in a way that the traditional 
category of passions perhaps did not make room for.  
But Rorty has not avoided the apparent confusion and tension in Hume’s thought 
regarding the cognitive vs. the sensational character of the passions.  Rorty notes in 
Hume the tendency to draw a distinction between analytic and psychological distinctness, 
and further, to take the typical analytic distinctions of his day and argue for their 
psychological wholeness.160 She explains his attitude towards these analytical distinctions 
in the following: 
Although they may be separable in thought, we would be unwise to separate 
them. Like the analytic scientist, the analytic philosopher separates independent 
variables that form an “uncompounded and inseparable motion” (T.493 
[3.2.2.14]).161 
Despite this kind of charitable reading of Hume’s project, I think there is ample evidence 
in the text that there is easily a tension between Hume’s characterization of passions as 
having a ‘psychological wholeness’ that constitutes their essence, while at the same time 
putting heavy emphasis on the logic of the passions as it pertains to relations between 
                                                 
159Rorty (1982), 159.  
160 Rorty (1993). 
161 Rorty (1993), 170. 
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ideas, impressions and ultimately beliefs. To prove it, I believe we only need consider the 
amassed textual evidence for both sides of the debate.   
Therefore, I will proceed in the next two sections to offer argument based on the text for 
the sensationalist and cognitivist readings of Hume respectively. I will also highlight 
some key arguments from various scholars who have made cases for each type of 
reading. My goal is to demonstrate that there are in fact very good reasons for holding 
either view. As a consequence, commentators tend to either hold one view, and are 
pressured to either ignore, or do a lot of work to explain away certain passages that 
appear to show the contrary, or they have conceded that in Hume there is at best some 
confusion, at worst a glaring tension in his thought. In the section following the 
presentation of each side, I will offer something of a resolution to this tension with the 
application of my emotion/passion distinction. To Hume’s credit, I believe he had a more 
conceptually rich theory of the passions than is usually attributed to him, with aspects of 
both a good sensationalist account and a well-reasoned cognitivist account. 
 
 
2.3 Support for a sensationalist reading of Hume on 
passion  
 
An obvious starting place for this discussion is to try to find a textual explanation of 
‘passion’ in the Treaitse, and then move from there to the various references Hume 
makes that may incline us towards a sensationalist reading of this category. But to find 
something like a definition of ‘passion’ in Hume is likely to be somewhat fruitless. The 
reason for this is that the very nature of Hume’s approach is such that he is unlikely to 
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offer this kind of definition. Barry Stroud162 explains this by offering the following read 
on Hume’s methodology.  
Stroud contends that Hume’s project is driven by two ever-present, but not always 
compatible methodological commitments: first, his naturalism, and second, his devotion 
to the theory of ideas. Stroud takes seriously Hume’s contention that his work is meant as 
an “attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects,” 
where moral subjects are understood to include “human thought, actions, feelings, 
perceptions, passions and language.”163 Stroud presents Hume as a sort of social or 
human scientist, and whether or not the work he did holds up under contemporary 
standards for such empirical investigation, is seems clear that Hume took himself to be 
doing something like this. His method generally involves positing general principles of 
the mind in an attempt to explain the diverse, complex phenomena he is very aware of by 
observation. Hume, Stroud argues, “wants to do for the human realm what he thinks 
natural philosophy, especially in the person of Newton, had done for the rest of 
nature.”164 
This methodological commitment runs side-by-side with a commitment to the theory of 
ideas and associationism in Hume. Stroud argues that Hume’s naturalistic project is often 
somewhat crippled by his unquestioning commitment to the theory of ideas. He argues 
that it tends to direct Hume’s attention away from the proper objects of his naturalistic 
study and leads him to oversimplify and even deny certain phenomena. His focus shifts to 
be more about providing explanations with his general principles and other ‘Newtonian’ 
tools of his theory than the actual empirical content of what it is he seeks to explain. The 
theory of ideas is an atomistic picture of distinct and separable perceptions. Hume 
understands thoughts, beliefs and feelings to be individual, relatively distinct events that 
                                                 
162 Stroud, B. (1988). Hume. London, Routledge. 
163 Stroud (1988), 2. The Hume quote is of course taken from the subtitle of the Treatise.   
164 Stroud (1988), 3. 
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have the potential to combine, separate and interact in a nearly mechanical fashion. 
Stroud notes that Hume is a Newtonian not only in method, but in the way he models his 
system, in the explanations he tends to give and the very terms he uses.165 This desire to 
provide first principles, often distracting Hume from the naturalistic requirements of his 
project, Stroud characterizes as a developmental or genetic approach. He says the 
following near the end of his book: 
I have tried to show that [Hume’s] main concern is always with the origin of 
perceptions in the mind, and not primarily with their content or definition. His 
program therefore does not commit him to providing ‘analyses’ or ‘definitions’, in 
the strict sense of expressions of meaning in alternative but precisely equivalent 
terms, of the thoughts, beliefs and reactions themselves.166 
 
This is relevant to the project at hand. Passions (and also emotions) for Hume, as 
examples of the basic, atomic components of his theory of mind, are unlikely to be given 
clear definitions or analyses. On the surface, this is not news. A first reading of Book II 
of the Treatise reveals that these important technical terms for Hume are only defined in 
terms of the theory of ideas he has already established and any deeper analysis needs to 
be gained by reading between the lines. What it is about Stroud’s contention here that is 
of further significance is the idea that Hume himself may not have had entirely clear 
ideas of the definitions of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, as his program is not focused on 
characterizing the atomic parts of the mind, but rather on explaining their origins, their 
operations under general principles and their effects. With regard to the passions, Stroud 
suggests that Hume was content to present a general outline of basic principles, without 
actually working out a successful, scientific theory of human nature. If Stroud is right, 
                                                 
165 Stroud, 8. 
166 Stroud, 224. 
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this explains much of the looseness with which Hume speaks of the passions and 
emotions. 
Of course, the principle of charity pushes us to seek out some kind of well-reasoned 
conceptual framework underneath the looseness of the terminology, as well as some 
firmly conceived ‘natures’ for the atomistic mental events he posits. This is certainly 
what I have sought to do in the case of ‘emotion’ in Part One. Now we can turn those 
efforts to the case of ‘passion.’    
Our starting place is the information that is provided through Hume’s account of the 
passion’s place in his taxonomy. This aspect of the account is easily agreed upon by both 
the cognitive and sensationalist interpretations of Hume’s passions. They are impressions, 
and more particularly impressions of reflection. They arise through reflection on ideas or 
impressions of pain or pleasure, or, in the instance of those passions that are ‘original’ to 
us, reflections on some kind of present perception that we are by nature inclined to 
respond to in a particular way (for example, all other things being equal, Hume assumes 
that we will respond to children with feelings of benevolence and kindness). Hume 
prompts our attention towards the passions by describing them as the more violent 
impressions of reflection, but (as has been discussed above) does not hold to the 
calm/violent distinction as a way to distinguish passions from non-passions.  
Hume goes on to characterizes each particular instance of a passion as a simple and 
uniform impression that cannot be broken down and explained by words,167 but must be 
known through experience,168 which naturally limits the ways in which Hume could or 
would try to describe them. In fact, one of the only characterizations of passions in 
                                                 
167 2.1.2.1: “The passions of PRIDE and HUMILTY being simple and uniform impressions, ‘tis impossible 
we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions.” 
Also, (Kemp Smith notes) this view is found at 2.2.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 (Kemp Smith identifies it with a view 
found in Locke that simple ideas cannot be defined). 
168 THN 2.1.2.1. 
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general offered by Hume is the following passage, which follows the famous ‘Reason is, 
and ought only to be, a slave of the passions’ argument of 2.3.3: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and 
contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other 
existence or modification. When I am angry I am actually possest with the 
passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than 
when I am thirsty or sick or more than five foot high. (2.3.3.5) 
First we should clarify what Hume means by “an original existence.” Clearly he does not 
mean “original” to be taken in the same sense as he does when he identifies our 
impressions of sensation as ‘original impressions’ at the beginning of Book II. 
Impressions of sensation are original in that they “without any antecedent perception 
arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the 
application of objects to the external organs” (2.1.1.1). The passions, on the other hand, 
are original in the sense that they are not copies of previous impressions, as ideas are. 
Thus the second claim in 2.3.3.5, that passions do not represent things. To be 
experiencing a passion, is to be in the moment feeling an impression that has no 
resemblance to anything beyond itself. Its existence is ‘original.’ When we feel a passion 
we are directly experiencing the object in question, not a representation of it, nor an idea 
pointing us towards some thing in the world. The passion is, in this sense, complete in 
itself.  
In context, Hume’s intention in this passage is to remind the reader that passions differ 
from ideas in that they are not copies of impressions that can be more or less accurate. 
Rather, they are ‘originals’, as they have no reference to anything else. Hume wants to 
use this point to conclude that reason cannot contradict a passion, since such a 
disagreement would require copies of things to be at issue, i.e. ideas. This intention of 
Hume’s in this passage is generally agreed upon. But the implications of the passage 
beyond that is a subject of some debate. I will, in 2.4, take the time to consider Baier’s 
response to this passage in particular. The passage at 2.3.3.5 likely constitutes the best 
single piece of textual evidence against a strongly cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory 
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of the passions, and hence Baier’s concern with it (she being one of the primary 
advocates for a more cognitivist reading of Hume). I will have more to say on this later.  
Despite the attention this passage has received, it is not the only place where Hume 
argues for the simple, non-representative nature of the passions.  At 1.1.6.1 Hume states 
that the “impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; 
none of which can possibly represent a substance.” Similarly, at 3.1.1.9 Hume reinforces 
the point that passions do not have content with which reason can disagree, and are 
therefore not representational. The non-representational characteristic of the passions is 
further emphasized when Hume points out that the nature of the passions as impressions 
is identical to the felt experience we have of the passion. Thus, he argues  
Upon this head we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as 
they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present themselves as 
distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their 
nature, but concerning their relations and situation. (1.4.2.5) 
Though Hume is here talking specifically about impressions of sensations, the point 
applies to all impressions, in that all are essentially felt in nature for Hume. Passions, 
therefore, are in their identity as they feel, identical to the feeling. And, as has been 
pointed out above, since that feeling is known and common to all through experience, 
discussion surrounding the passions will not tend to be about seeking to describe their felt 
nature, but rather seeking an accurate description of their relations and typical mental 
situations—their ‘attending circumstances,’ or in other words, their causal story. 
These causes of types of passions may be successfully identified on Hume’s account 
because:  
Passions are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than 
external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of cause and 
effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them. (1.3.2.16) 
Thus the enumeration of causes and objects as they surround the passions (especially the 
account of the indirect passions) in Book II. A more cognitive reading of these apparent 
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characterizations of the passions is avoided by understanding them to be mere reports of 
causal circumstances, just as in the external world, one object that causes another is not to 
be considered constitutive of the effected object. Hume may discuss the various causes 
and effects of the passions, without requiring that their natures include the ideas, beliefs 
or relations that constitute these causes and effects as part of the passions. 
Hume has more to say about the essentially felt nature of the passions, and of impressions 
generally in other places as well. For instance, he argues that, 
…every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains 
and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other 
differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true 
colours, as impressions or perceptions... ‘tis scarce possible they should be 
otherwise...” (1.4.2.7) 
He then goes on to say it is impossible to feel a perception wrongly; the perceived 
experience is exactly what the perception is. In fact, as I noted in Part One, Hume finds 
the felt quality of a passion to be its essential characteristic. He says that this quality 
…which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original 
quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and 
which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, 
and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in 
reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond 
feeling, ‘tis here in vain to reason or dispute. (2.1.5.4) 
This is a familiar Humean sentiment in the context of the analysis of ‘emotion’. Emotions 
(whether we take them to be distinct from passions or not) are without question felt in 
nature, and these characteristic feelings are here identified as the “very being and 
essence” of the particular passions.  
Further evidence for a sensationalist reading of Hume on the passions comes from 
Hume’s contrasting the ‘impenetrable’ nature of ideas with the potential for blending in 
the passions. He says,  
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[I]mpressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, 
may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and 
contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. 
Some of the most curious phaenomena of the human mind are deriv’d from this 
property of the passions. (2.2.6.1) 
Feelings, unlike ideas, are the sort of things that can be experienced as mixed, and still be 
a simple, uniform impression. In fact, as Hume reminds us here, much of the explanation 
he gives for the workings of the human mind depends on the ability of felt experience to 
blend, transfer feeling and establish a unified whole that moves us to act.  
Hume offers an argument for a non-cognitive account of the passions in a slightly 
different way at 2.2.6.6. There he argues that nature dictated the conjunction of 
benevolence and anger with love and hatred, respectively, not the logic of the terms or 
the beliefs they entail. Despite the agreement we may perceive between, say, an attitude 
of benevolence and an attitude of love, the fact that the one follows from the other is 
according to Hume actually contingent: 
If nature had so pleas’d, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred 
as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex’d 
to love, and of happiness to hatred. If the sensation of the passion and desire be 
opposite, nature cou’d have alter’d the sensation of the passion without altering 
the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each 
other. 
This kind of insistence on the contingent relationship between various beliefs and 
attitudes that appear to be essential to the production of the passions, and similar beliefs 
and attitudes that appear to be essential to the production of other, mutually arising 
passions likewise makes Hume’s account look highly non-cognitive.  
There are two more things that can be said about the production of the passions that seem 
to lend themselves to a more non-cognitive or sensationalist account of the passions in 
Hume. First, recall that the double-relation of impressions and ideas mechanism 
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responsible for the production of indirect passions, such as pride, includes as part of the 
(apparently causal) scheme the association of the feeling of pleasure with the feeling of 
pride. If this is the case it seems strange to claim that the ideas and impressions involved 
in the double relation of ideas and impressions are constitutive of pride (as presumably 
the cognitivist would want to do), since the feeling of pride is actually internal to the 
production process. The pride is completed in itself, and the impression of it is half of the 
relation of impressions that occasions the occurrence of the passion. The very story of the 
production of the indirect passions seems in this way to support a sensationalist reading 
of the essential nature of the passions. 
But Hume takes the support for a sensationalist characterization of his passions a step 
further when he offers an account of how the passion might be excited without the usual 
pre-requisite attending causal circumstances (which the cognitivist would seek to show to 
be not merely causal, but part of what constitutes the passion). Consider the following:  
[M]en often fall into a violent anger for injuries, which they themselves must own 
to be entirely involuntary and accidental. This emotion, indeed, cannot be of long 
continuance; but still is sufficient to show, that there is a natural connexion 
betwixt uneasiness and anger, and the relation of impressions will operate upon a 
very small relation of ideas. (2.2.3.6) 
In this case, anger does not arise because we have the right ideas and beliefs to produce 
it. Rather, there is a resemblance between uneasiness and the passion of anger such that 
the latter may arise merely because of the strong feeling of the former and the tendency 
towards association. Anger has no reference—therefore it can be established despite a 
lack of appropriate desires and because of its connection to uneasy feeling. It is only once 
the strength of the felt anger subsides a little that the vivacity of our reason-generated 
belief operates to change our feeling from one of anger (hence Hume’s claim that the 
passion that arises in this way “cannot be of long continuance”). 
This survey of some of the textual evidence one finds in the Treatise for a sensationalist 
reading of Hume’s theory of the passions is seconded by multiple commentators’ 
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arguments that the passions in Hume must be considered sensational and non-cognitive in 
nature. 
Prominent among these accounts is certainly that of Pal Ãrdal. He notes that, “Hume 
emphasizes the uniqueness of each different passion as a simple impression… [A] 
passion is a simple impression, and can obviously not be constructed out of simpler 
elements.”169 His claim in this context that the passion may not be built of simpler 
elements is meant to show that for Hume, no passion is built out of more fundamental 
perceptions—for Hume, there are not basic perceptions that serve as the building blocks 
for more complex passions, as each individual passion is experienced as a single, simple 
impression. He goes on to argue, regarding the simple nature of the passions, that 
The simple cannot be reductively analysed, for such an analysis would be 
tantamount to the denial that the simple really is simple. The analysis given is 
indeed meant to be causal in nature…170 
 
Ãrdal therefore comes to the same conclusion that the arguments from the text lead us to 
above: the details of the analyses in Book II of the direct and indirect passions are not 
accounts of the character or contents of the passions, as these are simple impressions 
known from experience and feeling, not belief and the content of ideas. Rather, the work 
of Book II is to give causal accounts.171 Ãrdal suggests that Hume’s detailed discussion 
of the passions in Book II can be viewed according to the three ways he thinks we can 
talk about a simple impression: “(1) by using a scale of intensity, (2) by pointing out its 
                                                 
169 Ãrdal (1966), 11. 
170 Ãrdal (1966), 12. 
171 In fact, Ãrdal takes it that “much of Hume’s trouble arises from treating each passion as a simple 
impression of which he can only give a causal explanation and point out its similarities to other passions,” a 
point that he argues for later in his book. 
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similarity or difference from other simple ideas,172 and (3) by describing the conditions 
under which it arises.”173 Thus Hume can go into much detail about the passions, despite 
their nature as simple, felt wholes.  
Jane McIntyre174 has also argued for the understanding of Hume’s passions as whole in 
themselves, as they exist as felt experiences.  She emphasizes their non-representational 
nature. She argues that Hume’s claim that a passion is an “original existence, and 
contains not any representative quality” (2.3.3.5) is a response against claims that 
passions and their causes and objects are not merely causally related, but suited to each 
other by nature. Hume’s passions, she argues, “[contain] not any representative quality” 
(2.3.3.5), and the nature of the passion is complete in itself. The relationship between the 
passion and the objects and causes is therefore merely causal and contingent. Indeed, she 
also argues that Hume’s concern in Book II is with causal mechanisms, and adds the 
further claim that in fact at no point does Hume provide “a clear picture of his account of 
the passions as a whole.”175 
David Owen adds to this type of argument by offering a brief discussion of what it is for 
ideas to be representative.176 He suggests that when Hume speaks of an idea 
‘representing’ something else, it is best understood as ‘corresponding,’ not resembling as 
an image might. The question of the way in which ideas represent is significant to 
understanding the argument in 2.3.3.5 about passions as original existences. Here the 
state of passions as having “not any representative quality” is contrasted with the 
                                                 
172 Ãrdal offers both an account of Hume’s line on how it is simple impressions may be similar, as well as a 
defense of this position from some potential objections. See Ãrdal (1966), pp. 13-15. 
173 Ãrdal (1966), 15. 
174 McIntyre, J. (2006). “Hume’s New and Extraordinary Account of the Passions,” in S. Traiger (ed.) The 
Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise (pp. 199-215). Malden, MA ; Oxford, Blackwell Pub. 
175McIntyre, J. (2000). “Hume’s Passions: Direct and Indirect.” Hume Studies (26: 77-86), 79. 
176 Owen, D. (1999). Hume's Reason. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, 68-69. 
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‘reference’ to other objects had by ideas. On Owen’s suggestion we could say that this 
amounts to the claim that while ideas correspond to impressions, passions are the 
impressions themselves, and though they may be explained in terms of  a causal story that 
involves certain beliefs, ideas and impressions, they do not ‘correspond’ to any of these 
in the way that ideas correspond to impressions. The argument would then proceed that, 
as truth or falsity is understood as a disagreement between ideas and directly 
corresponding impressions, passions cannot be true or false, though ideas may be. 
Therefore ideas may be contrary to reason, but passions may not.  
(Terence Penelhum, like the authors above, also takes 2.3.3.5 to be an indication that 
passions are non-intentional for Hume.177)   
Elijah Millgram178 makes a case for the necessity of understanding Hume’s theory of the 
passions as non-representational, and therefore non-cognitive, based on the requirement 
that passions be significantly different from mere vivacious ideas. Millgram notes an 
apparent ‘vivacity scale’ to be found in Hume, with unfelt ideas of imagination at one end 
and impressions at the other. If ideas, judgments of probability, beliefs, memories, desires 
and the various impressions on this scale are mental events only distinguished by the 
amount of vivacity they are experienced with, then you should be able to transform a 
belief into a desire simply by making it more vivid. This is not the case for Hume, so 
clearly he needs some way to distinguish between types of mental states other than their 
level of vivacity. Millgram argues that this distinction is in whether or not they have 
representational content. A desire, and the passions generally, are not distinguished from 
vivacious ideas (and each other) by their level of vivacity, nor their representational 
content, but rather “Hume can distinguish one kind of non-representational impression 
                                                 
177 Penelhum, T. (2009). “Hume’s Moral Psychology,” The Cambridge Companion to Hume: Second 
Edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 238-269.  
178 Millgram, E. (1995). "Was Hume a Humean?" Hume Studies 21(1): 75-94. 
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from another by its ‘peculiar’ feeling.”179 For Hume, he argues, mental states can have 
either representational content, or motivational force, but not both.180    
James Fieser makes an interesting historical case for the non-cognitive nature of the 
passions in Hume by commenting on the difference between Hume’s and Hutcheson’s 
accounts of the role of reflection in generating passions. He argues,  
For Hutcheson, reflecting on a sensation (such as the visual sensation produced by 
a new suit of clothes) is only the occasion for the passion of joy to arise. This 
differs from Hume's meaning, which is that reflective impressions follow from 
impressions of sensations either immediately, or "by the interposition of its idea" 
(T 276). Unlike Hutcheson, reflections for Hume are not simply the occasion for 
the passions to arise. Instead, the reflection is the passion.181 
For Hume, the actual act of reflecting on an impression or idea is felt and is identical to 
the passion, not a cause for the passion. Thus we find Hume bypassing an act of reflective 
cognition in his account; instead, he has the impression felt on reflection as constituting 
the character and essence of the passion.  
                                                 
179 Milgram (1995), 84.  
180 His reasons for pushing the connection with motivational force I have not explained here, but have to do 
with his broader project in this paper, which is to show that “Practical reasoning is not possible on Hume’s 
view, because passions cannot be representative states” [Millgram (1995), 85]. I am not in whole 
agreement with his reading of 2.3.3, as will become apparent as I move to a discussion of belief and 
attending emotion in 2.6 and its implications for Humean motivation. I do think, however, that Millgram 
has presented a neat argument for the need to give a strongly sensationalist reading of the passions in 
Hume. 
181 Fieser (1992), 5. 
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Finally, Philip Mercer182, in his work on Hume’s moral psychology assumes a 
sensationalist account of the passions. The focus of his discussion is the sympathy 
mechanism, which he takes to work as a kind of emotional infection, and to be therefore 
non-cognitive.183 He states that,  
For Hume, to experience an emotion or passion consists in perceiving or 
recognizing some inner mental event. It is therefore conceivable that I might feel 
proud of something which I believed had absolutely no connection with myself or 
that I might love someone and yet hope for his unhappiness most of the time.184 
Mercer supports this reading with Hume’s statements concerning the contingent 
relationship between various passions and their objects, as well as between certain 
passions and the desires that accompany them (such as love, and the desire for the 
beloved’s happiness). Hume argues that these connections just happen to be the case 
given our natures, and that it is not impossible that they could have been otherwise. This 
Mercer takes to be a good indication that for Hume passions are not characterized by any 
logic of beliefs and desires—rather they are “like all impressions, simple and 
unanalysable.”185 He quotes Anthony Kenny on this topic: 
It is because our minds happen to be made as they are that the object of pride is 
self, not because of anything involved in the concept of pride; just as it is because 
our bodies happen to be made as they are that our ears are lower than our eyes, 
not because of anything involved in the concept ear. A passion can be, and can be 
                                                 
182Mercer, P. (1972). Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the Relationship between Sympathy and Morality, 
with Special Reference to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford, Clarendon Press.  
183 More will be said about the workings of the sympathy mechanism and how interpretations of it tend to 
indicate either a cognitivist or sensationalist reading of Hume in 2.5 of this work. 
184 Mercer (1972), 25. 
185 Mercer (1972), 24. 
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recognized as, pride before the idea of its object comes before the mind: the 
relation between the passion and this idea is one of cause and effect, and 
therefore, on Hume’s general principles, a contingent one, inductively 
established.186 
Our natures determine what relations of impressions, ideas, beliefs, etc are causally 
efficacious in producing particular passions, and nature also determines the objects that 
the particular passions cause us to focus on. But there is no reason to make any of this 
causal account internal to the characterization of the passion itself. The passion is just one 
more element in the causal chain—and more importantly, in this case, it is a simple, 
unified, non-representational element, characterized wholly by its felt experience. 
Or so the arguments of this section would lead one to believe. As it happens, Hume 
makes things much less clear than the arguments and text presented here would lead one 
to believe. In the next section I will shift gears to take a look at some of the good reasons 
to think that Hume’s account of the passions is more cognitive than sensational in nature.   
 
 
2.4 Support for a cognitivist reading of Hume on 
passion  
  
This section will serve three general purposes. The first is the presentation of textual 
evidence that appears to create problems for the straightforwardly sensationalist reading 
of Hume’s theory of the passions that was just created. I will begin to make suggestions 
as to why it is difficult to read Hume as not providing an account of the passions with 
                                                 
186 Kenny, A. (1963).  Action, Emotion, and Will. Loudon, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Quoted in Mercer 
(1972), 24.  
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strong cognitivist elements; that is to say, that Hume’s account of the passions has them 
essentially including thought content, such as beliefs and particular associations of ideas. 
Despite his own claims about their simplicity and the felt nature of their ‘essence,’ his 
analysis points to strong cognitive elements. The second purpose of this section will be to 
consider in some detail one of the stronger, and I would say more prominent, accounts of 
Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion: that of Annette Baier. Her book, A Progression 
of Sentiment187 has been rightfully well-received by the scholarly community, and her 
reading of Hume on the passions has had broad influence. Therefore, the third task of this 
section will be to respond to Baier’s cognitivist reading, and to remind the reader that 
there is an authentic tension between her reading and things that Hume says that appear 
to place him squarely in the sensationalist camp. I will pay particular attention to her 
argument for a suggested distinction between emotion and passion that is different from 
my own. Offering a response to this will therefore constitute offering a response to what I 
take to be one of the better arguments that could be made against my account of the 
passion/emotion distinction in Part One of this work.   
The general content of this last discussion will be as follows: I will present Baier’s 
argument concerning Hume’s calm and violent passion distinction as both support for her 
cognitivist reading, and potentially providing an objection to my reading of the 
passion/emotion distinction in Hume. Baier argues that it is in the distinction between 
calm and violent passions in Hume that we can best understand his characterization of 
emotion, which she takes to be violence of passion. I will respond to this by arguing that 
Hume’s calm/violent distinction is not meant to outline a distinction between emotional 
and emotionless passions, along the lines of the discussion in Part One concerning the 
violent/calm passions. I will argue in particular that for Hume both violent and calm 
passions are attended by emotion, it is the experience of the emotion and passion over all 
that distinguishes them. 
                                                 
187 Baier, A. (1991). A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press. 
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But to be begin with, let us consider some of the evidence in Hume for a cognitivist 
reading. In much of her work on Hume, Baier188 makes a strong case for the claim that 
the three books of Hume’s Treatise are of a piece, and should be read not only in light of 
each other, but also as presenting a sort of progression of ideas and attitudes. One 
particular claim she makes on this front is the suggestion that all of the epistemology of 
Book I is in service to the theories of passion and action in Books II and III. Baier argues 
that Hume dealt with ideas first in his work because the impressions he felt most 
important to deal with were passions, and an understanding of these depends on an 
understanding of ideas. She points to the following quote from the very end of Hume’s  
Abstract: 
For as it is by means of thought only that any thing operates upon our passions, 
and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the cement of 
the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend 
on them. 
The point Baier is seeking to remind us of is that for Hume the passions are indeed 
central to human experience, but they themselves must be understood to necessarily 
depend on the content of our thought given in ideas. Hence Hume could not address the 
topic of this “cement of the universe” without first educating his readers on the more 
cognitive content of the mind, and the relations and associations that govern ideas and 
belief. 
The very fact that Hume identifies the passions as ‘impressions of reflection’ should be 
enough to tip us off to the more cognitive nature of these feelings. Fieser offers a brief 
history of the term, pointing out that,  
The term "reflection" (in contrast to "sensation") can be found in Locke who used 
it to mean introspection, or the ideas of the mind when it takes notice of its own 
                                                 
188 I am here considering in particular her essay, “Hume, the Reflective Women’s Epistemologist?” [Baier, 
A. (1994). Moral Prejudices. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.] 
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operations. For Locke, though, this does not involve passions, which are for him 
"internal sensations." The word "reflection" becomes associated with the passions 
in Hutcheson's Essay on the nature and conduct of the passions and affections 
(1728).189 
‘Reflection’ is appropriately contrasted with ‘sensation’ here, and this contrast is of 
course found internal to Hume’s treatment of the category of impressions generally. On 
the one hand, what separates the impressions of sensation from the impressions of 
reflection might be said to be genealogy; the former arise spontaneously, “without 
antecedent perceptions,” while the latter “proceed from” pre-existing mental content 
(2.1.1.1). Fieser’s brief historical comment above reminds us that following Hutcheson, 
Hume was adopting the introspective term ‘reflection,’ previously used by Locke in 
discussions of ideas, belief and reason, and applying it to a certain kind of affective 
experience. Therefore, another way to distinguish between impressions of sensation for 
Hume and impressions of reflection is to consider their interaction with pre-existing 
mental content. Indeed, if we are to hold that we can instantly distinguish between a 
feeling that qualifies as an impression of sensation (say, the pain of stubbing my toe), and 
a feeling that qualifies as an impression of reflection (say, the pain of being spurned by a 
lover), the most obvious difference we can appeal to is the belief and idea content of the 
latter, versus the spontaneously arising bodily pain of the former. There certainly seems 
to be a case for the claim that were I to suddenly wake up feeling one of these two things, 
I would be able to correctly identify each as an impression of sensation and an impression 
of reflection appropriately, without considering their causal story. Something about the 
experience of the two pains themselves would be different. And that difference would be 
derived from the connection to my thoughts. 
Of course, a James-Lange theorist may well object to this example, and claim that when 
presented with nothing but the two feelings, we would find the content of both to consist 
in bodily sensation. This would mean the distinction for Hume between his two kinds of 
                                                 
189 Feiser (1992), 5. 
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impression would really be the differences in causal account. But I do not think this is the 
case for Hume. He may at times refer to the physical underpinnings of impressions, but 
as I have argued above, his focus is on the felt aspect, and for Hume there is an important 
felt difference between the pain of an impression of sensation and the pain of an 
impression of reflection. Such a distinction, it would seem, could only be explained by 
insisting on the role that certain thought content plays in the experience of the passions.   
The strongest case for cognitive content in passions in Hume is of course to be found in 
his account of the indirect passions. Donald Davidson190 made much of this in his well-
known article, “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride,” where he argues that “Hume’s 
account of pride is best suited to what may be called propositional pride.”191 Hume’s 
characterization of pride is that we are proud of something, such that claims like, “she 
was proud that she had made a delicious cake” are accurate descriptions of emotions. He 
argues,  
It is commonly thought that in Hume’s opinion, to be proud that one is clever 
(say) is just to experience a certain “ultimate felt quality.” This would certainly be 
wrong, since it would provide no way of distinguishing between being proud that 
one is clever and being proud that one is kind to kangaroos… [B]eing proud that 
                                                 
190 Davidson, D. (1976). “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride.” The Journal of Philosophy, 73(19): 744-757. 
It may be appropriate to here remind the reader that Davidson does not take himself to be making a strong 
case for his reading on pride in Hume to have been precisely what Hume intended—rather, he takes it that 
these strongly cognitivist aspects are to be found in Hume, whether Hume realized it or not, and that large 
parts of his account may be read as offering a kind of cognitivist theory of the passions. Davidson (unlike 
Baier, who argues for a consistent reading of Hume) would likely tend to fall into a camp that sees Hume as 
having some tension in his theory of the passions, as he appears to want to characterize them as at once 
essentially sensational and essentially cognitive in nature.   
191 Davidson (1976), 744. 
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one is clever is a complex state of which the simple impression of “pride” is only 
one element.192 
Though pride of course tends to involve feeling, also essential to it, even on Hume’s 
account, is the particular relation of ideas that obtains in the double-relation of ideas and 
impressions that Hume takes to be the necessary attending circumstance of pride. 
Davidson points out that the beliefs and ideas conjoined in this relation “must amount to 
predication for Hume,”193 and this predication is essential to distinguishing between 
different instances of pride, something we certainly can and do do. Davidson reminds us 
that for Hume, “the effect of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our 
impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions” (1.3.10.3) and that “belief 
is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions” (1.3.10.4). Belief then plays a 
central role in the formation and distinguishing of the content of our passions.   
The details of the belief content in pride are of course provided by the double-relation of 
ideas and impressions, which Davidson argues is not only Hume’s way of explaining the 
causal relation between pride and certain beliefs and attitudes, but also the logical relation 
between them. Though pride is typically experienced with a felt component, it is 
necessarily experienced with a judgmental component. In fact, Davidson argues that the 
judgment is identical to the passion of pride. On this account the relationship between our 
believed judgment that we are clever, or have made a delicious cake, and our pride is not 
contingent, but necessary. And to those who may object that Hume’s account of the role 
of beliefs and ideas is causal in nature, Davidson responds that “there is no good 
argument to show that causal relations rule out necessary connections.”194 Hume may 
have presented them as causes, but his analysis of the passions themselves reveals logical 
relations that make certain beliefs and ideas necessary constituents of the passions.  
                                                 
192 Davidson (1976), 744-745. 
193 Davidson (1976), 746. 
194 Davidson (1976), 755. 
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Though it may seem that a Davidsonian account is too quick to dismiss much of what 
Hume says concerning the essentially felt nature of the passions, there are additional 
reasons found in the text to lean towards this kind of strongly cognitivist reading of 
Hume.  Consider, for example, Hume’s claim at 2.2.2.6 that when the appropriate 
relations of ideas for producing pride are lacking, “’Tis plain, that to consider the matter 
a priori, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected.” This language suggests the 
kind of logical relation between certain beliefs and pride that Davidson was suggesting. 
Hume goes on in this passage to say that our “reasoning a priori is confirm’d by 
experience,” but the mention of a priori reasoning is telling: passions have certain 
characteristic cognitive requirements that inform their very conceptualization. I only call 
my feeling pride when I am aware of my holding the appropriate beliefs. Without these, I 
would surely only be able to identify what I feel as some kind of pleasure.  
The argument that belief content is necessary in identifying Humean passions gains more 
support from his insistence on the possibility of calmly experienced passions. Consider, 
for example, the following: 
Now ‘tis certain there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which tho’ they be 
real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their 
effects than by the immediate feelings or sensations. (2.3.3.8)  
Hume is arguing here that we take ourselves to be motivated by reason at times because 
we assume that mental events are the same if they don’t feel different to us. This 
assumption of course leads to our confusion of reason and the calm passions. Implicit in 
this explanation seems to be this claim: feeling is in fact not enough to distinguish 
between certain kinds of mental events. What then is enough? Attending circumstances, 
observations about our beliefs, attitudes, etc (2.3.3.8, see also 2.2.5.3). But these then 
seem to be more than merely causal circumstances; they appear to be constitutive of the 
passions. How else is it that a calm passion may be identified as a passion, if there is no 
characteristic feeling constituting its ‘essence’? Therefore, the more cognitive aspects of 
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the passions must be essential in distinguishing them—passions must be characterized by 
more than mere feeling.195  
Passions are not only distinguished in some cases by their cognitive content, but Hume 
also argues that this content is often what determines how they will interact with each 
other. Consider this passage at 2.3.9.16: 
Contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other, except when their 
contrary movements exactly rencounter, and are opposite in their direction, as 
well as in the sensation they produce. This exact rencounter depends upon the 
relations of those ideas, from which they are deriv’d, and is more or less perfect , 
according to the degrees of relation.  
Whether contrary passions may cancel each other out depends on the relations of ideas 
connected to the passions in question. Therefore, in such circumstances, the interaction of 
the passions, the effect they have on each other and ultimately on our motivation, has as 
much to do with cognitive aspects of the passions as it does with the feeling and impulse 
behind them. Hume goes on say of this kind of example,  
The influence of the relation of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair. If the 
objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two 
opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the 
objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alcali and an acid, which, 
being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and consists 
in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and 
vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate. 
(2.3.9.17) 
The last two metaphors used here are telling. It is not aspects external to the fluids he 
discusses that determine whether they mix, ‘imperfectly’ coexist, or destroy each other, 
                                                 
195Davidson makes a similar point [Davidson (1976), 745]. 
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but rather their internal natures. In these cases the metaphors seem to suggest that it is not 
merely causal circumstances that determine how two passions will interact, but also 
cognitive content that is in some way constitutive of them.   
Finally, recall that Hume’s stated view on how we are to characterize a passion softens 
from his initial statements about their simple, immediately felt natures [“their sensations, 
or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and 
essence” (2.1.5.4)]. Consider 2.2.9.2, a passage I made much of in Part One:  
But that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must 
consider, that it is not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, 
which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of 
it from the beginning to the end. 
The passions may have distinctive felt components, but they are only fully characterized 
when our experience of them as wholes, including relations of ideas, beliefs, and 
resulting tendencies, is considered. This claim we might pair with Hume’s mention at 
2.2.2.7 that there is a difference between vague feelings of pain or pleasure, and a 
“…constant and establish’d passion.” This is argued in the case of the indirect passions in 
particular, but could be said of all the passions Hume characterizes in terms of beliefs and 
ideas. These feelings appear to have authentic cognitive content. 
Some reminder at this point of why Hume is so often given a sensationalist reading may 
be useful. As has been pointed out above, one of the main sources for the strongly non-
cognitive reading is found at 2.3.3.5, which I will include in full here: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and 
contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence 
or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in 
that emotion have no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty, 
or sick, or more than five foot high. ‘Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion 
can be oppos’d by, or contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction 
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consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects 
which they represent. 
Note that there is something somewhat confusing about Hume’s claim here that passions 
have no representational content. Consider Hume’s accounts of the characterization of 
individual passions, such as pride. His analysis of this and other indirect passions seems 
very much to depend on the way our ideas interact with each other, to the extent that 
these passions seem in large part to be mental representations of the world with a 
particular attitude (either preference or aversion) attached. How do we reconcile this with 
their nature as original existences, having no reference to anything else?   
Baier finds the 2.3.3.5 passage troublesome for related reasons. She claims that this “one 
very silly paragraph…has perversely dominated the interpretation of [Hume’s] moral 
psychology” with its assertion that passions are “original existences” without 
representative quality.196 Baier here parts ways from commentators like Davidson, who 
either seek to accommodate or merely shrug and overlook Hume’s claims about the 
sensational nature of the passions. She rather claims that the contentions of this particular 
paragraph are “at the very least, unrepresentative of Hume’s claims about passions in the 
preceding and following parts of Book Two,” and at worst a clear contradiction.197 She 
cites the complex nature of the passions as Hume has presented them in Book II as 
evidence that this paragraph is a misstep for Hume and his program. Beliefs, she argues, 
are essential to distinguishing indirect passions such as pride from other passions and the 
analysis he has presented has made much of his ‘double relation of impressions and 
ideas.’  
Baier also questions what sense can be made of the claim that things like being thirsty, 
sick or a certain height are free of reference to other things, never mind our passions like 
anger with their complex cognitive structures involving beliefs. Hume has explained 
                                                 
196 Baier (1991), 160. 
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anger in terms of causes, objects, ends and attendant passions, what Baier calls the 
“complex intentionality of anger.”198 All this, she argues, makes Hume’s statement that 
passions are original existences a “surprise announcement.”199 She says there is no sure 
answer to why it appears as it does, but argues that the uniqueness of the claim in Hume’s 
work is a clear indication that it was not really his considered view. Whatever the reason 
for its original composition, Baier wants to paint this passage as anomalous and then 
excuse her reading of Hume from accommodating it as it appears at face value. Instead, 
she proposes a “partial explanation” of how Hume could have come to generate such a 
silly paragraph,200 and this involves her characterization of emotion in Hume and its 
distinctness from passion generally, as was discussed above (and which I will return to 
shortly).  
I do not agree with Baier that 2.3.3.5 is an anomalous and problematic paragraph for 
Hume. I don’t find the contradiction between Hume’s claim in this passage and his 
account of the details of the indirect passions such as pride to be nearly as evident or 
obvious as Baier suggests. Hume characterizes the passions as whole, unified and simple 
experiences at various times and repeats the claim that they can only be known through 
experience. No amount of describing the feeling of anger to you can acquaint you with 
the sensation if you have never had it. On the other hand, Hume obviously thinks it is 
possible to analyze the familiar experience of various passions and produce a sort of logic 
to the passion, complete with analysis of causes, objects, effects etc. Thus, for him to 
both claim that a passion is an original existence, not a copy of anything that in that sense 
references anything else, and to claim that a passion has a particular causal history and 
context involving beliefs and associated impressions seems consistent with his general 
                                                 
198 Baier (1991), 163. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Baier (1991), 164. 
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approach.201 (Whether there is a tension to be found in this general approach is a separate 
question.)  
I also think Baier is wrong to claim that this is the only place where Hume claims that 
passions are without representative quality or reference to things outside of themselves. I 
have offered in 2.3 other instances where Hume appears to be making this same move, 
but will remind the reader of some of them here. See for example 1.1.6.1, where Hume 
tells us that passions and emotions cannot possibly represent a substance. Elijah Millgram 
has argued that the argument at 2.3.3.5 is the same as the argument found at 3.1.1.9.202  
He responds to Baier’s reading as follows:  
Baier seems to take Hume’s insistence on the near ubiquitous causal role of 
beliefs in the formation of impressions of reflexion as the view that passions 
“incorporate the influence of reason…[and] presuppose beliefs” [Baier (1991), 
159], but…Hume did not make the mistake of confusing causal with logical 
influence.203  
But even putting these instances of apparent corroboration of Hume’s account at 2.3.3.5 
aside, one might question how Baier would explain the ‘anomalous’ passage. Baier’s 
story as to how Hume came to write the “very silly paragraph” centers on the suggestion 
that what he says there may be true of ‘emotions’, though it is certainly not of passions, 
for the reasons offered above. Recall that Baier is one of the authors I mentioned who 
presents a reasoned distinction between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ in the Treatise that ends 
up playing role in her broader Humean interpretive approach. Her proposed distinction, 
recall, focuses on the older sense of the term ‘emotion’ as involving agitation, motion, 
perturbation, etc. She says emotions are therefore in some ways much more like 
                                                 
201 Recall the case made by Rorty, quoted in 2.2, for Hume’s ability to make analytic distinctions while still 
arguing for psychological wholeness.  
202 Millgram, E. (1995). "Was Hume a Humean?" Hume Studies 21(1): 75-94, 77. 
203 [Millgram (1995), 92]. 
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sensations than like the more highly cognitive passions. This distinction has the potential, 
she thinks, to explain 2.3.3.5, if what is said there can be claimed true of emotion, just not 
passions. Thus, agitated feeling can be said to have no representative quality, but 
passions cannot.   
First, let me respond to Baier’s characterization of the emotion/passion distinction. That 
Hume is using the term ‘emotion’ in a more contemporary sense than Baier wants to 
grant I think is quite likely. Certainly in Hume’s day the term would have had the kinds 
of connotations she is suggesting: agitation, movement, perturbation etc. But though the 
older sense intended a physical sort of movement and agitation, Hume would have meant 
to take that physical term and introduce it into his non-physical mechanics of the mind. 
His talk of emotion in conjunction with and at times contrasted with specific passions is 
not intended to be about what is physically occurring in the brain and nerves—as I have 
argued above, this kind of discussion Hume leaves to the anatomists.204 And his 
‘emotions’ are not merely the felt counterpart to such bodily events, at least in the sense 
that his impressions of sensation are. Indeed, I think that while Baier’s characterization of 
‘emotion’ has similarities to mine, this is one point on which we lean in different 
directions: I would choose to emphasize their nature as impressions of reflection. 
Emotion for Hume is the “sensible agitation”205 in the reflective mind; it is feeling 
generated by consideration of our sensations and ideas of pain and pleasure. 
Much of the strength of Baier’s argument for an emotion/passion distinction is taken 
from Hume’s discussions of the calm and violent passions in 2.3.3.8-10 and 2.3.4. As has 
been discussed in Part One, in these sections Hume initially explains the presence of 
more or less violence in terms of the amount of emotion attending passions. He contrasts 
‘calm’ passions, which produce in us little feeling as they are “settled principles of 
                                                 
204 Actually, Hume routinely claims to leave such projects to the anatomists- it has been pointed out to me 
by Lorne Falkenstein that he on occasion breaks this trend and offers a more physical explanation of some 
things than one would expect from him. 
205 THN 2.3.4.1. 
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action,” with the “sensible agitation” of violent passions.206 Baier suggests her reading of 
the emotion/passion distinction in Hume makes it crucial to his “explaining away the 
rationalist error” of taking ourselves to be at times motivated by reason, not by 
passions.207 “When our passions are calm,” Baier claims, “then there will be no internal 
“combat”, so no violence… such emotion-free passions get confused with emotionless 
reason…”208 
I have already argued at length for a different understanding of the calm/violent 
distinction, and its relation to the emotions, but I will seek to briefly re-present it here. On 
my account, violence should not be understood as strictly synonymous with emotion. The 
difference between the calm and the violent is not whether or not they are emotions, but 
rather the degree to which the emotion of the passion, and any attending emotion, 
constitute ‘violence’ has to do with the degree of disorder caused by movements of mind 
that are not the natural or customary movements. Further, though Baier talks about 
“emotion-free passions,” I have argued that for Hume (depending on the way he is 
talking) either all passions are emotions, or all passions (and in fact, virtually all 
perceptions) are attended by emotion (see for example, 2.2.8.4, 2.2.8.6, and 2.2.10.9).  
My arguments from Part One are presented rather quickly here, but my hope is that they 
are enough to convince the reader that Hume is not understanding ‘emotion’ merely to 
mean ‘violence’, nor more generally speaking, is his use identical to the older sense of 
the term suggested by Baier’s O.E.D. reference. It is likely that this sense of ‘emotion’ is 
still very much in Hume’s mind (and perhaps at times he even uses this term in this more 
limited sense). However, I hope that the passages and arguments I have presented are 
enough to show that Baier’s suggested reading comes short of explaining all the use 
Hume is making of this term. 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207  Baier (1991), 167. 
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That being said, I believe there is ultimately a strong degree of resemblance between my 
suggested distinction between emotion and passion, and subsequent approaches to 
passages like 2.3.3.5 and Baier’s position. The difference, perhaps, is that where Baier 
makes a case for a strongly cognitivist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions 
generally, I am inclined to argue that Hume has elements of both a sensationalist (non-
cognitivist) and cognitivist theory of emotions in his picture of the mind. In the next 
section, I will argue that the cases made for each reading in the last two sections can be 
reconciled by the introduction of the conceptual distinction between emotion and passion 
in Hume that I have argued for in Part One.   
 
 
2.5 Reconciling the sensationalist and cognitivist 
approaches with the introduction of an 
emotion/passion distinction  
 
That there is a case to be made for claiming Hume both as a cognitive theorist of 
emotion, and a sensationalist or non-cognitive theorist of emotion I hope to have shown. 
The various pieces of textual evidence and well-reasoned argument from commentators 
on both sides of the debate I believe present us with a dilemma. Either we must find a 
way to explain the apparent inconsistencies in what Hume said that are highlighted when 
the two types of readings are brought together, or we must acknowledge that there is a 
tension in Hume’s thought that he was unaware of. My aim is to show that the apparent 
inconsistencies dissolve upon the application of the conceptual distinction between 
‘established passions’ and ‘attending emotion’ that I argued for in Part One. This is not to 
say there is no kind of tension in Hume considered as a theorist of emotion. But the 
application of the cognitive/non-cognitive question to Hume’s theory of the passions is 
without question anachronistic, and it should not be a surprise that on this type of 
contemporary analysis Hume’s theory comes out a bit muddy. What I seek to argue, 
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however, is that there is not the kind of tension internal to Hume’s system that the debate 
between cognitivist and sensationalist theories seems to suggest.  That is, Hume’s thought 
is not in tension with itself insofar as he posits both highly cognitive and highly 
sensationalist affective mental states, and he has the conceptual tools to account for both 
types when we attribute to him an emotion/passion distinction, as emotions are for Hume 
a more highly sensationalist mental category, and passions more cognitive. Though no 
terminological distinction is made explicit (and, as I have noted above, his use of terms is 
often loose), Hume did have these tools internal to his system to talk about the passions 
and impressions of reflection generally in both a sensationalist and highly cognitivist 
manner.  
The form my suggested reconciliation will take may be evident by now, and since much 
of the argument for it is internal to the arguments that have been made in Part One, I will 
not so much give a detailed defense here, as guide the reader through the application of 
my distinction to some of the key points of potential tension. It is perhaps best to start 
where Baier left us, with the potentially troublesome passage at 2.3.3.5, the ‘silly 
paragraph.’ Here is the central troublesome passage in it, one more time: 
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and 
contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence 
or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in 
that emotion have no more a reference to any other object than when I am thirsty, 
or sick, or more than five foot high. 
The question of whether or not passions are intentional for Hume—or perhaps put more 
directly, the question of whether they have representative components, like beliefs—does 
indeed appear to have different answers depending on whether we think of the passions 
as he often characterizes them as essentially the immediately felt mental event, or as part 
of a more complex cognitive state that involves certain beliefs and associations. Baier 
rightly emphasizes all the work that Hume does in Book II to describe the passions in 
terms of the cognitive content. Her move to explain this passage by saying that here 
Hume is talking about emotions, not passions, seems to me on the right track (though, as 
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has been shown, Baier and I differ in our understanding of what exactly emotions are, 
and how they relate to the calm/violent distinction).  
As Baier seems to imply, I do not think that the switch from ‘passion’ to ‘emotion’ as the 
term for the impression of reflection part way through the second sentence is an accident. 
I have argued for a distinction between ‘fully established’ passions that have distinctive 
valenced feeling, as well as characteristic relations of ideas and impressions as part of the 
‘bent and tendency’ of the entire experience, and ‘attending emotion,’ which is a 
valenced, but changeable feeling, often characterized as a transient force or impulse. All 
passions have these felt components; and each particular passion has a distinctive felt 
component. My suggestion has been that we accordingly find Hume talking about 
passions in two ways: (1) as they are considered identical to that felt emotion that is their 
phenomenology on the one hand, and (2) as they are considered as part of the broader 
mental event, including the characteristic associations of impressions, ideas and beliefs 
on the other. Typically, ‘emotion’ is used either to mean the attending feeling and 
impulse [often when Hume is using ‘passion’ in the sense of (2)], or as a synonym for the 
particular passion in question [typically when Hume is using passion in the sense of (1)]. 
What does this mean for the reading of 2.3.3.5? I would suggest that Hume’s insistence 
on the non-representational character of passions is a use of ‘passion’ in the first (1) 
sense. His intention in this argument is to show that reason cannot oppose passions, 
because as a fundamentally felt state it is “not susceptible of… agreement or 
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of reason” 
(3.1.1.9). Emotions, as I have characterized them, certainly fall into this category. So do 
passions, considered as emotions. And if Hume’s oversimplification of passion in this 
way, in this passage, strikes the reader as objectionable given the complex picture of the 
structure of various passions that he has just finished presenting in Parts I and II of Book 
II, perhaps it is worth noting that his characterization of reason in this section is similarly 
oversimplified given the characterization of reason and belief that Hume developed in 
Book I. The argument of 2.3.3 concerns the impotency of reason to motivate alone, 
unassisted by passion. Perhaps Hume is guilty of overstating the point, or at least using 
misleading language, as his point seems to be primarily about the necessity of feeling and 
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impulse to motivation. And feeling and impulse come from the presence of impressions 
of reflection. Therefore, reason considered simply as the tool of discovering truth and 
falsehood will not be able to move us along, lacking felt impulse as it does. And such 
unfelt reason will also have nothing to say about the feeling that we do have—it isn’t true 
or false, agreeing or disagreeing with what is in the world. It is what is in the world. 
Emotions are in that sense ‘original existences.’ Neither passions considered as emotions, 
nor attending emotions that can be identified as transient, valenced feelings independent 
of the particular perceptions that they attends, contain representational content, and 
neither considered in this sense have an impulse that may be opposed by reason.  
Of course, anger considered as a passion in the sense of (2) is still not representational 
exactly, but our experience of it has much to do with our beliefs, and as such we may find 
that reasoned belief content actually does influence that passion. In 2.2.3 Hume points to 
the particular effect that beliefs about the intention of the offending party have on our 
anger response to them. He describes the effects of these beliefs as follows: 
[A]n intention, besides its strengthening the relation of ideas, is often necessary to 
produce a relation of impressions, and give rise to pleasure and uneasiness. For 
‘tis observable, that the principle part of an injury is the contempt and hatred, 
which it shews in the person, that injures us; and without that, the mere harm 
gives us a less sensible uneasiness…A removal of the intention…must of course 
cause a remarkable diminution in the [passion]… (2.2.3.5) 
So the experience of the more cognitively conceived passion of anger is strongly colored 
by our beliefs: it may not even occur with injury if we fail to attribute intention to the 
offending party, and once felt it tends to diminish if we discover that no offence has been 
intended. 
 It is interesting to note that in the case of anger, a passion Hume appears to take to be 
more often experienced violently than calmly, the influence of belief has its limits. We 
may get angry even when we know no offense was intended, or we may remain 
somewhat angry when we are corrected in a false belief that offense was intended. Thus, 
the cognitive aspects of Hume’s theory of emotion/passion importantly contribute to the 
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experience of the passions without controlling them in all cases—feeling can linger, the 
original existence of the felt passion can stay with us even when the beliefs appropriate to 
it are not or no longer present. This was clearly an observable fact about human 
experience for Hume, and his system needed a way to accommodate it. Thus the need for 
the dual way of talking about affective experience that I have suggested is found in 
Hume’s implicit conceptual distinction between the more sensational emotions and more 
cognitive passions. 
In the interest of clarity, let me restate the emotion/passion distinction in Hume that I 
have suggested, now that I have sought to apply it to this discussion. First, there are the 
two different ways of talking about passions that are found in Hume: (1) considered as 
identical to the felt emotion that is their essence, and (2) considered as including both that 
distinctive feeling, and the broader experience of the various causes, beliefs and objects 
that constitute our complete experience of the passions. (1) allows Hume to talk about the 
passions in a more sensationalist manner, and account for instances of human experience 
where feeling appears to work against belief, or linger despite the adoption of beliefs that 
it seems should extinguish the passion (for example, I remain angry with you even 
though I realize that you had only accidentally injured me). On the other hand, (2) allows 
Hume to talk about all the instances in which our passions arise, change, and even at 
times desist according to changes in beliefs (such as when my anger ceases when I realize 
that you had no intention of harming me). Both of these kinds of instances are observable 
in human interaction. Hume allows himself two ways of talking about the passions, in 
order to allow for both in his system. But the contemporary debate between sensationalist 
and cognitivist theories of emotion seems to suggest that Hume is trying to have his cake 
and eat it too, as it were. How can he justify the presence of both kinds of affective 
mental events in his system? 
This is where I think the emotion/passion distinction that I have argued is found in Hume 
is useful. Hume can talk about the passions in these two ways exactly because his 
category of impressions of reflection can accommodate both experiences of pure feeling, 
uninfluenced by belief as they have no reference (what I have called, ‘attending 
emotions’), and experiences of particular types of feeling that are by nature tied to a 
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certain belief structure and set of causes and objects (what I have called, ‘fully 
established passions). The difference between these two include the transient nature of 
the former and the more settled nature of the latter, but we should not allow this to 
mislead us into thinking of them as mutually exclusive kinds of mental events. Passions 
are at their core emotions, but insofar as they are granted identity as particular feelings, 
by nature occurring along with certain causes, objects and appropriate beliefs, which lose 
their identity once these mental circumstances change, they are not mere emotions, but 
fully established passions. The feeling of a passion is never extinguished by a change in 
belief, however. This emotion component can transfer to other perceptions, change to 
match the new dominate passion, or mix with our other feelings to create new feelings all 
together. The rules and maxims outlining how our more simple emotions interact, move, 
blend, etc., are in part what Hume is seeking to explain in Book II, Part III of the 
Treatise. These emotions I have identified as ‘attending’ since this creates space for a 
clear distinction between certain instances of fully established passions, and fleeting 
instances of feeling that change to match whatever passion is currently dominant. But 
‘attending emotion’ is the feeling that infuses all of our affective experience.  
What this additionally gives Hume is two kinds of rule sets that he can apply when 
talking about the interaction of his impressions of reflection. As discussed above, the 
rules and maxims governing emotions tend to have to do with circumstances under which 
they change in their felt nature (even their valence), and the degree to which they attend 
all our perceptions. Hume’s observations about the patterns and apparent rules that our 
fully established passions follow, on the other hand, have to do with how changes in 
beliefs and circumstances affect the arousal or cessation of these passions. And because 
we find that our beliefs have considerable influence on our passions (as Hume argues in 
1.3.10), we find that we are often much more cognitivist in our experience of the passions 
than the sensational nature of our ‘original existence’ emotions may suggest.     
How strong, then, should we take the strain of cognitivism in Hume to be? I would 
suggest that his characterization of the passions ultimately puts more or less equal weight 
on their felt content and their cognitive content. Consider the following claim Hume 
makes about pride: 
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That we may comprehend this better, we must suppose, that nature has given to 
the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar 
impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign’d a 
certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce. (2.1.5.6) 
Here Hume talks about the two ways in which nature has determined our passionate 
experience of this particular passion: on the one hand, there is a particular emotion or 
feeling that is characteristic of the passion. On the other hand, there is the idea that the 
passion always focuses us on. Hume’s language here is causal (“never fails to produce”), 
but his insistence on the necessity of the connection, which we have seen used in other 
places as well, makes him appear just as concerned with these more cognitive elements of 
our experience of the passion as he is with our immediate felt experience of the emotion.   
Hume’s theory of the passions really is only whole when we allow both the more 
cognitive account of particular ‘passions’ and the more sensationalist account of the 
phenomenon of ‘emotion.’ Consider, for instance, Hume’s claim that a passion is simply 
identical to the feeling one has when experiencing the passion. This on the surface is a 
purely sensationalist account. Pride is the feeling of pride, love the feeling of love, etc. 
Hume’s initial presentation of the particular passions makes it sound as though he is 
content with this simple theory. Put in the right causes in terms of ideas, impressions and 
associations, and the natural outcome is a feeling predetermined by nature, common to 
all, of (say) pride. But one may object that not all feelings of pride are the same. I am 
proud of my lovely home, but I am also proud of my moral character. There is a 
difference of feeling, and it isn’t merely a difference of degree (i.e., of my being more 
proud of one than the other, and therefore feel more of the passion). The case of pride for 
the success of my child or partner presents different felt qualities of pride again. The felt 
experience of pride in each case will likely be similar—in Hume’s terms we might say 
there is a strong relation of resemblance—but it seems that the feelings we identify with 
pride are not always identical, and the difference in feeling has much to do with the 
differences in the attitudes and beliefs that are the cognitive element of the pride.  
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How might Hume account for this apparent multiplying of ‘peculiar emotions’ associated 
with a general kind of passion? On the sensationalist story, with its strongly atomic 
reading of the passions, this seems to be difficult. But Hume is aware of the difference 
that variety of ideas, beliefs and other aspects of the situation make to the emotion 
experienced. Close to the end of Book II he says of hope and fear in particular:    
I have here confin’d myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most 
simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may 
receive from the mixture of different views and reflections. Terror, consternation, 
astonishment, anxiety, and other passions of that kind, are nothing but different 
species and degrees of fear. ’Tis easy to imagine how a different situation of the 
object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion; 
and this may in general account for all the particular sub-divisions of the other 
affections, as well as of fear. (2.3.9.31) 
Hume goes on to attribute a similar multiplicity of ‘species’ to love, and then says that all 
sub-divisions of particular passion types 
…arise from the same causes, tho’ with a small variation, which it is not 
necessary to give an particular account of. ‘Tis for this reason I have all along 
confin’d myself to the principal passion. (2.3.9.31) 
This is a far cry from the initial presentation of pride, where it was treated as though there 
were a single feeling we are all familiar with through experience, that consistently arises 
due to certain ‘causes’ that were stated as certain very general kinds of beliefs and 
feelings. Here Hume is talking about ‘principal passions’ which have multiple 
instantiations depending on the circumstance, whether it be external or internal to us, that 
affects the thought content we have when we experience the passion.  
In general, by the end of Book II Hume is struggling to explain his theory of passions and 
motivation in the simple (and generally more cognitivist) way he had when he began the 
book with in the treatment of pride. His basic associationism of Book I is being 
supplemented with new ‘maxims’ that arise to account for the diversity of feeling-driven 
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mental experience. There are two particularly interesting maxims that were added as the 
complexity of discussion in Book II began to make Hume’s topics unmanageable by 
appeal to his basic associationism. The first is the maxim that “no object is presented to 
the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompany’d with emotion” (first 
stated at 2.2.8.4). The second is that “any emotion, which attends a passion, is easily 
converted to it” (first stated at 2.3.4.2). Notice that both these late-game qualifications to 
his associationism involve emotion. Both of them arise well after Hume is done outlining 
the basic causal structure of the indirect passions, the most highly cognitive of his 
passions. It is as though the progression of Book II necessitates a conceptual distinction 
between the highly cognitive impressions of reflection he has characterized according to 
his rules of association, and the fluid, changeable, feeling that means these particularly 
structured passions can be found to mix, blend, oppose one another, and ultimately 
motivate. I have argued that Hume does provide this distinction with the difference 
between the fully established passions, with their cognitive content, and attending 
emotion, with its purely sensational nature and moving impulse.    
I am not suggesting that any passage where Hume uses either ‘passion’ or ‘emotion’ can 
be readily brought under this interpretation. This would be an overstatement of the 
connection between the terms and the mental elements I have suggested they often 
correspond to. Emotion is in most cases, though, used in a way such that slotting in my 
characterization will not hurt the reading of Hume. This is likely because it is the term 
with broader application, and includes the particular passions among the impressions of 
reflection that it generally designates. ‘Passion’ on the other hand is a term that is, like 
‘imagination’, context sensitive for Hume. Sometimes ‘passion’ is used to designate a 
mental event that is essentially sensational in nature, albeit the sensation of an impression 
of reflection. Other times it is used to refer to a broader phenomenon, which includes 
causes and objects, relations of ideas and impressions, tendencies and desires, and even 
sometimes belief. 
Hume therefore appears to be drawing on both sensationalist and cognitivist elements in 
the description of our passionate experience. I will not seek to determine whether there is 
a tension in his thought despite the clarification of conceptual divides and ways of using 
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his ‘technical’ terminology. For the moment, and for the purpose of this work, my 
intention is to take a step back, and claim that the application of the emotion/passion 
distinction I have developed to answer the debate between cognitivist and sensationalist 
readings of Hume is a form of evidence in support of the reality of this implicit 
distinction in Hume’s work. This is something of a reminder to the reader at this point—
the main thesis of this dissertation is to establish this reading of Hume. The proposed 
solution to the cognivist/sensationalist debate is a secondary purpose, and suited to my 
discussion precisely because, if it is successful, we have more reason to adopt the reading 
I give in Part One. The next two sections are much briefer treatments, but similarly seek 
to make more sense of interpretive questions in Hume scholarship by applying the 
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for. The first is on an interpretive problem I 
take there to be in understanding the workings of Hume’s sympathy mechanism. The 
second—which will be a very brief treatment, given that the subject matter could easily 
constitute a dissertation of its own!—is on the implications of my distinction for Hume’s 
theory of belief and motivation.       
 
 
2.6 Application of a concept of emotion in Hume to the 
sympathy puzzle  
 
On the surface, the basic mechanism of sympathy as Hume presents it in Book II of his 
Treatise has an uncontroversial reading.209 Upon the perception of a passion in another 
we acquire an idea of that passion. This idea is infused with the vivacity of our present 
idea of the self to the degree that our mind finds a relation between our impression that is 
                                                 
209 Much of the material in this chapter was presented in a paper called, “What happens when I feel your 
pride? A (re)examination of Hume’s principle of sympathy and the indirect passions,” in August 2009, at 
the International Hume Conference, Halifax NS, Canada.  
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the source of our idea of the passion, and our idea of the self. The idea of the passion may 
thereby gain vivacity sufficient to become the passion itself, and we come to experience 
the same feelings that we perceive in another.210 This mechanism is introduced in the 
context of Hume’s discussion of our pride and humility, and in particular our love of 
fame.211 Hume builds his account on the principles of association he has established in 
Book I. He is straightforward and methodical in its presentation and appears to find his 
description quite complete.  
But there is a puzzle in the application of this basic sympathetic mechanism, and this is 
perhaps not surprising given the discussions above about the complexity of passion and 
emotion in Hume. The most difficult case appears to be the indirect passions which will 
be the focus of this discussion, though I take it that there is a general puzzle for any 
passion that seems to require some kind of belief or object. The puzzle is captured 
generally in a series of questions we may ask of the particular workings of Humean 
sympathy. When I sympathize with your pride in yourself do I experience the emotion of 
pride in self, pride in you or love of another (namely, you)? Does your pleasure in me 
(love) become my pleasure in me (pride)? Or will I feel a sympathetic love? And if so, 
who or what would be the object of this love? Similarly, were you to sympathize with my 
hate of you, would you feel the passion of hatred, or the passion of shame (self-hate?) As 
has been discussed above, Hume emphasizes that all passions are ‘original existences’, 
lacking parts and non-representational, but he also presents the reader with detailed 
analysis of the causes and objects of certain individual passions—particularly the indirect 
passions—and the relations and attitudes necessary for their production. Put one way, the 
puzzle I wish to present questions what the identity conditions are when Hume claims 
                                                 
210 This basic presentation of the sympathy mechanism I take to be uncontroversial, as it is consistent with 
the bare-bones presentations of this principle in much of the standard Hume scholarship [Smith (1960), pp. 
169-170; Stroud (1977), pp. 196-197; Ardal (1989), 42-44].  
211 THN 2.1.11. 
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that sympathy is the mechanism by which we come to experience the same passion that 
we perceive in another.212  
My intention here is to set up the puzzle and potential solutions that might be applied 
prior to any application of my emotion/passion distinction. The reason for this is that I 
want to show how this part of Hume’s project presents an interpretive challenge when we 
do not have the tools of the conceptual distinction I have developed. One way this puzzle 
could be summed up is as the question of whether Hume intended the communicated 
passions to be conceived as simple, original existences (the sensationalist reading) or as 
involving beliefs, objects, etc (cognitivist reading). I will argue at the end of presenting 
the puzzle and the multiple options for interpretation that might be suggested, that once 
my emotion/passion distinction is applied, and the tension between a cognitivist and 
sensationalist reading resolved, it is easy to see how the Humean sympathy mechanism 
works—and it works, it turns out, in several different ways.     
Before moving into the discussion of the problem, here is a quick refresher on Hume’s 
account of the indirect passions.213 The direct passions are those that “arise immediately 
                                                 
212 After presenting the basic sympathy mechanism, Stroud (1977) questions whether Hume really meant 
that the sympathy mechanism causes me to experience the exact passion that I perceive in the other person. 
He argues that Hume’s theory of action commits him to recognizing that the feelings of others can move us, 
and since feeling is required for action, this makes it necessary for Hume to provide an account of how we 
might acquire the feelings others have. But, he argues, Hume only requires that by sympathy “we get 
feelings of the same general affective quality as those we observe or contemplate” (198). Stroud, however, 
does not provide textual support for this contention that Hume didn’t mean that sympathy passes on the 
very same passion or sentiment, but rather the general pleasant or unpleasant nature of the feelings. Such 
support seems necessary for this claim, as Hume often makes statements that suggest the opposite (see for 
example THN 2.1.11.3 and 3.3.1.7).  
213 In this section I have striven, as much as possible, to assume a reading of Hume that sticks closely to the 
text and the basic progression and accomplishment of Hume’s thought through THN 2.1.1-11. My reading 
has been guided in part by the interpretations offered by both Smith (1960) and Ardal (1989) on these 
topics.  
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from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (2.1.1.4), while the indirect are “such as 
proceed from the same principles [as the direct], but by the conjunction of other 
qualities” (2.1.1.4). Hume emphasizes that passions of both types are “simple and 
uniform impressions”, and that though we are all familiar with the meaning of the terms 
through our own experiences of the passions, a definition of them is not possible. Hume 
introduces the concepts of object, subject and cause of a passion as a way of talking 
about the circumstances found to attend the passion. Whether these ‘attending 
circumstances’ are passed on in the case of the sympathetic adoption of the indirect 
passions- or whether it is some experience of the passions as ‘original existences’, with 
no reference to anything else- is exactly the sort of question we need to be asking. 
I first noted the puzzle in reading Hume’s discussion of fame,214 which follows his initial 
presentation of the sympathetic mechanism.215 Hume’s purpose in introducing the 
principle of sympathy in this section is to provide the reader with an explanation of 
secondary causes of pride and humility. With primary causes, such as vice and virtue, or 
beauty and deformity, the cause consists in a subject and quality that are related to us in 
some way strong enough to provoke pride or shame. When the opinions of others or our 
reputation act as causes of pride or humility, it is not of that form. Thus, it requires a 
special kind of explanation, and that is the role that sympathy is meant to play. Our 
tendency to adopt the sentiments of others in a way takes the place of the usual cause of a 
passion. In the other cases a cause, composed of subject and quality, has the effect of 
producing the passion of pride or humility, which in turn makes the self its object.  In the 
case of the admiration or disapproval of others as cause our passion of pride or humility 
                                                 
214 THN 2.1.11.9-19. 
215 As the reader will see as this paper progresses, my considered view now is that Hume does not actually 
provide us with an example of the puzzling ambiguity in his discussion of fame. It is rather that on a 
shallow reading of this section the ambiguity appears to surface. However, as it was discussion of this 
section that first alerted me to the puzzle, I have opted to introduce it in this way. The smaller puzzle that 
this micro discussion introduces I believe can be answered. But the larger ambiguity in the workings of 
sympathy generally that it suggests I am not sure can be so easily dealt with.      
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is acquired sympathetically. Take the case of pride. I perceive in others an admiration of 
myself. I have an idea of this admiration. Assuming the relation between myself and 
those who admire me is strong enough, I find that my present impression of self infuses 
my idea of their admiration with vivacity, until it becomes an impression. I thereby come 
to feel the passion of pride, as a result of sympathy.  
The problem, as may already be apparent, is that it doesn’t look like it is really the 
sympathetic mechanism taking effect in this example. How is it that when the perceived 
sentiment is admiration I come to experience the passion of pride sympathetically? Isn’t 
the purpose of the principle of sympathy to offer a ‘first principles’ explanation of why it 
is we humans are so inclined to adopt the very same passions and opinions of those 
around us?216 How could my fame—the admiration of many people of myself—through 
the principle of sympathy create pride in me? 
It appears that sympathy is not straightforward when we are dealing with the indirect 
passions. For the sake of contrast, consider briefly what it would be to sympathize with a 
direct passion, like grief over the loss of a loved one. Suppose I know that you have 
recently lost a loved one, and as I perceive you now I see all the signs of deep sorrow and 
grief. Assuming that my conception of you is closely enough related to my conception of 
myself, I will find my idea of your grief enlivened to the point of becoming the 
impression of grief. I would thus experience sympathetic grief over the death of your 
loved one. This is an easy and obvious example of the principle of sympathy at work. But 
consider now the case of an indirect passion, such as pride. My sister has recently 
redecorated her room. When I see her I perceive in her all the signs of someone who is 
                                                 
216This is why at times Hume calls the mechanism the ‘principle of communication.’ It is an explanation of 
our propensity to “receive by communication [others’] inclinations and sentiments” (2.1.11.2). This 
happens because our idea of their passion “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the 
very passion itself” (2.1.11.3; italics added). This point is made again in Book III in the following way: 
“When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes 
from these effects to their causes, and forms such as lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted 
into the passion itself” (3.3.1.7). 
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very proud of herself as a decorator. I have an idea of this passion, and since she is my 
sister I am sufficiently related to her for my impression of myself to enliven my idea of 
her pride, until it becomes an impression. I thereby experience the passion of—what? If it 
is pride I am feeling, then its object must be the self. But what is the subject? In Hume’s 
picture of the indirect passions usually we find the subject of our pride in the cause of the 
pride. But the cause in this case is not a subject with a particular quality, but rather an 
idea of your pride that has been converted to an impression through sympathy. And 
Hume does not address how the sympathetic mechanism does or does not communicate 
the beliefs about the subject and quality that have caused the passion in the individual we 
are sympathizing with.217 
 Furthermore, it is unclear that pride is what I would feel at all as I sympathize with you 
and your pride. If I adopt the same pleasure and admiration of my sister’s skill as a 
decorator that she is experiencing, wouldn’t that result in my feeling love for her, not 
pride? Your pleasure in something related to you will result in pride. But for me that 
same pleasure in you and admiration of you would be a cause of love. This latter case 
seems related to the phenomenon that Hume is getting at in his discussion of pride 
through fame. Your admiration of me becomes my admiration of self, i.e. pride. But this 
feels unsatisfactory. Why should the principle of sympathy work to make me feel proud 
of myself, and not a sentiment of admiration in another as those who admire me are 
feeling? Wouldn’t the latter be a case of feeling the same passion (as sympathy is meant 
to accomplish), while the former is the acquisition of a new passion altogether?    
In Hume’s discussion of our love of fame I think that a closer reading of the text will not 
provide a solution to the puzzle, but rather sidestep it altogether. The reading that I 
presented immediately above was not so much taken from exactly what is said in 2.1.11 
                                                 
217 One may even argue that the point of the sympathetic mechanism is that it needn’t communicate the 
associated beliefs about the subject and quality that have acted as cause of the passion in order to 
communicate the passion.  In the direct case it seems simpler: I can imagine sympathizing with someone's 
grief or fear without knowing what causes it.  It seems as though the indirect case should be similar; I see 
the symptoms of pride on your face and then, even without knowing the cause, I feel a sympathetic passion. 
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after Hume’s presentation of the principle of sympathy (in which he shows exactly the 
part it plays in the pride we feel from the admiration of others). Rather, it was a 
presentation of what I think the reader would likely assume to be Hume’s application of 
the principle of sympathy in this context, given his initial presentation and description of 
the principle. That is, the reader would be justified in thinking that what would follow 
Hume’s presentation of the principle of sympathy here would be an illustration of the 
principle at work in a case where a passion is felt through the perception of (the same?) 
passion in someone else. But this is not actually what Hume goes on to do. For though 
Hume presents sympathy in general primarily as a means by which we come to feel the 
passions that we perceive in others, the application of the principle he immediately 
presents to the reader is not of the sympathetic adoption of passions at all, but rather of 
opinions or beliefs.  
 Consider the following, which Hume states in presenting sympathy’s role in our pride in 
the admiration and opinions of others: 
We may observe, that no person is ever prais’d by another for any quality, which 
wou’d not, if real, produce of itself, a pride in the person possest of it. …’Tis 
certain, then, that if a person consider’d himself in the same light, in which he 
appears to his admirer, he wou’d first receive a separate pleasure, and afterwards 
a pride or self-satisfaction… (2.1.11.9) 
Here it is clear that what Hume is concerned with is not a passion of admiration or love, 
but rather praise of an individual based on the belief that they possess a certain quality. 
As it happens, if the quality were actually possessed by someone it would be a source of 
pleasure. But that sentiment is not the content of the praise. The content of the praise is a 
belief. From here, Hume goes on:  
Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions of others in this 
particular; both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately 
present to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a 
kind of argument for what they affirm. (2.1.11.9) 
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Here we have a double confirmation that what is being sympathetically communicated is 
a belief. Not only does Hume refer to the principle of sympathy as causing us to embrace 
opinions, but he argues for their adoption being further assured through reasoning about 
the judgments of others as sources of belief.  
It is in the following way then, that sympathy plays a role in the pride we gain from the 
opinions of others. We perceive in another a belief about our praiseworthiness in a 
particular regard. We thereby have an idea of their belief, and as a result of a strong 
relation we find between our impression of our self and their self, that idea is infused 
with sufficient vivacity to become a belief.218 This belief about our praiseworthiness is 
pleasing to us. The pleasant belief about our own praiseworthiness acts as a cause of 
pride in us. This pride, true to the account above, would have as its object the self, and its 
subject would be the pleasant belief in our own praiseworthiness. In a sense our pride is a 
result of sympathy, though certainly not in the direct way that we might have initially 
assumed would be the case. It is not a passion of another that sympathy helps us to feel in 
this case, but a belief that would lead to the passion that we are facilitated in adopting. 
So the puzzle that appeared to arise from this section can be avoided entirely by pointing 
out that Hume is not actually claiming here that sympathy with admiration or love can 
directly produce the passion of pride. Unfortunately for Hume, however, the broader 
puzzle is still present. There presumably are instances of the principle of sympathy 
operating on indirect passions such as pride, and it is not yet clear what the results of such 
sympathizing would be. As I see it there are four possible ways that the principle of 
sympathy could operate in the case of the indirect passions. The first I think can quickly 
be dismissed as not the route that Hume would take. But the other three options I take to 
                                                 
218 Of course for Hume believed ideas are no different from other ideas in content, only in the way they feel 
or the ‘manner of their conception’. Thus it is easy to see how an infusion of vivacity from our conception 
of the self could turn a mere idea into a believed idea, in the same way that it can turn a mere idea of a 
passion into the passion itself.  
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all conceivably be supported at various times by things Hume says or assumptions he 
makes. It is to a discussion of these options that I will now turn.  
The first possibility is an interpretation of sympathy as we may construe it from 
descriptions such as the following: 
The minds of men are all similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one 
be actuated by any affection, of which the others are not, in some degree, 
susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates 
itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and 
beget correspondent movements in every human creature. (3.3.1.7) 
This reference to our natures is reminiscent of Hume’s discussion of passions as original 
existences, certain dispositions of the human mind present in virtue of our nature. The 
metaphor suggests that when a passion is resonating with one person it is easily passed on 
to another, because our like natures can communicate passions as easily and effortlessly 
as strings of the same tone may communicate sound and vibration. In contemporary 
discussions this would be identified as empathy operating as a sort of emotional 
contagion. There is no cognition of the particular emotional state involved, merely the 
adoption of the feelings that we perceive. Think of the way a dog may mirror the 
nervousness of her owner in an unfamiliar place. Though there has been no recognition of 
the nervousness as nervousness with a particular cause or object, there has been an 
adoption of the mood and general feeling of anxiety sensed in the owner by the dog.  
If Humean sympathy in the case of indirect passions works in this way, as a sort of pre-
cognitive, purely sensitive emotional contagion, then it would make sense to conclude 
that when I sympathize with your pride what I feel is the identical passion of pride, the 
identical feeling that I take you to be having. But this account seems unlikely. First of all, 
it doesn’t seem to help us make much sense of the differences between the passion of 
pride you feel in yourself due to a particular cause, and the pride I would feel 
sympathetically (obviously with my self as the object) and how I would make sense of 
the subject and cause of that pride. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it just doesn’t 
seem to match up to the steps of the mechanism as Hume outlines them. Before I can 
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have an idea of your pride I must attribute the passion to you based on the signs I 
perceive in you of the passion. It is difficult to imagine how I could come to attribute 
pride to you without recognizing in you pleasure at something you are related to. And if 
this kind of recognition is necessary, how could it be that the sentiment is passing to me 
in that most primitive, emotional contagion form, like the owner’s anxiety to the dog? It 
would seem that attributions of indirect passions require the formation of certain beliefs 
about the person we are attributing the passion to, or rather the belief that the individual 
holds a particular belief about themselves that makes them, say, proud. Otherwise it 
would not be pride that we attribute to them, as Hume points out that self as the object of 
pride is the distinguishing characteristic of the passion.219 Therefore sympathizing with 
indirect passions cannot be a matter of mere unreflective resonating and precognitive 
emotional contagion.   
This brings us to the three options that seem to me all possible, and perhaps all intended 
by Hume at various times. These three options, A, B and C, I have put into a chart below 
(fig.1), with the examples of the indirect passions of pride, humility (shame), love and 
hate to illustrate how sympathizing in each way would play out.220 Briefly, in option A 
we perceive the passion in another and have an idea of that passion in a way that is 
identical to how we take the passion to be experienced in the other in all respects (i.e., 
same object, subject, cause etc). As it is enlivened we come to experience that exact 
                                                 
219 THN 2.1.3.3. 
220 Though I will only look in particular at these four passions here, my suspicion, as has been indicated, is 
that this problem with the sympathetic mechanism would occur in all cases of sympathy with indirect 
passions. For instance, it seems conceivable that the same three kinds of options would appear in the case 
of sympathizing with your envy of me: Do I feel a sympathetic envy of myself, just as you do? Or does my 
envy find a new subject, to mirror your state of envy of another? Or, do I feel vanity as a sympathetic result 
of your envy of me? In this way the three options may play out in the case of envy. But it is not clear 
whether we would find the possibility of these variations on sympathetic communication in all the other 
indirect passions, mostly because Hume does not offer the same in-depth analysis of these passions as he 
does for pride and humility. For now I will have to leave it as mere speculation, that each could be 
sympathetically communicated in the ways I am outlining here. 
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passion ourselves, in all respects. This type of sympathy seems to necessarily involve a 
kind of suspension of disbelief. I am, in effect, experiencing your pride in your self as 
though I were you and experiencing my pride in my self. To do this I obviously have to 
ignore for the moment that I am not identical to you. Perhaps a good way to think of this 
is to compare it to what happens when we let ourselves become completely engaged in 
the situation of a character in a play or movie. The distinction we know exists between 
our self and the other must be ignored for a moment in order for us to fully experience the 
passion of the other.    
Fig. 1 
  Passion perceived in another:   
  Pride in self Shame of self Love of me Hate of me 
Passion I feel Option A Pride in self Shame of self Love of me Hate of me 
Sympathetically: Option B Pride in other Shame of other Love of other Hate of other 
 Option C Love of other Hate of other Pride in self Hate of self 
 
In option B I perceive the passion in you, and have a corresponding idea. But the idea is 
of that passion alone, that is, that particular feeling that all humans by their natures have 
the same capacity to experience. This idea is therefore independent of the particular cause 
and subject the passion I perceive may have (though not the object, as at least in the case 
of pride and humility it must always be the self). The idea is then converted to the 
passion. The subject of my passion would usually be understood to be part of the cause. 
In the case of sympathetic passions the cause is not a subject conjoined with a quality, but 
rather my idea of the passion in you. In an indirect way, the subject of your passion could 
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be identified as the subject of my sympathetic passion.221 Thus, I will find that 
sympathizing with your pride makes me feel proud of you, sympathizing with your love 
of me (who is other to you) will make me feel love of another (likely you). 
Option C has the sympathetic communication working more as it was initially assumed 
Hume wanted it to in his discussion of pride through fame. I perceive in another a 
passion, and have an idea of that passion. But my idea is not of the particular indirect 
passion they are experiencing, but rather of the feelings of pleasure or pain that I take 
them to have, combined with the beliefs that they possess about the object and cause of 
their passion.222 In other words, I understand their passion more in terms of the 
circumstances that attend the passion.223 When the idea(s) of the circumstances is (are) 
                                                 
221 It is also quite possible that I would not try to trace the causal chain that lead to my experience of the 
passion to find the subject, but would rather upon experiencing the passion light on some other potential 
object and make that the subject of my passion, though it had been completely unrelated to that point. This 
kind of behavior has been noted in patients with brain disorders that cause sudden bursts of emotion, 
unconnected to the normal emotional life of the patient. Often a patient experiencing such an episode, say 
the sudden onset of sadness, will find something in their current experience to attribute the emotion to, like 
some family matter that until that moment had not really been bothering them. There is further discussion 
of this kind of case in Damasio (1994).   
222 Ardal (1989) criticizes J.A. Passmore for drawing an analogy between the relation of simple ideas to 
complex ideas and the relation between direct and indirect passions. It would be a mistake to think that the 
indirect passions are somehow combinations of direct passions and beliefs for Hume. The indirect passions, 
as has been repeated above, are original existences themselves, simple and no easier to define than the 
direct passions. It is the case, however, that in the description of the circumstances attending them we find 
various beliefs and even pleasures and pains, propensities and aversions. These are the types of things I am 
suggesting we are receiving by sympathy in option C, which provide the context necessary for certain 
indirect passions that are sympathetically gained, yet not the same as those of the person we are 
sympathizing with. I do not mean to suggest, however, that in this process the sympathetic passion is 
somehow constructed out of the sympathized sentiments and beliefs that are part of the ‘attending 
circumstances’. 
223 Recall that Hume insists that this is the only way that passions can be talked about: “by enumeration of 
such circumstances as attend them” (THN 2.1.2.1). 
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enlivened, I will not find myself experiencing the passion of the person with whom I am 
sympathizing. Rather, if I experience an indirect passion it will be one that is appropriate 
to the sentiments I have had communicated to me. For instance, if it is pride in her newly 
decorated room that I perceive in my sister, the principle of sympathy will cause in me 
not pride in myself, nor even pride in my sister, but rather love for my sister.  
Each of these options has its own strengths and drawbacks as a solution to the puzzle. 
The strength of option A seems to be that it preserves the mechanism of sympathy in its 
most basic form. We are affected in the ways that others are affected. Not in an entirely 
felt, non-cognitive way, as it was with the first option discussed and dismissed. Rather, 
we have the mental tools to enter into mental lives of others, and gain an understanding 
of both the feeling and the thinking of that individual. On the other hand, option A does 
not seem to properly reflect what we often take to happen in instances of sympathizing. 
For instance, I would expect that sympathy with my sister’s pride in her decorating would 
make me proud of her, not proud of myself. An account of this experience of 
sympathizing with indirect passions is perhaps more a strength of option B. The passion 
of pride as an isolated original existence is preserved, while the subject of that passion 
shifts in a way that reflects my awareness of the source of the passion. Option B certainly 
seems to reflect the experience we often have of sympathizing- I see you proud of 
yourself, and I too feel proud of you. The difference is that in your case the subject of 
your pride is (for instance) your decorated room, while the subject of my pride is you.224 
But this option ultimately lacks the strength of option C, which is able to accommodate 
the sympathetic adoption of the passion of pride through the praise of others, which 
seems most appropriate for the task Hume wants sympathy to accomplish in its 
introduction. It is then able to account for the way we respond to the opinions of others, 
whether feeling pride at their love, shame at their hate or loving them when we see their 
pride and hating them when we see their shame. But, if Hume also wants the principle to 
be a means for adopting the same passions as those around us, this option seems a 
                                                 
224 In both cases the object of the pride is necessarily the self. 
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somewhat forced and weak use of the term ‘sympathetic passion’. After all, it is not, in 
this case, an identical passion I feel. To use Hume’s metaphor, my strings are 
‘sympathetically’ resonating at a different tone than those of the person I am 
sympathizing with. 
It could be that the most charitable way of trying to answer this puzzle about the 
application of sympathy to the indirect passions is to assume that Hume would have been 
willing to draw on variations on all three potential solutions I have offered as appropriate. 
But this answer will not be satisfactory for every reading of Hume. The reason for this is 
that I take it that the option that will be preferred for each reader or commentator will be 
a function of what kind of reading they are inclined to give Hume as a theorist of the 
passions. For instance, someone who insists on sticking closely to a sensationalist reading 
of Hume will likely choose option A, where I gain an idea of a particular, familiar feeling 
in someone else (indicated by the appropriate behaviors in the person, and the presence of 
cause and object). When my idea of the passion is enlivened, it will become the identical 
passion itself. But this would be unsatisfying for someone who holds Hume to be a more 
cognitive theorist of the passions. Option B might be most appealing to someone who 
takes the passions to indeed have a characteristic sensation, but insist that certain beliefs 
are constitutive of the passion. Thus, the adoption of the particular feeling would have to 
include the adoption of aspects of the cognitive content surrounding it. Finally, if one 
were inclined to an even stronger cognitivist reading of Hume, the only feeling to be 
sympathetically adopted would be a basic pleasure or pain, as on this reading anything 
more to the experience of the passion is tied to cognitive content. Thus, as in option C, 
the sympathizing would take the basic felt pleasure or pain, and otherwise be focused on 
adopting the beliefs about cause and object that we perceive. This option has the curious 
feeling of breaking the passion into parts, and reassembling is in a way appropriate to our 
own context and perspective. It is still the communication of passion, just not in the direct 
sense one would assume Hume intended. 
Now let us consider how my suggested reconciliation of the cognitivism/sensationalism 
debate with a conceptual distinction between emotion/passion might be usefully applied 
here. I believe understanding Hume’s take on passions as such makes room for the 
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possibility that passions are sympathetically communicated in Hume in all three ways. 
Consider option A. Here we perceive the passion in another as the characteristic emotion 
that is the ‘essence’ of that passion. We know from experience what this feels like, and as 
our impression of self lends this emotion vivacity, we will come to feel the actual 
impression. But we need not continue to feel that exact passion, as the emotion we are 
experiencing has a transient and fluid nature. Though the sympathetic communication 
may have been of an original existence, with no beliefs or representational content 
attached, it will be immediately introduced into a mind where there are other beliefs, 
ideas, sources of emotion and vivacity, and instant associations that will be made. 
Therefore, depending on our psychological landscape, that emotion may quickly be 
adopted by a different passion. For instance, suppose I perceive pride in my sister, and 
come to feel sympathetically the emotion of pride. That feeling will likely ‘wheel about’ 
and find associations and perhaps a dominant passion. Let’s say that independent of the 
pride I perceive in my sister, I am inclined to love her for the accomplishment that she is 
at the moment proud of. The emotion of pride I feel sympathetically will likely come to 
attend my passion of love for her. Thus, though the initial sympathetic mechanism will 
cause in me the emotion of pride (which is self directed), I will find that without the 
appropriate relations of ideas and impressions the emotion of pride will not be lasting, but 
the feeling and vivacity will pass to sentiments more appropriate to my perspective and 
situation.225 The emotion here operates something like the emotion of anger in instances 
where we know that no offense was intended, but feel angry anyway. Of such cases 
Hume says that the “emotion, indeed, cannot be of long continuance… [W]hen the 
violence of the passion is once a little abated, the defect of the relation begins to be better 
felt…” and the passion, unsupported by the appropriate relations of ideas, cannot last 
(2.2.3.6) 
                                                 
225 My choice to use the term ‘sentiment’ here is intentional, given its connotations of both passions and 
beliefs. Recall that the sympathy mechanism applies to belief as well as to impressions of reflection. 
Therefore there is no reason to think that the sympathetically acquired emotion will only lend vivacity and 
force to passions—it may well come to attend some belief.   
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Therefore, on my reading the sympathy mechanism may well communicate the precise 
passion (in the sense of the emotional essence) we observe, as in option A, but unless we 
have the appropriate supporting beliefs and associations, it is unlikely that the feeling of 
that particular passion will persist long. Instead, the emotion and vivacity will move to a 
dominant passion, or spread to various associated ideas, impressions, beliefs, etc, as 
appropriate to the individual.  
What then of options B and C? In both of these cases what is communicated appears to 
be part(s) of what constitute(s) the ‘whole bent and tendency’ of the experience of the 
passion, possibly including particular beliefs. Considering the passions as more complex 
cognitive events opens up different aspects of the mental experience of the individual we 
observe for us to gain ideas of and have subsequently enlivened by the sympathy 
mechanism. We may gain the idea of the emotion of the passion, or we may gain an idea 
of the general pain or pleasure being experienced. We may gain an idea of particular 
beliefs. All of these elements may be lent vivacity and come to be experienced by us 
sympathetically, or only some or one of them. In any case, how the passions, emotions, 
pains, pleasures and beliefs come to be experienced by us will depend in part on the 
mental context they enter into, i.e., our own package of perceptions, associations, 
dominant passions, and customs and habits of mind. In the end, the sympathy mechanism 
can be seen to work in an incredibly broad way, and result in a large range of types of 
sympathetically acquired mental states. 
This reading seems consistent with the diverse application Hume attributes to the 
sympathy mechanism. Not least of these attributed functions is the communication of 
belief in particular via sympathy.  Philip Mercer seconds this, arguing that the sympathy 
mechanism must work in the case of belief, due to the sensitive nature of Humean belief.  
He states,  
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In so far as Hume thinks that belief is merely a lively idea or impression,226 there 
can be no objections to saying that an idea that X is the case can, through being 
associated with an impression, be so enlivened as to become a belief that X is the 
case. It follows that beliefs, opinions, and attitudes are just as susceptible of 
communication from one person to another by means of the sympathetic 
mechanism as passions and emotions are.227 
I noted close to the end of my arguments in Part One that emotion seems closely 
connected to Humean ‘vivacity.’ Vivacity, of course, plays several key roles in Hume. I 
questioned what the relationship might be between vivacity broadly construed in Hume, 
and the vivacity he refers to in his discussions of emotion in particular. This question 
seems highlighted by consideration of the sympathy mechanism, since it seems that the 
vivacity gained from the impression of self is capable of both turning an idea of an 
impression into that impression, and turning an idea of someone else’s belief into the 
belief itself. Hume talks about beliefs being attended by vivacity, and passions being 
attended by emotion. He also allows for considerable influence of passions over beliefs 
and vice versa. Now we find in the case of sympathy the same vivacity capable of 
creating beliefs and passions. This all together seems to suggest the more direct question: 
is the vivacity that attends a believed idea a kind of emotion? 
I take this to be a very difficult question to answer, and not possible to do within the 
restrictions of this project. I will, however, offer the beginnings of this discussion about 
the connection between emotion and belief in the next section, along with some 
suggestion on how this might affect Hume’s theory of motivation.   
                                                 
226 I do not think that Hume anywhere explicitly identifies belief as an impression—rather, he is inclined to 
talk about our believed ideas as ‘approaching impressions’ in their force and vivacity, due to the vivacity of 
some present impression (see 1.3.7.5n1). Therefore, Mercer may be somewhat overstating the case here. 
His general point, however, about the felt and enlivened nature of believed ideas, and the possibility of 
these being communicated via the sympathy mechanism seems to me correct.   
227 Mercer (1972), 34. 
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2.7 Application of the emotion/passion distinction to 
Hume on belief and motivation  
 
Potential connections between Hume’s account of belief and his work on the passions 
and impressions of reflection generally have not gone unnoticed in the scholarship. For 
instance, Norman Kemp Smith has suggested that Hume’s doctrine of belief is modeled 
on his doctrine of sympathy.228 James Fieser has questioned whether passions exhaust the 
category of impressions of reflection, suggesting among the possible additional 
candidates for inclusion the feeling of causal connection (the “internal impressions”) that 
Hume suggests plays a role in our belief in necessary connection in Book I.229 Annette 
                                                 
228 Kemp Smith, (1941). 
229 Fieser, (1992). Ultimately, Fieser suggests that Hume doesn’t give us enough to know whether the 
internal impression of a feeling of causal anticipation (or the impression of willing, which he also suggests 
as a potential candidate) could be classified as impressions of reflection. He suggests two potential 
interpretations, “(1) internal impressions, (which include the will and expectation), are distinct from 
[impressions of reflection] (which are the passions), and, (2) [impressions of reflection] are identical to 
internal impressions and include the passions, as well as the will and the feeling of causal anticipation” (13)  
The first of these interpretations he suggests is preferable because of Hume’s description of impressions of 
reflection as including passions, emotions and desires,  “none of which seem proper classifications for the 
will and the feeling of causal anticipation” and because the term ‘internal impression’ is only used in 
Hume’s discussions of will and causal anticipation, never the passions (13). (Fieser also mentions that these 
two kinds of feeling do not fit into either the calm nor violent classification, which he takes to be a part of 
Hume’s taxonomy of impressions of reflection, a point I have argued against earlier in this work.) It may 
be, however, that his question about the possible status of Hume’s ‘internal impressions’ as impressions of 
reflection merits new consideration given the distinction between emotion and passion that has been 
suggested here, as it makes room in the category of impressions of reflection for a broader range of feelings 
  
198 
 
Baier, among others, has noted that Hume’s discussion of passion and motivation at 2.3.3 
must be read in conjunction with his discussion of the influence of belief at 1.3.10, which 
in many ways runs parallel to it.230 I suggested at the end of the last section that there is 
an important connection between the vivacity of believed ideas and the vivacity that turns 
ideas of particular passions into the passions themselves. It is clear that there are many 
different angles from which one might enter a discussion of the relationship in Hume 
between his general category of impressions of reflection and his characterization of 
belief. Any such discussion will also have implications for Hume’s famous claims in 
2.3.3 about the impotency of reason alone—often understood in terms of rational 
beliefs—with regard to motivation. In fact, any reading of Hume that aligns his doctrine 
of belief with his doctrines concerning impressions of reflection in some way is of 
particular importance in understanding 2.3.3 since a standard reading of that section 
attributes to Hume a strong distinction between belief and passion.  
I will not be able to treat this subject in much detail here, though I do wish to suggest to 
the reader some potential implications of my emotion/passion distinction on some of the 
recent discussion surrounding the relationships between passion, belief, reason and 
motivation. I will set up this short discussion by presenting a potential tension in Hume’s 
account of motivation as presented in 2.3.3, a tension that was the focus of a paper 
written by Nathan Brett and myself.231 I will then consider some related work by Rachel 
Cohon, David Owen and Lorne Falkenstein, and the bearing it may have on the questions 
the paper presents. Finally, I will suggest how my reading of the emotion/passion 
distinction might further clarify aspects of the Humean doctrine of belief and motivation. 
I will suggest that beliefs in Hume can be ‘attended’ by emotion, and that ultimately this 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
than can be generally intended by ‘passions.’ But I will not pursue the questions surrounding these kinds of 
internal impressions here.  
230 Baier (1991). 
231 Brett, N., Paxman, K. (2008). “Reason in Hume’s Passions.” Hume Studies 34(1): 43-59. 
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means that Hume actually grants more power to influence the will to reasoned beliefs 
than a superficial reading of 2.3.3 may suggest. The influence that such reason may have 
on the passions, and ultimately action, will be argued to obtain partly due to the sensitive 
nature of Humean belief (as it is contrasted with the activity of reason), and the particular 
kind of vivacity that may ‘attend’ our motivating beliefs.  
In a paper entitled, “Reason in Hume’s Passions,” Nathan Brett and I focus on an 
apparent tension in Hume’s claims about motivation that is captured in the comparison of 
the following two passages, both taken from a section in Book II titled, “Of the 
influencing motives of the will”: 
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion 
and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (2.3.3.4) 
The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of 
any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. (2.3.3.7)232 
 
There is clearly context for each of these claims that could be argued to soften the 
potential conflict, but this side-by-side comparison brings the apparent tension in Hume’s 
thought clearly to the forefront: How can Hume at once claim that reason can never 
oppose the passions, but merely obey them, and also that passions may be instantly 
extinguished upon rational recognition of the falsity of certain kinds of beliefs? At the 
very least, Hume has some work to do to explain how and in what way ‘impotent’ reason 
can come to halt motivating passions in their impulse. The purpose of the paper is 
therefore to consider this “passage in which Hume appears to go too far in the direction 
                                                 
232 We note that Hume makes a similar claim at Intro. 9: “[N]othing is more certain, than that despair has 
almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility 
of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” [Brett and Paxman, (2008), 43].  
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of rational control, attributing to reason a mastery of the passions that it does not seem to 
have.”233 
A brief reminder of the arguments of 2.3.3 would be useful. Recall that there are two 
points that Hume attempts to prove in 2.3.3: “That reason alone can never be the motive 
to any action of the will, and … that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the 
will” (2.3.3.1). The first point Hume supports by presenting reason as operating in two 
ways: from demonstration and from probability. Reasoning by demonstration involves 
“abstract relations of our ideas,” such as mathematical and logical truths. Such reasoning 
may help me determine what course of action will have the effect I desire; for example, 
how much money I need to pay my debt at the market. But beyond directing judgments 
concerning cause and effect, Hume claims that such reasoning “never influences any of 
our actions” (2.3.3.2). Similarly, reasoning from probability, which concerns relations 
between objects of our experience, can inform us about the existence of objects, and their 
causal relationships to each other, but, Hume argues, 
It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such 
others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects 
themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; 
and ‘tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it 
cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us. (2.3.3.3)  
  
Hume therefore finds that neither kind of reason can result in an impulse to act 
independent of a passion (in particular, some kind of propensity or aversion) that has 
determined an end for us. Thus, reason alone cannot act as a motive to the will. The first 
point leads to the second for Hume. If reason cannot alone produce action, he takes it as 
obvious that “the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the 
preference with any passion or emotion,” since it cannot provide an independent impulse 
                                                 
233 Brett and Paxman (2008), 44. 
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(2.3.3.4).  Only impulse can oppose impulse, and since reason is without impulse it is 
relegated to be a ‘slave’ of the passions—acting only to inform desires concerning means 
to achieve the impulse-driven ends.  
While we did not in the paper set out to question the first point (“That reason alone can 
never be the motive to any action of the will”), we did challenge the second (“that it can 
never oppose passion in the direction of the will”), which “appears to be at odds with the 
view that passions disappear when reason discovers that they are based on a false 
supposition, or discovers insufficient means to obtain that to which passion directs us.”234 
Beyond the quotation given above from 2.3.3.7, there are other aspects of Hume’s theory 
of the passions that appear to put reasoning and belief at centre stage. We found that in 
Hume reason clearly plays a role as the source of causal information that can inform and 
re-direct our passions and therefore ultimately our actions. Desire and aversion for Hume 
have built into their very concepts the requirement of reasoning concerning the prospect 
of pleasure or pain, and ‘prospect’ here is certainly being used as a causal term.235 There 
is also the highly cognitive structure of the passions (in particular, the indirect passions) 
which appears to suggest that belief plays a key role not only in causing, but also in 
determining and sustaining our passions. Following Baier, we pointed out that Hume’s 
account of passions like pride (in which he claims to be offering the causal conditions of 
passions) offers certain beliefs as constitutive of the passions, along with distinctive 
feelings. Thus, I will feel proud of my daughter for quitting smoking until I am informed 
that my belief that she has quit is false. Without this key belief, I will not feel pride. Thus, 
despite Hume’s claims that reason is a slave to passion, we find that our reasoned beliefs 
can, on his account, instantly extinguish passion and any accompanying motives for 
action.    
                                                 
234Ibid. 
235 “’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent 
emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or 
satisfaction… ‘Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object” (2.3.3.3).  
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If this reading is right, then Hume is not only faced with a potential tension in the claims 
he makes concerning the power of reason as it pertains to passions and motivation, but 
also some problems with his theory as an account of human nature generally. If our 
perceptions of mistakes in reasoning and belief are really so key to sustaining our 
passions, how can Hume explain the phenomenon of akrasia or ‘weakness of will’? If 
our passions must yield to reason upon the discovery by reason that our desire will not 
help us obtain our preferred ends, how can we explain instances when our passions 
apparently drive us to act against our own acknowledged best interests? Another typical 
human experience that appears to create problems for Hume’s account of the power of 
reason over passions is when circumstances change such that there is no longer any 
prospect of pleasure from some previously desired object, but the desire for the object 
continues. An example offered is of the realization that my plane has left, while I am still 
in the taxi headed to the airport. I may continue to desire to catch the plane, even though I 
now know it to be impossible. Hume appears to have causal anticipation built into his 
concepts of desire and aversion—when our desired ends are no longer possible means to 
the pleasure we seek his account seems to suggest we no longer desire them. But this is 
clearly not always the case. A very strong case of such continued desire in the face of the 
impossibility of fulfillment we argued can be found in a particular kind of experience of 
grief.236 The pain of grief at the loss of a loved one is a pain that actually appears to 
depend on the impossibility of getting what we want. Thus in such a case it is the very 
fact that my reason tells me that it is impossible to ever speak to my loved one again that 
causes me the pain of the continued desire to do so. I do not cease to feel the passion of 
desire when I recognize that there is no prospect of pleasure from its object in such cases.  
To recap, Hume appears to claim that reason has the power to remove desires by 
undermining the judgment that the object is a means to my desired end, changing our 
beliefs that are apparently constitutive of the motivating passion (such as in the case of 
                                                 
236 This discussion does employ a modified conception of grief, not identical to the more broadly construed 
concept of grief that Hume includes in his taxonomy of the basic passions. See Brett and Paxman (2008), p. 
49 for further discussion of the distinction between our use and Hume’s use of the term. 
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pride), and by judging that there is no possible means to achieve my desired end (such as 
in the case of grief). But it seems that these “ways in which reason can limit what we 
desire grant reason some fairly hefty powers of directing and disabling our passions.”237 
This is a problem on two counts: first, because of the way it apparently conflicts with 
Hume’s claim that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave of the passions” and, one 
might add, his subsequent argument at 2.3.3.5 that passions are original existences, 
simple and non-representational. Second, it is a problem because these claims about the 
power of reason over our passions just don’t seem to match up with aspects of human 
experience, in which both desires and aversions often arise and persist despite reasoned 
belief that should, on this reading of the power of reason in Hume, cause the passions to 
‘yield without any opposition.’ 
I will not repeat the conclusions of our paper here. Rather, I would like to offer a 
different take on how to approach this topic and the tensions we suggest can be found to 
arise in Hume concerning the interactions of reason, belief and motivation through 
impressions of reflection. To do so I will look briefly at work by Cohon, Owen and 
Falkenstein, and end with the application of my emotion/passion distinction to the topic. 
I will start with a consideration of some of the work done by Rachel Cohon on the 
subject. In her book, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, Cohon argues that the 
common reading that at 2.3.3 Hume argues that “Beliefs alone cannot motivate us” is in 
fact mistaken, and that Hume does not actually hold this conclusion.238 She argues that 
common readings of Hume, which typically includes this claim, lead to apparent puzzles, 
errors, and contradictions in his writing, which must either become difficulties that 
somehow must be explained away by commentators seeking to defend Hume, or taken as 
evidence that Hume was indeed an inconsistent thinker by those who would critique him. 
Cohon thinks that neither approach is the right one, and instead opts to reveal some of the 
                                                 
237 Brett and Paxman (2008), 50. 
238 Cohon, R. (2008). Hume’s Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. New York, Oxford University Press. 
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problems with the standard reading, and then offer an alternative reading which 
ultimately denies the claim that for Hume “belief alone cannot motivate us,” and suggests 
instead a distinction be made between ‘reason’ and ‘belief.’  
First let us look at some of the problems she finds in the text for the common reading. 
Like Brett and myself, Cohon points out that for Hume beliefs about the prospects of pain 
and pleasure can cause desire or aversion—that is to say, can cause passions to arise in 
us. She argues,  
The prospect of pain or pleasure would certainly seem to be the belief (the lively 
idea) that pain or pleasure is available from an object, and this belief causes 
motivating “aversion or propensity”. Before our rational discovery of causal 
relations can come in to direct the aversion or propensity that is present in us to 
appropriate means of fulfillment, the impulse itself apparently arises from 
belief.239  
The idea that a kind of belief is the source of the initial impulse for desires and aversions 
may be surprising given Hume’s rejection of reason as providing any impulse of its own 
in 2.3.3.4. But Cohon finds further support for the claim that  
…even on the most subtle interpretation of the text, the best evidence shows that 
for Hume beliefs about available pleasure and pain cause new motivating passions 
and do not merely direct existing passions.240  
She cites as additional evidence Hume’s reference to passions as founded on suppositions 
(2.3.3.6), his claim that passions yield to reason (2.3.3.7, the passage of central concern to 
the Brett and Paxman article), the claim that reason can excite passion (3.1.1.12), and, 
very importantly, Hume’s claim that belief makes ideas like impressions, with a like 
influence on the passions (1.3.10.3).  
                                                 
239 Cohon (2008), 18. 
240 Cohon (2008), 5. 
  
205 
 
This last reference to the text is worth citing at length here: 
Tho’ an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of 
those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser 
degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to 
the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to 
an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the 
passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression 
in force and vivacity. For as the different degrees of force make all the original 
difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the 
source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions, and their removal, 
in whole or in part, the cause of every new resemblance they acquire. Wherever 
we can make an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity, it will 
likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind; and vice versa, where it 
imitates them in that influence… this must proceed from its approaching them in 
force and vivacity. Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects 
of an impression, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing 
but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea. (1.3.10.3; italics Hume’s) 
There is much that could be said about this passage. Most important to note for the 
current discussion is that Hume is clearly claiming that, (a) believed ideas can have 
similar effects on us to those of actual impressions, and (b) passions can arise from 
beliefs. Cohon combines these two observations, and suggests that for Hume, “beliefs of 
a particular sort—beliefs about forthcoming pleasures and pains—are the immediate 
causes of (new) motivating passions.”241   
But how, one might ask, can one claim this reading of Hume where beliefs are the causes 
of action while still taking seriously his arguments regarding the impotency of reason 
alone to provide impulse at 2.3.3.4? Key to the success of Cohon’s argument here is her 
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insistence that we need to understand there to be a distinction in Hume between the 
process or activity of reasoning and the ideas accompanied by vivacity that are our 
beliefs. That such a distinction needs to be borne in mind while reading Hume is easily 
overlooked, but (to this reader at least) seems quite obvious once pointed out. One of 
Hume’s main projects in Book I of the Treatise is the characterization of reasoning as a 
particular kind of process or activity, involving the discovery of relations between ideas 
or the movement from one idea to another by means of some relation. Cohon argues that 
reason as it is presented in Book I is an activity of comparing ideas and finding relations 
between them. The production of something by reason alone must be through this 
process, a kind of causation distinct from that which causes us to take action (which is 
causation through impulse and feeling242). Reason alone, therefore, fails to motivate us 
because it is not a causal agent of action, being an activity of mind, not a mental event 
with impulse. Cohon explains, 
To invoke the notion of a causal chain, one must link items with causal efficacy—
whether objects, as Hume tends to call them, or events—that can occupy nodes on 
the chain. To invoke the notion here, one must assume that reason is such an 
item… But as we have seen, Hume’s empiricism does not permit him to think of 
reason as an independently identifiable item. Rather, he identifies it solely as 
reasoning activity. Consequently, reason cannot in the same way [as beliefs or 
passions] occupy a node in the causal chain.243 
                                                 
242 Cohon addresses briefly the fact that for Hume there is an assumed requirement of feeling to produce 
impulse and motivation. She says, “Most likely [Hume] supposes that there is overwhelming empirical 
evidence that a feeling of some sort precedes each action, though he never exhibits this evidence, and it 
may be more difficult to amass than he imagines” [Cohon (2008), 32]. Cohon does not challenge this 
assumption on Hume’s part. I have likewise suggested, in Part One of this work, that feeling is an essential 
part of providing impulse on Hume’s account of the mind, with the added thesis that this impulse is found 
in valenced attending emotion.  
243 Cohon (2008), 73-74. 
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A belief may indeed by formed by the process of reasoning. And that belief may in turn 
be the cause of a passion. But this no more means that the reasoning was the cause of the 
passion than the fact that a headache caused me to lie down means that a headache was 
the cause of a depression in the bed (an example Cohon uses in a footnote244). Thus 
reasoning and belief are distinct in their causal roles, and while the former cannot be said 
to cause passions, the latter may be found to. In short, Cohon’s argument is that 
…when Hume says that reason alone cannot produce a passion, what he means is 
that a passion is not the outcome of a reasoning process; he does not mean that a 
passion is not produced by a belief without the help of a prior passion.”245  
The distinction between ‘reason alone’ and belief may be further emphasized by looking 
at David Owen’s take on reason. Owen has argued that reason for Hume should be 
understood, not as a God-given faculty for the production of truth (as it often was 
considered by his contemporaries and those who went before him), but (like Cohon) as a 
particular kind of interaction between impressions and ideas.246 He further explains the 
classic Humean claim from Book I that probable reasoning is not based on reason by 
appealing to the central role played by associative principles of the imagination. That is 
to say, the traditional conception of reason that Hume was responding against did not 
include reference to the role of the imagination in infusing ideas with vivacity to create 
beliefs, but Hume’s new conception of reason did. Owen draws a parallel between 
Hume’s claim in Book I that the understanding alone “entirely subverts itself, and leaves 
not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common 
life”247 and the Book II claim that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of 
                                                 
244 Cohon (2008), 73n16. 
245 Cohon (2008), 77. 
246 Owen, D. (1999). Hume's Reason. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press. 
247 1.4.7.7 [As quoted in Owen (1999), 197]. 
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the will.”248 In both instances Hume is identifying ‘reason alone’ as the interactions and 
relations between ideas and impressions, as well as the vivacity infusing processes of the 
imagination. The conception of reason that Hume ultimately develops, he argues is that  
…everything required for an inference to a belief in an unobserved event, upon 
the receiving of an impression, counts as a principle of the imagination that 
constitutes reason. This includes not only those principles, such as experience and 
habit, that explain the transition from the impression to the idea , but also that 
property of the imagination, vivacity, that turns a mere idea into a belief.249  
Thus Humean reasoning is a complex activity that involves comparison and relations of 
ideas, as well as the associations of impressions in the imagination that infuse ideas with 
vivacity as they become beliefs. Humean reasoning is therefore a particular kind of 
activity and process, not, as Owen points out, God-given mental states that have their 
own impulse or existence.   
How then might we understand Humean beliefs in contrast to this reasoning process? 
Owen includes in his conception of reason the activity of infusing ideas with vivacity 
such that they become beliefs, but the vivid mental states that result, i.e., the beliefs, are 
not identical to that activity. Lorne Falkenstein has provided a useful and detailed account 
of the various belief-forming mechanisms found in Hume, only one of which he identifies 
as reason produced belief.250 He points out that for Hume beliefs can vary in vivacity, and 
therefore in strength, and that not only are there multiple ways that vivacity may be 
transferred, but in fact these mechanisms sometimes “work at cross purposes,” resulting 
                                                 
248 2.3.3.1 [As quoted in Owen (1999), 197]. 
249 Owen, 204. 
250 Falkenstein, L. (1997). "Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume's Account of Belief." Hume 
Studies 23(1): 29-72. 
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in contradictory beliefs, weakened beliefs and even inducing “a suspension of belief.”251 
He argues that though Hume’s  
…account can be partially captured by the deceptively simple maxim that belief is 
“nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression” or memory [1.3.9.8; see 
also 1.3.7.6], the maxim is both too partial and deceptively simple. For Hume, not 
all beliefs are in fact produced by the transmission of vivacity from an impression 
or memory to a related idea.252 
Included among the kinds of belief that are not produced by transmission of vivacity from 
current impressions or memory are our beliefs produced by reason and education, the 
former being a product of the demonstration of relations of ideas, the latter of the 
repetition of ideas.  
Reason is considered a ‘natural cause of belief’ which “as exhibited paradigmatically in 
arithmetical calculations, does impress us with the ‘evidence’ or even ‘certainty’ of what 
has been demonstrated,” generating belief with vivacity equal to that of memory, and 
often exceeding the vivacity of our beliefs from causal reasoning.253 Despite the strength 
of such naturally formed and generally true belief, however, belief through reasoning is 
easily upset; though “[o]ur reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is 
the natural effect” it’s efficacy in producing belief in us is threatened “by the irruption of 
other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers” (1.4.1.1). Thus our reason-
produced beliefs are challenged, not generally by other strong and vivid beliefs, but 
rather by interruptions to our reasoning process by other mental activities (such as the 
                                                 
251 Falkenstein (1997), 32. He also emphasizes that for Hume not all beliefs are involuntary—a point which 
ends up being important to his overall project as he seeks to develop the Humean account of warranted 
belief. I will not focus on that aspect of belief formation in Hume here, as my focus will be the mechanisms 
by which these vivacious ideas are produced, and the sensitive nature of belief generally.  
252 Ibid. 
253 Falkenstein (1997), 33. 
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passions; see 1.4.1.11), or general mental weakness. Either way the vivacity that usually 
comes to attend ideas produced through reason can be lessened.   
Education, on the other hand, produces vivacious beliefs through sheer repetition of 
ideas. Falkenstein describes this “odd” way of gaining belief as “not only non-
associative, but entirely non-demonstrative, in the sense that it does not proceed from any 
previously given premises, impressions, passions or memories.”254 Hume argues that an 
idea that makes frequent appearance in the mind will “by degrees acquire a facility and 
force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and 
unusual idea” 255(1.3.9.16). More particularly, Hume argues that education produces 
belief by unintentional and un-designed (at least on the part of the individual being 
educated) repetition of the idea. Falkenstein explains that for Hume, “the healthy mind is 
aware of its volition in producing the repetition, and this realization leads it to consider 
the idea to be its own invention.”256 Despite the frequent exposure, and subsequent 
enlivening of the idea, our awareness of our own part in its production keeps it from 
becoming a belief.257         
                                                 
254 Falkenstein (1997), 40. 
255 Note that this account of the way in which frequently entertained ideas gain “facility and force” until 
they acquire a strength of vivacity in order to become beliefs bears some resemblance to Hume’s 
explanation of how it is that through custom we develop tendencies towards certain passions, which are 
then experienced calmly (2.3.5). In both cases repetition increases the strength of presence of the 
perception in question: the idea becomes increasingly vivid, until it is a settled belief, while the passion 
increases in strength (though not violence) until it becomes part of our disposition.  
256 Falkestein (1997), 41. 
257 This appears to be a related phenomenon to our resistance to belief in poetical embellishment—we know 
that the poet is using cleverness to make the ideas she is presenting more present to us, and this knowledge 
makes a general rule applicable that condemns the formation of beliefs on this basis. Falkenstein discusses 
this phenomenon [Falkenstein (1997), 48].  
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The other mechanisms for belief formation are all variations on vivacity transferring 
associations. The belief-forming mechanisms of association Falkenstein argues are of 
most interest to Hume. The basic mechanism for transference of vivacity in such cases, as 
pointed out by Kemp Smith, is similar to the sympathy mechanism. An idea in the 
imagination is associated with some present impression or a memory. Both of these kinds 
of perceptions are experienced with a high degree of vivacity. The association causes a 
transfer of vivacity between the associated ideas and impressions, and when an idea is 
transfused with sufficient vivacity it becomes a belief (just as the idea of the passion, in 
the case of sympathy, becomes the very passion when it is attended with sufficient 
vivacity from our ever-present impression of the self). Conviction of the belief is 
proportional the quantity of vivacity transferred to it (as strength of the passion is 
proportional to the degree of vivacity it gains from our impression of the self, which is in 
turn determined by the closeness of association between our idea of self and our idea of 
the person we are sympathizing with).  
Falkenstein offers analysis of multiple versions of belief-forming mechanisms by 
association, including associations through causal inference, and associations of 
resemblance and contiguity. He also details how the transference of vivacity through 
association is in part governed by variations in the “quality or character of [the] 
components” involved in associations, such as strength of current impressions, potential 
doubts surrounding memories, the history of past experiences of constant conjunctions, 
experience of contrary experiments, degree of reflection on our experiences, etc.258 
Finally, he finds Hume’s associative mechanisms include the mixtures of fantasy with 
fact (which may transfer vivacity to what would otherwise be un-believed ideas) and the 
associations of passions with ideas [which can likewise transfer vivacity to mere ideas 
and make them believed; consider for instance Hume’s example of the man in an iron 
cage, who feels fear of falling despite being supported (1.3.13.10)].  
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I will not try here to reproduce the details of Falkenstein’s complete analysis of the 
various ways in which associative belief-forming mechanisms work. What is important 
for our purposes is to note the great lengths that Hume goes to in generating principles 
and explanations in order to account for his picture of mind in which beliefs are formed 
by acquisition of vivacity. Whether through the ‘natural’ belief-forming mechanism of 
reason, the sympathy-like mechanism of belief formation through associations, or the 
slightly curious case of increased vivacity through repetition, belief for Hume is a 
phenomenon centered on the acquisition and transfer of vivacity to our ideas. 
Why is such an analysis of belief important to our current project? To recap, Cohon has 
suggested that one key step in making Hume’s writing consistent is in reading 2.3.3 as an 
argument for the claim that reason alone cannot motivate passion, but belief can, in that 
beliefs about pains and pleasures are causal agents in forming passions of desire and 
aversion. Both Cohon and Owen make the case for a distinction between reason and 
belief by presenting Humean reason as an activity or process that involves relations and 
comparisons of ideas—as well as (potentially) the natural production of vivacious ideas 
that are beliefs—not to be confused with the vivacious individual ideas that are beliefs. 
Falkenstein shows that in fact reason is just one process that may result in the successful 
enlivening of ideas to the point of belief production—and, incidentally, not obviously the 
most important method of belief production (particularly since there are key beliefs, such 
as those about causal relations and external existence, that cannot be generated by reason 
alone259). Reason the process is thereby shown to be something quite different from 
individual existing beliefs, which are created, determined and have their influence via 
vivacity. 
How is this to be brought to bear on the claims of 2.3.3.4 and 2.3.3.7 that Brett and I 
found to be potentially in tension with one another regarding the power of reason over 
motivation? One possible response, based on some of the arguments made by the authors 
discussed above, is that when Hume claims that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave 
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of the passions” he is talking about reason the process. As has been argued by Cohon and 
others, this process alone cannot move us to act. However, when Hume states that “[t]he 
moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means 
our passions yield to our reason without any opposition” he is talking about the power of 
the beliefs produced by reason. Beliefs about pain and pleasure, as Cohon argues, have 
the same effect on our passion formation and subsequent motivation as currently 
experienced impressions of pain and pleasure—belief makes ideas equal to passions in 
their ability to “actuate the soul” (1.3.10.2260). Therefore, our relevant beliefs about the 
prospects of pain and pleasure will have similar effects to our impressions of pain and 
pleasure in creating and re-directing passions—possibly even causing contrary passions 
to yield without any opposition. Note that this type of explanation of Hume’s claims has 
further implications for Hume’s picture of the power of belief with regard to motivation. 
It is surely not only our rationally formed beliefs about pains and pleasures that may act 
as the impulse to form passions of desire and aversion. Beliefs formed by the acquisition 
of vivacity in the multiplicity of ways that Falkenstein has suggested will have similar 
potential to influence action, insofar as they are beliefs about prospects of pain and 
pleasure. 
Does this explanation go far enough? Brett and I suggested that Hume needs a response 
on two fronts: first, he needs to show his theory to be internally coherent, and second, he 
needs to show that it can account for the diversity of human experience. There are indeed 
instances in which our passions appear to ‘yield’ to our reasonable beliefs (“when I 
discover that my car-lottery ticket does not have the winning number, I drop it in the 
wastebasket, though a moment before I was treating it like a prized possession”261), but 
there are also instances in which passions persist in the face of beliefs that should be 
damaging to them, such as the particular case of grief that was discussed above. The 
application of the distinction between reason and belief brings us a step closer to 
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interpretive coherence. With such a distinction, Hume is able to account both for his 
claims about the impotency of reason, and his claims about the apparent power of our 
rational (and perhaps at times our non-rational) beliefs to create, direct and redirect our 
passions. Add to this Falkenstein’s analysis of the multiple belief-formation mechanisms 
in Hume, and his explanations of how beliefs for Hume can come to be of varying 
strengths and work at cross-purposes, and we begin to have the tools to make sense of a 
greater diversity of instances where belief does and does not have the necessary ‘impulse’ 
to govern our motivating passions. But I wish to build on these accounts, and will suggest 
now that this picture becomes even clearer when we apply the emotion/passion 
distinction to Hume’s discussion, and use it to more explicitly draw a connection between 
the vivacity of our beliefs about pain and pleasure and the attending emotions that 
provides the transient impulse found in impressions of reflection generally. 
One way to understand the problem highlighted by the contrast between the reason-slave 
passage, and the passions-yield passage is to understand it in light of the tension between 
the cognitivist and sensationalist readings of Hume’s theory of the passions. On the 
cognitivist account, our passions clearly will yield to reason without opposition because a 
certain cognitive structure is essential to the passions conceived in this way. Thus, 
reason’s discovery of truth and falsehood, and the subsequent beliefs generated, will 
mean a change in the cognitive content of the passion, which will result in a change in the 
passion, all without the ‘opposition’ characteristic of conflicting impulses of the passions. 
This is the kind of picture that Brett and I had in mind when we claim that “human (and 
Humean) passions are complex in their cognitive structure… There is… no pride without 
beliefs about one’s self and about some properties, possessions, or dispositions, that 
connect with oneself.”262 On the other hand, Hume’s claim that “Reason is, and ought 
only to be, a slave of the passions,” can be taken to assume a sensationalist reading of 
Hume’s theory of the passions, particularly as it is found to be supported by the argument 
of 2.3.3.5 that passions are original existences, without representational content. Thus, a 
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reader who is inclined to read Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion will be inclined 
to play down the power of reason, privileging 2.3.3.4-5 over the claims of 2.3.3.7. The 
passions-yield passage will be read as a claim merely about how our instrumental 
reasoning may come to affect our particular desires for means to certain passion 
determined ends, but not govern or direct them in any stronger sense. The reader inclined 
to interpret Hume as a cognitive theorist of emotion, on the other hand, will point to 
2.3.3.7 in conjunction with all that Hume has to say about the double-relation of ideas 
and impressions attending the indirect passions, and the implied cognitive structure and 
belief content in the Humean analysis of particular passions generally. Thus the claim 
that passion yield to reason will be given a stronger reading, taken to be clearly the case 
given the internal logic of the passions. 
How then might the emotion/passion distinction be brought to bear on this issue? My 
suggestion above was that the reason/belief distinction could mean that while reason 
alone is impotent to move us, beliefs, with their impression-resembling vivacity, have a 
kind of impulse of their own, which makes them function more like passions. Thus it is 
no surprise that relevant beliefs about pain and pleasure will redirect, and perhaps even 
extinguish passion in some instances. But this is not wholly satisfying. The claim Hume 
makes is that “our passions yield to reason without any opposition” (my emphasis).To 
grant our beliefs power over motivation in virtue of their “like influence” to impressions 
of pain and pleasure, i.e., their ability to provide the initial impulse to aversion and 
propensity, appears to put them in the position where they may actually oppose our 
potentially motivating passions. Hume’s claim at 2.3.3.7 that the passions yield without 
opposition would be inaccurate—in fact, beliefs would generate new, conflicting 
passions, which may have the strength of impulse to dominate the contrary passion. An 
explanation of 2.3.3.7 that brings beliefs to the level of impressions in their influence 
creates conflicting impulses, not a change in motivating passion without opposition. 
The ‘cognitivist’ reading of 2.3.3.7 at this point seems more in keeping with Hume’s 
intention in this passage. But this is not to say that the circumstance in which beliefs 
generate new directing passions could not also occur on the Humean picture. Cohon is 
quite right to point to Hume’s doctrine found in 1.3.10 that particular beliefs—beliefs 
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about pain and pleasure—have an influence on the passions much like our impressions of 
pain and pleasure. Such beliefs are indeed causes of new passions, and their particular 
vivacity appears to provide the initial impulse for desires and aversions. What appears to 
be needed, therefore, is a way to talk about the passions in Hume both as original 
impressions, with non-representational impulse that has its own existence and influence 
that is untouched by discoveries of truth and falsehood, and a way to talk about the 
passions as involving more complex cognitive structures, including certain necessarily 
constitutive beliefs, that are altered ‘without any opposition’ when those constitutive 
beliefs change. This dual way of understanding Hume’s theory of the passions is what I 
have argued my proposed emotion/passion distinction provides. Passions considered for 
Hume as original existences, essentially the felt component of the experience, are 
emotions. ‘Fully established’ passions, understood as the ‘full bent’ of the experience 
from beginning to end, have identity partly determined by varied cognitive content, 
including beliefs. The term ‘emotion’ used in either case denotes feeling that is 
potentially transient and fluid, and provides impulses that can move us to act.  
These concepts play out in this discussion in the following way: emotions cannot be 
‘extinguished’263 without contrary impulse. Therefore discovery of truth or falsehood 
alone will not affect them. But emotion can easily be redirected, and attend different 
perceptions, even taking on different hedonic tones. The emotion attending a fully 
established passion, which depends on certain beliefs, will not cease to exist when reason 
causes us to “perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any 
means” (2.3.3.7), but it will ‘yield’ in the sense that it will likely move to attend whatever 
has become the ‘dominant’ passion. Thus, if I desire a piece of fruit because I believe it 
to be delicious, but reason comes to form in me the belief that it has been laced with 
poison, my desire will turn to aversion, the passion of desire for the fruit immediately 
yielding to the relevant change in belief. The felt emotion of that passion, however, will 
likely not disappear, but rather will attend my new, more dominant passion of aversion to 
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the fruit. The impulse and feeling remain, but attend another passion. Meanwhile, reason 
alone is still clearly impotent to move the will—vivacity and impulse in some form is still 
needed.  
This brings us back to the question of the connection between the attending vivacity to 
belief, and the emotion which attends passions. Here I would like to suggest an 
interpretation that I cannot fully defend here, but I think is a plausible direction, and 
potentially an interesting application of the emotion/passion distinction I have developed. 
Vivacity in and of itself cannot be identical to emotion. The term ‘vivacity,’ along with 
its common companions ‘force’ and ‘liveliness’,264 is a description of the immediacy of 
felt experience, and is used to describe the difference between ideas and impressions 
generally. A key difference between the feeling of vivacity generally and the feeling I 
have characterized as emotion is that emotions, as impressions of reflection, have a 
particular valence (even if it is changeable). Consider, however, that the particular kind of 
vivacity that Hume is most concerned about when he discusses the influence of belief is 
the vivacity that attends beliefs about pain and pleasure. When our ideas about pains and 
pleasures are attended by belief, these ideas come to have a like influence on the passions 
to our experiences of pain and pleasure. Hume argues that “impressions always actuate 
the soul, and that in the highest degree; but ‘tis not every idea which has the same effect” 
(1.3.10.2). It is only when “an idea approach the impressions in force and vivacity” that 
“it will likewise imitate them in its influence on the mind” (1.3.10.3). Impressions of pain 
and pleasure have influence on the mind through providing the “chief spring and moving 
principle of all its actions” (1.3.10.2). Our beliefs about pain and pleasure likewise 
activate the will. Impressions of pain and pleasure are the source of valenced vivacity that 
becomes the felt impulse of our passions. I have identified this felt, valenced impulse 
with emotion. I would therefore suggest that our vivid beliefs concerning pain and 
pleasure likewise act as a source of valenced, felt, impulse. There is a sense in which, on 
my analysis, it appears to be appropriate to claim that our beliefs about pain and pleasure 
                                                 
264 Hume also lists solidity, firmness and steadiness (Appendix, 12). 
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are not attended merely by general, belief-making vivacity, but by the particular kind of 
valenced, impulse-giving vivacity I have identified as emotion.  
This emotion would have the same properties of transitivity and fluidity that I presented 
as part of Humean emotion in 1.10. In fact, it might be quite interesting to compare the 
principles and maxims Hume offers in Book II as governing the transitivity of emotion 
with the various ways in which the vivacity necessary for creating belief moves between 
impressions and ideas. A comparative project that starts with Falkenstein’s analysis of the 
various belief-forming mechanisms in Hume and then turns to look at whether Hume’s 
treatment of the movement of emotion might reveal interesting similarities. This also 
makes the parallels between belief and sympathy in Hume seem very natural, as well as 
Hume’s contention that the sympathy mechanism applies to beliefs as well as impressions 
of reflection. In all cases, the concern is with the way in which feeling is extended to 
ideas. In the case of ideas about pain and pleasure, ideas with added vivacity will come to 
acquire the impulse that comes for Hume from feeling with valence. Hence, as Cohon 
also concluded, Hume is not committed to the thesis that belief alone can never motivate. 
Beliefs about pain and pleasure provide valenced, felt, impulse that is the attending 
emotion of the passions, and is part of the changeability and motion of the mind that is 
animated by feeling, and ultimately governed by passion.  
This suggestion is here presented as only an outline of a possible interpretive move to be 
made in understanding reason, belief, passion and motivation in Hume as informed by the 
emotion/passion distinction I have argued for. Certainly a full defense is a larger project, 
and too much to undertake here. But I hope to have shown that Hume’s claims 
concerning the potential influence of reason over our passion-governed wills—
particularly as reason is the activity whereby we come to have beliefs about pain and 
pleasure—are not inconsistent, and can be shown to fit together quite coherently in his 
overall picture. I also think this interpretation addresses the second concern expressed in 
the paper by Brett and myself: that of whether Hume accurately reflects human emotional 
experience in his claims about the influence of rational beliefs on our passions. Reason’s 
power is lessened when the diversity of belief-forming mechanisms and factors that 
influence the adoption of beliefs are considered. Falkenstein’s main purpose in his article 
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is to make room for normativity in Hume’s naturalistic take on belief, and that project 
involves showing all the ways that the formation of rational belief can be foiled on the 
Humean picture. That is not to say that there are never instances when clear reasoning 
results in our passions immediately yielding to the discoveries of truth or falsehood. But 
the power that belief has to influence action is sometimes going to be in virtue of belief 
content changes effecting passions more cognitively conceived (which then ‘yield 
without opposition’), sometimes due to opposing impulse being provided by new 
influencing beliefs (cases in which opposition is present), and yet other times belief will 
contribute the transient emotional impulse, which will come to attend the dominant 
passion (as in the special case of grief discussed, where the vivacity  of the belief that our 
desire cannot be filled, along with the emotion of the desire, come to attend and add to 
the felt pain of the grief).   
I have argued that for Hume the sensitive nature of belief means that these vividly 
experienced ideas about pains and pleasures are (in a sense) attended by emotion. 
Motivation in Hume is therefore not subject to the strong belief/passion distinction often 
attributed to it, though the impotency of reason alone is maintained as part of his 
approach. However, this does mean that belief as a product of reason has more potential 
influence over the will for Hume than a superficial reading of 2.3.3 may suggest. And the 
transient, attending nature of emotion in Hume, as distinct from the set nature of 
particular fully established passions, makes them a key player in explaining Humean 
motivation both in terms of our impressions of reflection and our beliefs.   
 
 
2.8 Conclusion and suggestions for further study  
 
The main objective of this project was to suggest a textually based reading of Hume’s 
concept of ‘emotion’ that provides a way of understanding it as distinct from passion. 
What I believe I have shown is that Hume’s theory of the passions, and his treatment in 
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general of affective mental states, is best parsed when we attribute to him a conceptual 
distinction between changing, transient, valenced, ‘attending’ feelings (emotions) and 
more cognitively complex structures of feeling, natural causes and beliefs that he 
identifies as the individual passions (or, as I have often called them, the ‘fully 
established’ passions). This distinction, I have argued, can help to explain why Hume’s 
theory of the passions has inspired a debate between more sensationalist and more 
cognitivist interpretations. I have presented textual evidence that supports a reading of 
Hume as a sensational theorist of emotion, and also as a cognitive theorist of emotion, 
and sought to show how each approach can be shown to be part of Hume’s system once 
we grant him the conceptual distinction between passion and emotion that I have argued 
for. I finished this work by applying the distinction to two major topics in Hume studies: 
the workings of his sympathy mechanism, and the relationship of belief to motivation. I 
have argued that interpretive questions in both areas receive new and helpful direction 
from the application of the emotion/passion distinction. The success of this application of 
my thesis I hope to be two-fold. On the one hand, I hope these discussions provide 
additional support for the argument that such a distinction is to be found in Hume, in 
virtue of the sense that can be made of his broader philosophical projects when we 
assume his theory of affective mental states takes the form I argue it does. On the other 
hand, I hope to have successfully suggested new approaches to these topics, new 
directions for interpretive solutions to the puzzles these topics tend to present to 
interpretive projects in Hume studies.  
The last thing I would like to do is suggest some additional directions and topics for study 
of this general topic. There is much that can be explored as pertains to the 
emotion/passion distinction in Hume that I have not been able to fully develop and 
include in this work. A brief overview of some of the directions I see work on this 
interpretive line taking in the future will have to suffice for now. My suggestions will fall 
generally into two camps: (1) Further study to be undertaken in the area of Hume studies 
and the general history of theories of emotion, and  (2) application of this historical and 
interpretive account of Hume to contemporary debate within the philosophy of emotion.      
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There is certainly interesting work to be done in continuing to explore the 
emotion/passion distinction in the context of Hume’s other work. I have suggested how 
the distinction might apply to discussions about the nature of belief in Hume, and the 
implications for his theory of motivation, but my sketch was preliminary, and there 
certainly remains more to be said. I have also touched on what the distinction can do for 
understanding the sympathy mechanism. I have not yet, however, said anything about the 
potential implications of this distinction and the modified understanding of the sympathy 
mechanism for Hume’s moral psychology and moral theory generally. Most of the 
scholarship on Hume’s theory of the passions is written in the context of scholarship on 
his moral theory—my approach is somewhat unusual in that I focus on his theory of 
mind, prior to its moral application, as it is found in Books I and II. One of the reasons 
my study took this form is the simple fact that the vast majority of uses of ‘emotion’ in 
the Treatise are to be found in Books I and II.265 This is not to say that the 
emotion/passion distinction I have outlined would not have implications for Hume’s 
moral theory.266 My suggested interpretation of the working of the sympathy mechanism 
in the context of Hume’s moral psychology needs to be further pursued as it pertains to 
his moral philosophy. It is also worth noting that the sensationalist/cognitivist interpretive 
debate can be extended to readings of Hume’s moral theory, and in particular to questions 
of the nature of moral judgments. My thesis that Hume has both cognitive and non-
cognitive conceptions of passion-like experiences in his account might have interesting 
implications for how we understand his moral judgments.   
There is also the question of how or whether this distinction plays a role in his other 
published works. Hume’s A Dissertation on the Passions is his mature reworking of his 
                                                 
265 In fact, ‘emotion’ only occurs in Book III of the Treatise, “Of Morals,” 5 times, compared to the 100 
appearances in Books I and II combined.  
266 While the discussions in Book III of the Treatise do not often use the term ‘emotion,’ they very 
frequently employ another term common in Hume’s day for our affective mental states: ‘sentiment.’ An 
interesting extension of this project, therefore, might take the form of determining how Hume takes 
‘sentiment’ to fit into his conceptual scheme as it includes ‘emotion’ and ‘passion.’   
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theory of the passions, though it is less of a reworking, and more of an edited version of 
the material in Book II of the Treatise. There is, however, significant reorganization in 
the order of presentation of topics, and omissions of some material, including most of his 
account of the sympathy mechanism. This is of particular interest for our purposes, as I 
have noted that the term ‘emotion’ shows up frequently in Hume’s discussions of 
sympathy in the Treatise. Also omitted is the ‘silly paragraph’, 2.3.3.5, which gives the 
strong reading of Humean passions as nonrepresentational. The term ‘emotion’ is still 
present with some frequency,267 however, with a couple of the passages that my 
interpretation takes to be key fully intact, including the distinction between an 
‘overflowing of emotion’ and a ‘fully established passion’ at 2.2.2.8, and the much of the 
discussion of the maxim that ‘any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted 
into it’. Whether the distinction that I have outlined exists in this work remains to be 
shown, though it seems likely, given the appearance of these key arguments.    
Outside of interpretive issues internal to Hume’s writing, we may also consider how the 
emotion/passion distinction may be found to come out of Hume’s intellectual inheritance. 
Descartes, Hobbes and Hutcheson are three obvious influences on Hume’s account of the 
passions, with Descartes’ émotion in particular apparently being the source for Hume’s 
use of the term ‘emotion.’ I would suggest that there is also significant influence on 
Hume’s theory of the passions from two less acknowledged sources: Cicero (and his 
brand of Stoicism) and Malebranche (and his brand of Cartesianism).  
There is also the question of the reception of Hume’s theory of the passions, both in his 
time and in the work on the passions that came after him. The term ‘emotion’ was 
adopted by many of Hume’s contemporaries, and Dixon argues that the term‘s use over 
the century following Hume’s Treatise culminated in the popular lectures of Thomas 
Brown (1778-1820), who he calls, ‘the inventor of the emotions.’  Brown used ‘emotion’ 
as a sort of umbrella term for what had been multiple, often distinguished, kinds of 
affective mental states- ‘passions’, ‘active powers’, ‘appetites’, ‘desires’, ‘affections’, etc. 
                                                 
267  The term ‘emotion’ is found 20 times in A Dissertation on the Passions.  
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His reinvention of the emotions emphasized their passivity, making them non-intellectual 
feeling states and pushing them farther away from the ‘intellectual judgements’ of reason. 
It would be interesting to investigate how Hume’s famous discourse on reason and the 
passions created a reason/passion dichotomy, in which ‘passion’ was eventually replaced 
with the (less cognitive term) ‘emotion.’ This influence of Hume’s work I would suggest 
was not intentional, but rather is a predictable result of his failure to clarify the 
distinctions that can be made in his work between the concepts of passion and emotion.  
Louis Charland offers a kind of alternative, or at least supplementary, story to Dixon’s, in 
which he finds Alexander Crichton in particular to have embraced a category of emotions 
in conjunction with a category of passions, offering a clearer and more useful distinction 
between these mental contents than Hume did.268 It would be useful to trace this history 
with an idea of the emotion/passion distinction implicit in Hume in mind, and note that 
the emotion/passion distinction, though unclear in Hume, did enjoy some notice as a 
useful distinction to make in understanding the workings of the mind- a distinction that 
(as Charland suggests) may yet be useful in the discourse on affective mental states. 
In general, the question of how the term ‘emotion’ was adopted and developed post-
Hume provides a bridge between Hume’s work on the passions, and the contemporary 
debate surrounding the category term emotion. As was mentioned in the introductory 
section of this dissertation, I believe that my analysis of the emotion/passion distinction 
in Hume is of some significance to this debate, and will spend the remainder of this 
section setting up briefly why I take Hume’s use of ‘emotion’ to be of particular 
importance to this investigation.  
In From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category, 
Thomas Dixon presents a history of psychology that follows in large part the appearance 
and progression of the use of the term ‘emotion’ in English language discussions of mind. 
                                                 
268 Charland, L. (2008). "Alexander Crichton on the psychopathology of the passions." History of 
Psychiatry 19: 275-296. 
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Dixon argues that an examination of the history of Western thought prior to the 
appearance of this category of mental state reveals that discussion of what we would now 
label ‘emotions’ involved several categories and distinctions, such as affections, 
appetites, sentiments and passions. These various categories had strong ties to the 
religious systems being adopted in philosophical and psychological approaches to the 
mind. Dixon argues that there is a correlation between the secularization of studies of 
mind and the dissolution of the diversity of these psychological categories into the 
overarching category of ‘emotion’. Along with this conflation he argues that a certain 
degree of richness may have been lost in discussions of the various affective mental 
states. For instance, discussions that contrast emotion and intellect as a simple dualism 
become a possibility, and indeed this seemed to be a common attitude. Discussions of 
affective mental states prior to the common use of the category ‘emotion’ could involve 
attributing to them various levels of rationality, as well as influence of the individual’s 
will, depending on whether it was sentiments, affections, passions etc that were being 
discussed. On the other hand, inclusion of all such mental states under the umbrella term 
‘emotion’ encourages sweeping generalizations and a lack of subtlety and diversity in the 
claims made about the nature of emotion. This is to be lamented, according to Dixon.269 
And perhaps, this loss of diversity in terminology could in part explain contemporary 
difficulties in agreeing on a characterization of ‘emotion’ at all.     
                                                 
269 There is a further point to be noted here, of particular interest to us in light of the above discussion. That 
these various kinds of mental phenomena were over a relatively short period (Dixon argues over the course 
of the 19th century) all collected under the term ‘emotion’ gives us a good starting place for understanding 
why it may be that contemporary discussion of emotion has such difficulty in determining whether emotion 
can or should be considered a natural kind. Hume was among the first to use the term ‘emotion,’ and it 
could be argued that his use of this term and the conceptual distinction between emotion and passion that I 
have argued accompanied it, created room in his system for both a sensationalist and cognitivist reading of 
the nature of the passions.  It would be interesting to trace if and in what way Hume may have influenced 
the development of schools of thought within philosophy of emotions into the cognitivist and non-
cognitivist camps. 
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The entry on emotion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes the following useful 
insight into one of the problems faced in approaching the topic of emotion in 
contemporary discussions: “…it is not obvious that the states we call emotions have 
anything interesting or important in common that distinguishes them from all other 
mental states.”270 In its everyday use, and even often in its use in various scholarly 
treatments, the term ‘emotion’ is employed with little reflection. It is generally assumed 
to refer to a certain category of mental states, often affective in some way, that can be 
compared and contrasted with other mental states, particularly with those we associate 
with intellect. In its entry on emotion the Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes its earliest 
appearances as having connotations of “agitated motion, or turbulence,”271 and applied in 
a somewhat metaphorical way to certain ‘disruptive’ mental states. Of course the 
extension of the term in contemporary use tends to include mental states once included in 
the older category of the passions. Modern application can range from denoting mere 
physical, affective states to desires and aversions to complex attitudes and dispositions 
towards ideas of particular things. With such diversity and, at times, disagreement about 
the proper use and meaning of the word ‘emotion’, it is becoming increasingly common 
for scholars to question whether there is actually a class, or “natural kind” that properly 
corresponds to the concept of emotion.  
Louis Charland offers an answer to this debate in his article, “The Natural Kind Status of 
Emotion,”272 as well as a helpful summary of the recent contributions scholars have 
made. Charland is careful to distinguish between debates over whether emotions are 
natural kinds and whether emotion itself is a natural kind. In the former debate the 
question is whether mental states such as anger, fear, joy etc, are natural kinds, basic 
emotions that have identifiable manifestations regardless of the individual. The later 
                                                 
270 Charland and Gordon, (2005), 198.  
271 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (2005), 197. 
272 Charland, L. (2002). "The Natural Kind Status of Emotion." British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 53: 511-537. 
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debate, the one of interest both for Charland in his article and our purposes here, is 
whether the category of emotion itself is a natural kind, uniting all mental states we 
would label as individual emotions as distinct from other mental states, for instance 
phenomena like cognition.273 
Charland references Paul Griffiths as offering strong argument for treating emotions as 
natural kinds. He quotes Griffiths in saying that natural kinds are “ways of classifying the 
world that correspond to some structure inherent in the subject matter being classified”, 
and points out that they are useful in referring to “any fundamental theoretical posit in a 
scientific domain”, with a strong need to be categories in at least an epistemological and 
ontological sense.274 It is largely through empirical research that Griffiths supports his 
thesis of the natural kind status of particular basic emotions, and Charland suggests that 
similarly we can find support for the natural kind status of emotion. He also examines the 
arguments for the natural kind status of basic emotions found Jaak Panksepp’s work, 
which is generally neurological in character. He uses aspects of the approaches of both of 
these authors to argue for, at the very least, the plausibility of the natural kind status of 
emotion. He proposes that there is a natural class of organisms, ‘emoters’, that respond to 
the world in ways that reflect particular biological values, which are themselves in turn 
reflected in our emotions. Emotion as a category is then united in “a shared evolutionary 
heritage of a distinct kind of organism that comes to the world designed to appraise it 
according to specific biological values and priorities.”275 It is the category of affective 
                                                 
273 It would be interesting to apply the question of the distinction between the natural kind status of emotion 
and emotions to Hume’s analysis of the passions. It could be that Hume’s discussions of what I have called 
the ‘fully established passions’ is a discussion of particular emotions, while what I have identified in Hume 
as ‘attending emotion’ is his more general analysis of emotion as a natural kind. In the first case the interest 
is in characterizing certain natural types. In the second case, it is in outlining the role and functioning of a 
more general category of impressions of reflection.  
274 Charland (2002), 513. 
275 Charland (2002), 520. 
  
227 
 
response that reflects the development of an organism that places particular value of 
various aspects of its environment. He argues that emotion has both “its own special 
regularities” and “its own special affective representational posits; namely appraisals,” 
and that these are strong premises for the conclusion that emotion is a natural kind.276  
Key to his arguments is a conception of natural kinds that does not look for necessary and 
sufficient conditions and a certain set of shared properties (as a traditional Aristotelian or 
Russellian approach may do), but rather is focused on “homeostatic property clusters”277 
and homology. He quotes Griffiths in saying that a natural kind is a category that “brings 
together a set of objects with correlated properties.”278 The properties are correlated, not 
necessarily by analogy or resemblance with each other, as many categories tend to bring 
together their various objects, but rather by homology, which is focused more on history 
and origin of the objects. Thus, the evolutionary homology of emotions would be 
considered more important than the shared function or resemblance that may provide us 
with common properties or necessary and sufficient conditions. This allows for flexibility 
and diversity in particular properties and functions of various emotions, as certainly is to 
be found, without denying the possibility of a uniting category of emotion that includes 
each of them as examples. Further, in the case of emotion, when we look for a common 
homology and understand it in the context of a particular organism we can understand 
certain values to be reflected in the members of the category, and from there even 
understand a uniting purpose in the various individual emotions. 
At this point the reader may ask why this information about the contemporary debate 
about the natural kind status of emotion is of importance to an application of an 
emotion/passion distinction in Hume to contemporary debate. I would suggest that we 
can ask ourselves whether Hume had developed a concept of emotion as a natural kind. 
                                                 
276 Charland (2002), 521. 
277 Charland (2002), 527. 
278 Charland (2002), 512. 
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When I ask how it is that’ emotion’ in Hume could be considered a distinct concept from 
other mental state concepts (such as ‘passion’), I am asking in part for an account of how 
Hume conceives emotion as a natural kind (and indeed whether such an approach to 
emotion can be attributed to Hume at all). The answer to this could usefully inform 
contemporary debate about conceptions of natural kinds. Meanwhile, the contemporary 
approach could interestingly shape our reading of Hume’s development of the concept of 
emotion. For instance, in characterizing the concept instead of trying to produce a list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions, or a set of properties, we can think of the category of 
emotion as indicating a common history or origin and a particular uniting purpose that 
Hume sees emotion as playing.  
Another interesting direction that further study on this topic could address is whether the 
term ‘passion,’ which fell out of use as ‘emotion’ became more popular, would be a 
useful term to reintroduce into discourse on affective mental states and philosophy of 
emotion generally. Charland in particular argues that ‘passion’ is a useful additional 
category that perhaps needs to be reintroduced to the discourse.279 He argues for the need 
to reintroduce passion to denote affective states of long duration that would be contrasted 
by our more intense and temporary bouts of emotion. This might in turn have interesting 
application to Hume interpretation, where it is assumed that some calm passions are such 
because they are part of the individual’s disposition. These are longer lasting affective 
states, and Hume could have intended to contrast them with the fleeting bouts of 
disruptive emotion that attend our more violent passions.   
Future topics of investigation aside, it is my hope that at this point I have motivated my 
general project, and made it clear why it should be of interest to gain clearer 
understanding of Hume’s use of the term ‘emotion.’ My hope is that accomplishing this 
will not only answer an exegetical question in Hume scholarship, but also offer historical 
perspective to contemporary discussions surrounding the question of what exactly the 
                                                 
279 Charland, L. (forthcoming). Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from History of Psychopathology. The 
Oxford Companion to the Philosophy of Emotion. P. Goldie. 
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term ‘emotion’ should be understood to denote. That this is a live topic of investigation, 
and worthy of the pursuit may be captured in the following: 
It is one thing… to recognize the need for a theory of mind that finds a place for 
the unique role of emotions, and quite another to construct one. Emotions vary so 
much in a number of dimensions—transparency, intensity, behavioral expression, 
object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment—as to cast doubt on 
the assumption that they have anything in common. However, while this variation 
may have led philosophers to steer clear of emotions in the past, many 
philosophers are now rising to the challenge. The explanatory inadequacy of 
theories that shortchange emotion is becoming increasingly apparent, and… it is 
no longer the case that emotion is treated as a poor relation in the philosophy of 
mind.280 
Perhaps the greatest significance of the work I have sought to achieve here is that, if 
successful, I have shown Hume to have developed a theory of passion/emotion that offers 
a rich conceptualization and organization of these feeling states, and ultimately offers a 
much richer (and much more contemporarily relevant) theory than he is generally 
credited with.   
 
 
                                                 
280 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion. Retrieved March 18, 2010. 
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